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Abstract 
The dissertation, Shareholder protection and stock market development, contains five 
parts: An introduction, three major chapters, and a short conclusion. The First Chapter, 
Law matters?: A Bayesian analysis of the empirical law and finance studies, starts 
from a survey and discussion of the studies on corporate law and financial 
development literature. For over a decade’s study, the literature identifies legal 
institutions including legal origins, law on the book, legal enforcement strategies, 
property rights protection, in addition to extra-legal determinants, including 
colonization strategies, political factors, and culture, to be correlated with the stock 
market development.   
 
Though the field is proliferative, the commonly used methods in these cross-sectional 
analyses are biased as legal origins are no longer valid instruments (La Porta et al, 
2008), which makes the model uncertainty problem, i.e. which controls should be 
included in the empirical model specification, a salient problem. As a result, the First 
Chapter tries to answer the research question whether legal institutions are robust 
predictors of the financial development. If they are not, which of the variables that 
theoretically matter are empirically robust determinants? The Bayesian Model 
Averaging algorithm is applied to test the robustness of empirical results in Djankov 
et al. (2008). The analysis finds that their constructed legal index is not robustly 
correlated with most of the various stock market outcome variables. In addition, the 
variable selection algorithm, stepwise backward elimination, is applied to check the 
robustness of the Bayesian analysis, which confirms its results. 
 
The second Chapter, Minority shareholder protection, underpricing, and the decision 
to issue external equity, assumes that stock market outcomes are heterogeneous, and 
focuses on the effects of minority shareholders protection in corporate governance 
regime on entrepreneurs’ ex ante incentives to undertake IPO. Most of the current 
Abstract 
4 
literature emphasizes the beneficial part of minority shareholder protection on 
valuation, while overlooks its private costs on entrepreneur’s control. The private 
costs of maintaining control are modeled by the magnitude of underprcing of asset in 
place, which attracts oversubscription of shares to form dispersed ownership structure 
(Brennan and Franks, 1997). As a result, the entrepreneur tradeoffs the costs of 
monitoring with the benefits of cheap sources of finance when minority shareholder 
protection improves. The net effects of minority shareholder protection on IPO 
incentives shall depend on which effects dominate. 
 
To test the predictions of the model, this Chapter employs the panel data sets of 
shareholder protection developed by the Center for Business Research at the 
Cambridge University and the Law School at the University of Oxford. Furthermore, 
the GMM-sys estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Roodman, 2009) is employed to 
control for the country-specific fixed effects and the endogeneity of the shareholder 
protection index, with the lagged observations of interested variables as the 
instruments. The empirical part finds that the number of listed firms is negatively 
correlated with the shareholder protection level, indicating that the burden of 
additional monitoring may discourage the entrepreneur from taking the firm public.  
 
The third Chapter, The over-empowered controlling shareholder and the stagnant 
Chinese stock market: The mismatched means and ends of corporate governance, is 
legal-oriented and applies the law and finance theories to the current corporate law 
and corporate governance reform in China. The Chinese stock market is dominated by 
listed firms with controlling shareholders, which is due to the transformation from a 
planned economy to socialist market economy. The large state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) are partially privatized through share issuing privatization (Dewenter and 
Malatesta, 1997). As a result, around 22% (254/1170) of the listed firms are ultimately 
owned by the State, 65% (758/1170) by marketized institutions controlled by the State, 
and 14% (158/1170) by private parties in the year 2002 (Delios et al., 2006). In 
addition, the corporate law in China regards shareholder control as the means to the 
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ends of pursuing the interests of stockholders. The current reform follows those 
carried out in both United States (U.S.) and United Kingdom (U.K.), which takes the 
perspective of principal-agent theory and argues to increase the power of minority 
shareholders, which overlooks the hazards to entrench controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholder control.  
 
The Chapter combines two theories of the firm, i.e., the team production theory 
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Blair and Stout, 1999) and the property rights theory 
(Hart and Moore, 1990), to solve the problems of corporate governance in China. The 
Chinese corporate law and governance system features with ends of shareholder 
wealth maximization and means of shareholder control. Though shareholder wealth 
maximization is still an influential criteria, it imposes great costs on listed firms. A 
new concept, enlightened shareholder value, which has already been written into the 
Company Act in U.K., should be considered as the alternative objectives for Chinese 
listed firms. It regards the long term valuation of the firm as its objectives and argues 
that to achieve such ends, the interests of corporate constituencies should be taken 
into consideration.  
 
Given the ownership structure of the Chinese listed firms, the shareholder control as 
mandated by corporate law proves to be an inefficient arrangement, which entrenches 
the controlling shareholders and makes it easy for them to exploit the interests of 
minority shareholders and other constituencies. Though the legislature and regulators 
in China tries to increase the independence of listed firms through establishing the 
modern independent director system, it proves to be futile as the independent directors 
are dependent on controlling shareholders for reelection and lack appropriate 
incentives to guard interests of minority shareholders. The problem lies in overweight 
of accountability of agent director to shareholder principle, which overlooks the 
feature of team production arguing for director authority. To fix such problem, a move 
from the mandatory division of power between shareholder meeting and board 
meeting to the default regime, is proposed. Market competition will drive listed firms 
Abstract 
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to opt-out inefficient requirements and opt-into more efficient internal governance 
system.
1 Introduction 
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1 Introduction 
The last decade sees the rise of law and finance scholarship, with both theoretical 
and empirical studies on the effects of corporate law and governance (CLG) on 
financial market development and firm-level attributes of public corporations, 
which is defined by Denis and McConnell (2003) as the second generation of 
researches on corporate governance.1 Such enthusiasm for CLG is enhanced after 
the breakout of a series corporate scandals during the earlier 20th century, when 
companies with high reputation, such as Enron and WorldCom in U.S., falls.2  
 
The earlier researches focus on the difference between the Anglo-Saxons CLG 
model with that of Continental-Europe, while recent ones recognize the diversity 
of CLG model. For example, even within the Anglo-Saxions governance model, 
the American rule-based model is in sharp contrast with the British 
principles-based one. Most of the research on corporate governance uses the 
agency theory, first applied to the modern corporations by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), to investigate the separation of ownership and control due to dispersed 
ownership structure that documented by Berle and Means (1932). As management 
                                                             
1 In an influential survey, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) define the corporate governance as “the 
ways in which the suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return 
on their investment.” A relevant and broader concept is “governance”, the analysis of which 
earns Oliver Williamson the Noble Price for economics. Williamson (2005: 1) gives a 
definition of the economics of governance, which is “an effort to implement the ‘study of 
good order and workable arrangements,’ where good order includes both spontaneous order in 
the market, which is a venerated tradition in economics … and intentional order, of a 
‘conscious, deliberate, purposeful’ kind.” The workable arrangements means “feasible modes 
of organization, all of which are flawed in comparison with a hypothetical ideal … The object 
is to work out the efficiency logic for managing transactions by alternative modes of 
governance-principally spot markets, various long-term contracts (hybrids), and hierarchies.” 
Similarly, Dixit (2009: 5) define the economic governance as “the structure and functioning of 
the legal and social institutions that support economic activity and economic transactions by 
protecting property rights, enforcing contracts, and taking collective action to provide 
physical and organizational infrastructure.” 
2 The discussion of corporate governance is usually entangled with that of corporate law, as 
Hopt (2011: 10) names it as “Corporate Governance in the Shadow of the Law”.  
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has information advantage about public corporations and contracts are 
incomplete3, there are huge agency costs between investors and management. 
Self-interested management tends to maximize their own wealth in the detriment 
of shareholders’ interests. 
 
Kraakman et al. (2011) summarize three types of agency problem within public 
corporations: The agency problems between management and shareholders in 
those firms with dispersed ownership structure, between controlling shareholders 
and minority shareholders in those firms with dominant shareholders, and 
between shareholders and other corporate constituencies, such as creditors in the 
vicinity of insolvency. This dissertation focuses on the first two types of agency 
problem. Governance strategies come up aiming to properly constrain the agency 
costs within the public corporation. For example, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
propose that in countries with poor investor protection, shareholders accumulate 
concentrated ownership as a complementary governance mechanism to protect 
their own interests.  
 
To test the hypothesis that institutions shape the economic outcomes, several 
indices are invented as the proxy for cross-country CLG quality. The 
“Anti-director rights index”4 (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 
1998, henceforth LLSV) measuring the protection of shareholder against 
                                                             
3 According to Tirole (1999), the incomplete contracts are due to transactional costs, which 
comprise three ingredients: Unforeseen contingencies, parties cannot define ex ante the 
contingencies that may occur or actions that may be feasible later on; cost of writing contracts, 
costs relating to describe all contingencies in a contract; cost of enforcing contracts, costs of 
courts to understand the terms of the contract and verify the contingencies and actions in 
order to enforce the contract. 
4 The index is an average of six sub-indices: “Proxy by mail allowed”, “Shares not blocked 
before the meeting”, “Cumulative voting or proportional representation”, “Oppressed 
minorities mechanism”, and “preemptive rights”, and “Percentage of share capital to call an 
extraordinary shareholders’ meeting”. Spamann (2010) argues that the empirical correlation 
identified by LLSV (1998) is not trustworthy. After the coding errors are corrected, there is no 
correlation between corrected “Anti-director rights index” and ownership concentration.  
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exploitation of management and “Anti-self-dealing index”5 (Djankov, La Porta, 
Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2008, henceforth DLLS) measuring the 
protection of minority shareholder against exploitation of controlling shareholder6, 
are the two most popular ones. A series of studies follow the law and finance spirit 
and employ these indices and its variants to test the relationship between legal 
institutions and financial outcomes. The documented cross-country evidence 
shows that better shareholder protection is associated with higher percentage of 
long-term finance (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998), higher proportion of 
external finance and more dispersed ownership structure (LLSV, 1997, 1998), 
higher valuation of firm (LLSV, 2002), larger market capitalization and number of 
listed firms (Pagano and Volpin, 2006; DLLS, 2008), and greater market liquidity 
(Cumming et al., 2011), and more efficient resource allocation (Mclean et al. 
2012).   
 
However, the empirical strategies employed to test these “macro” relationship are 
criticized severely by some commentators. First, the workhorse of these empirical 
researches, cross sectional regressions with legal origins as instrumental variables, 
is rejected since it fails to satisfy the exclusion restrictions (La Port et al., 2008; 
Bazzi and Clemens, 2009). Without valid instruments, the cross sectional analysis 
could suffer from severe endogenous biases.7 As in a recent book review, Klick 
(2013) uses the title “Shleifer’s Failure” to express his dissatisfaction with 
Professor Shleifer’s negligence on recent development in empirical economics. 
 
                                                             
5 The index is constructed basing on a multinational survey on the regulation of stylized 
self-dealing transaction, which measures the protection of minority shareholders against 
controlling shareholders. 
6 A controlling shareholder is usually identified with the criteria that it owns more than 20 
percent of a company’s voting rights (Enriques and Volpin, 2007). 
7 A recent attempt to correct this failure is the panel analysis by Armour et al. (2009), who 
fail to find any significant positive correlation between shareholder protection and stock 
market outcomes. 
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Furthermore, the proxy of shareholder protection, “Anti-director rights index” is 
biased and constructed with errors (Spamann, 2010). It exhibits home-country 
bias towards the agency problem that is common in Anglo-Saxons countries, i.e. 
the one between shareholders and management, as the name “Anti-director rights 
index” suggests (Braendle, 2006). Martynova and Renneboog (2011) try to correct 
such bias and recognize that potential agency problems in different countries 
could be heterogeneous. They investigate the legal strategies to deal with different 
agency problems separately in 30 European countries, and find that the rules are 
converging. 
 
The home country-bias is lethal in carrying out cross-country empirical analysis. 
Bebchuk and Hamdani (2009) argue that agency problem between the minority 
shareholders and management is the major concern for firms with dispersed 
ownership structure, which is prevalent in both American and British listed firms. 
Yet it is well documented that in continental Europe, such as Italy and Germany, 
listed firms often have controlling shareholders. Hence, the major agency problem 
is between minority shareholders and majority shareholders, and the governance 
institutions suitable to the Anglo-Saxons listed firms could bring harm to firms 
with dominant shareholders. They propose to include separated proxies as 
measures of the institutional arrangements against agency problem between 
minority and majority shareholders, and minority shareholders and management 
in the specification of empirical model.  
 
Against the background of law and finance movement, this dissertation tries to 
evaluate the empirical supports for and criticisms on the theories, and applies 
them to corporate law and governance reform in China. The First Chapter intends 
to test the robustness of the empirical proposition that law matters for financial 
development from a Bayesian perspective. The study replicates and examines the 
1 Introduction 
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analysis carried out by DLLS (2008) (The law and economics of self-dealing, 
Journal of Financial Economics 88 (3): 430-465), which proposes a proxy, 
“Anti-self-dealing index” for legal protection of minority shareholder against the 
exploitation of controlling shareholders, and updates the corrected “Anti-director 
rights index”.8 The authors employ legal origins as the instrumental variables, 
which fails the exclusion restriction assumption and is invalid (La Porta et al., 
2008).   
 
Hence, the problem of model uncertainty, i.e. which controlling variables should 
be included in the model specification becomes prominent. To deal with such 
problem, the Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) is applied, which regards that the 
“true” model or data generating process is unknown and attaches probability to 
each possible model, and then averages the model-specific estimates of parameter 
according to Bayesian weights. The analysis finds that the empirical results of 
DLLS (2008) are not robust and that the “Anti-director rights index” is not 
significantly correlated with the various stock market outcomes. To test the 
robustness of the BMA analysis, the Chapter employs the variable selection 
algorithm stepwise backward elimination. With the both three information criteria, 
Adjusted R-squared, Bayesian information criterion (BIC) and Akaike 
information criterion (AIC), the variable “Anti-self-dealing index” is not included 
as a robust predictor for the various outcomes of stock markets. 
 
As illustrated in the First Chapter, different features of stock market follow 
different data generating process and theoretical models. The relationship between 
Initial Public Offering (IPO) market and investor protection is hence 
                                                             
8 Self-dealing, or tunneling, is defined by Johnson et al. (2000) as transferring value from 
firms that controlling shareholders hold a smaller proportion of the cash flow rights to firms 
that controlling shareholders owns a larger proportion of cash flow rights. Controlling 
shareholders could transfer value in various ways, for example, related party transactions; 
biased allocation of liabilities; excessive compensation; and others. 
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undetermined. The rules on shareholder protection impose both benefits and costs 
on corporate insiders, with the benefits of cheaper external finance and costs of 
stronger monitoring. The Second Chapter concentrates on the effects of the 
minority shareholders protection on entrepreneurs’ ex ante incentives to undertake 
IPO. Current literature only focuses on the beneficial part of minority shareholder 
protection on valuation, while overlooks its private costs on entrepreneur’s control. 
The private costs of maintaining control over the firm are modeled by the 
underprcing of asset in place, which attracts oversubscription of shares to form 
dispersed ownership structure (Brennan and Franks, 1997). As a result, the 
entrepreneur is modeled to tradeoff the costs of enhanced monitoring with the 
benefits of cheap sources of finance when minority shareholder protection 
improves. The net effects of minority shareholder protection on IPO incentives 
shall depend on which effects dominate. 
 
To test the predictions of the model, the Second Chapter employs the panel 
datasets of shareholder protection developed by the Center for Business Research 
at the Cambridge University and the Law School at the University of Oxford. 
Furthermore, the GMM-sys estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Roodman, 2009) 
is employed to control for the country-specific fixed effects and the endogeneity 
of the shareholder protection index, with the lagged observations of interested 
variables as the instruments. The empirical part finds that the number of listed 
firms is negatively correlated with the shareholder protection level, indicating that 
the additional monitoring burden may discourage the entrepreneur from taking the 
firm public.  
 
The Third Chapter probes into the corporate governance reform in China against 
the background of law and finance movement. The recent debates on the subject 
“law matters” cast doubts on the policy recommendations derived from the law 
1 Introduction 
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and finance movement that countries with poor investor protection shall adopt the 
common-law best practice of shareholder protection during their corporate 
governance reform. A potential weakness is emphasized by Martynova and 
Renneboog (2011) that indices following the fashion of “Anti-director rights 
index” have severe home-country bias. China just fits into their framework, which 
has actively transplanted the American and British corporate law aiming at 
solving the agency problem between shareholder group and senior managers.  
 
In contrast, the ownership structure of the listed firms in China is much more 
complex than that in U.S. and U.K.. On one hand, the government is still the 
largest shareholder, which holds approximately 83.1% of market capitalization in 
2007 (OECD, 2013). Around 22% (254/1170) of the listed firms are ultimately 
owned by the State, 65% (758/1170) by marketized institutions controlled by the 
State, and 14% (158/1170) by private parties in the year 2002 (Delios et al., 2006). 
The directors and senior management are selected and monitored by the same 
public agency, which lacks the incentives and resources to discipline all these 
officials. Consequently, the listed state-owned enterprises suffer from “tragedy of 
commons” and the insiders extract large private benefits. On the other, the rest 
firms without state shareholding are run by controllers tunneling the firm’s asset. 
Pyramidal arrangements are common in private listed firms, which separate the 
cash flow rights from control rights.9 Consequently, the rules aiming to constrain 
the agency problems between shareholder and management does not suit the 
Chinese problem.  
 
To exacerbate the problem, Chinese corporate law mandates the governance 
model that shareholder control as the means to the ends of pursuing the 
                                                             
9 In contrast, pyramidal control structures are not common in American listed firms, which, 
according to Morck and Yeung (2005), is due to the taxation of intercompany dividends 
introduced in 1935 in the United States. 
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stakeholder interests. As the ownership structure of Chinese listed firms is 
concentrated, the shareholder meeting is dominated by the controlling 
shareholders. Given the shareholder passivity argument, minority shareholders are 
rationally apathetic about the decision rights. Being rational investors, controlling 
shareholders will use their rights to maximize their own benefits, which include 
exploiting the interests of minority shareholders. This is especially the case in the 
situation of state-owned enterprises, where the controllers, the civil servants and 
management, hold trivial cash flow rights in the listed companies. 
  
To shed light on the corporate governance reform in China, the Chapter combines 
two recent theoretical developments, i.e., the team production (Blair and Stout, 
1999) and the property rights theory of the firm (Hart and Moore, 1990), which 
argues that considering the feature of team production, the board of directors 
should be independent from all of the corporate constituencies, rather than either 
controlled by majority shareholder or influential minority shareholder. In addition, 
to maximize the value of corporate entity, the enlightened shareholder value (ESV) 
should be adopted as the ends of the corporate governance.
2 Law Matters?: A Bayesian Analysis of the Empirical Law and Finance Literature 
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2 Law Matters?: A Bayesian Analysis of the Empirical 
Law and Finance Literature 
2.1 Introduction 
The contemporary financial scholarship has identified polarization of models of 
capitalism10 between two rival groups, on one hand U.K. and U.S. (Anglo-Saxons 
countries) relying on external equity finance and arms-length transaction, with 
dispersed ownership structure and high level protection to investors 
(shareholder-centric objectives of corporation). And on the other German and 
Japan (Continental Europe), which have concentrated ownership structure, rely on 
relationship transaction and bank loans, 11  and provide high protection to 
employees (life-time employment).12 
 
One of the most significant divergences between different models of capitalism, 
the stock market development, attract great attention from the law and finance 
scholarship. The last decade witnesses the prosperity of law and finance literature, 
both empirical and theoretical, which discusses the determinants of the 
                                                             
10 See Dore (2000) for general discussions on models of capitalisms. Amable (2005: 14) has 
adopted a much more detailed classification based on five fundamental institutional areas: 
product-market competition; the wage-labor nexus and labor-market institutions; the financial 
intermediation sector and corporate governance; social protection and the Welfare State; and 
the education sector, and proposes five types of capitalism: the market-based model; the 
social-democratic model; the Continental European model; the Mediterranean model; and the 
Asian model.  
11 Bank loans, together with the cross-shareholdings among industrial corporations, play 
important role in corporate finance structures in both countries. Yet there are still some 
differences within the model of capitalism, as reflected in the statistics of 1995, German firms 
have more fixed-interest bond market financing, which takes 88% of GDP, while Japanese 
firms have more stock market financing, which takes 78% of GDP, see Dore (2000: 173). 
12 Dore (2000: 76) gives a description about how the gross value-added is divided among 
different constituencies during the 1990s. The total surplus is defined as the gross value-added 
amount minus the tax taken out by the state. In 1995, the employment takes 70%, the capital 
13%, and the firm itself, in the form of depreciation and retained earnings 17%. 
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cross-country capital market diversities, and prescribes policy recommendations 
that legal reforms should follow the best practice of common law countries, to 
those developing countries aiming to facilitate the development of their internal 
markets.  
 
This strand of literature proliferates since the 1990s, and starts from the role of 
financial markets and intermediaries on the economic growth. Before 1990s, the 
academic studies view financial development trivial for the economic growth, 
though Schumpeter (1911) has already argued that banks facilitate the “creative 
destruction”. Robinson (1952: 86) proposes that “where enterprise leads finance 
follows”, and the financial development is seen as a byproduct of the economic 
growth. In addition, the dominant “financial repression” ideology of Keynesian 
School, including control of interest rate, requiring high reserve and directing 
credit programs, were popular among policy maker as ways to finance fiscal 
deficits without increasing tax or inflation (Ang, 2008). 
 
One influential review by Levine (1997) ascribes the rise of the financial 
instruments, markets, and institutions to overcoming the asymmetry information 
and transaction costs, and identifies their five major functions: facilitating trading, 
hedging, diversifying, and pooling of risk; allocating resources; monitoring 
managers and exerting corporate control; mobilizing savings; and facilitating the 
exchange of goods and services. In contrast, banking system may be good at 
acquiring information at lower costs and establishing long-term relationship with 
firms and enhancing corporate governance, which is one of the theoretical 
arguments supporting the efficiency of Continental Europe model of capitalism. 
 
Earlier cross-country empirical studies using the country level data seem to 
support Schumpeterian ideology, as financial development is proven to be a good 
2 Law Matters?: A Bayesian Analysis of the Empirical Law and Finance Literature 
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predictor for the economic growth. King and Levine (1993) conduct a pooled 
cross sectional analysis with data from 80 countries and find the financial 
development in 1969 is a good predictor of long-run growth over the next 10 to 30 
years controlling for the initial capital market development level. In addition, 
Levine and Zervos (1998) empirically confirms the theories that high liquid stock 
market will lower the costs of trading equity and hence encourage investors to 
participate in long duration, high return projects, which stimulate productivity 
growth.  
 
Firm-level empirical researches provide some evidence for capital market’s role in 
allocating resources to those firms in need. Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(1996) find out that the level of activity of the market (turnover ratio) is positively 
correlated with the percentage of firms growing at a rate faster than the maximum 
growth rate (calculated using financial planning model) that can be financed 
internally or with limited access to the market for long-term capital. Rajan and 
Zingales (1998a) employ the assumption that industries differ in their reliance on 
external finance due to technological reasons, and rank them according to their 
need. The within-country, between industries analysis finds that those industries 
more reliant on external financing grow faster in the countries with more 
developed financial market. Furthermore, they ascribe these fast-growing effects 
to disproportionally high percentage of new establishment of firms, which may 
confirm the role of financial development in “creative destruction”. 
  
In addition, the distributional effects of financial development seem to be very 
intriguing. Beck et al. (2007) establish that the credit by financial intermediaries 
to the private sector both reduces the income inequality, and increases the 
aggregate economic growth. Claessens and Perotti (2007) review the potential 
explanations for such effects, and argue that in countries with less developed 
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financial markets, the poor are biased away from the assess to external finance. 
The inequality, especially in countries with weak institution, where de facto 
political influence dominates de jure political representation, is more severe, since 
the incumbents will protect their rents and power. Another group benefits from 
financial development is the small firms. In theory, small firms, which are lack of 
economy of scale, are in greater difficulty to access to external finance due to 
informational and transactional costs. Beck et al. (2008) argue that financial 
development has a comparative advantage in reducing the barrier of fixed costs 
than direct subsidy, and exerts a disproportionately positive effect on small firms.  
 
However, financial development does not bring pure benefits, one backfiring 
comes from the recent financial crisis, originating from the 2008 Subprime Crisis 
in the USA, then spreading to the world and resulting in a drastic drop of the 
world GDP growth rate and soaring unemployment rate. The liquidity provision 
and risk sharing function of the financial markets generate the “systemic risk”, 
which gains attention from both the academics and practitioners. Under traditional 
financial thinking, the investors and market participants could protect themselves 
from the idiosyncratic risk through holding a diversified portfolio, but still they 
will suffer from the systematic risks. Hellwig (1994) has repeatedly argued that 
attempts to shift risks can lead to a situation where these risks come back in the 
form of counterparty credit risks.  
 
Kaufman (1996) points out that within the banking system, this 
interconnectedness among institutions and individuals derives from the balance 
sheet of the banks, because the assets and liabilities of these institutions tangled 
with each other. However, as the disintermediation level is much higher now, the 
financial innovative instruments shift the risk among a broader participants base 
with different risk preference. As a result, the interconnectedness is among all the 
2 Law Matters?: A Bayesian Analysis of the Empirical Law and Finance Literature 
19 
market participants. Kaufman (1996) defines systemic risks as “the probability 
that cumulative losses will occur from an event that ignites a series of successive 
losses along a chain of institutions or markets comprising a system”. From the 
definition we can see that the interconnectedness is the primary feature of the 
systemic risk. That is to say if one financial institution is subject to a significant 
loss and goes bankrupt, but its failure has no lethal effects on other institutions, 
the risk would not be classified as the systemic risk. Only those that would result 
in a series of institutions experiencing significant losses, may be treated as 
systemic risk.  
 
Schwarcz (2008) synthesizes the former researches and puts forward that the 
systemic risk is “the risk that (i) an economic shock such as market or institutional 
failure triggers (through a panic or otherwise) either (X) the failure of a chain of 
markets or institutions or (Y) a chain of significant losses to financial institutions, 
(ii) resulting in increases in the cost of capital or decreases in its availability, often 
evidenced by substantial financial-market price volatility”. Compared with the 
former one, this definition considers the cause of systemic risk as the economic 
shock, instead of other events. Furthermore, not only the significant loss, but also 
the failure of institutions could be regarded as the phenomena of the systemic risk. 
Finally, the result of the systemic risk is the contraction of liquidity. Both the 
definitions highlight the chain-reaction as the key characteristic of the systemic 
risk.  
 
The risk is due to market failure 13  that self-interested market participants 
optimize risk exposure to the extent that their marginal costs equal marginal 
benefits. They do not take into account the negative externalities that its failure 
                                                             
13 Schwarcz (2012) identifies four reasons causing the market failure, they are information 
failure due to complexity, bounded rationality, principal-agent failure, and incentive failure. 
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imposes on other firms.14 Bertezzolo (2009) points out that the global financial 
regulatory system is still a segmented one and lacks a consolidated regulatory 
authority, which fails to accommodate the globalization trend in economic 
development. If the world is segmented, when one country is trapped into 
financial difficulties, other countries would not be affected, because there are no 
counter-party risks and the well-functioned countries have no risks of exposure. 
But when the world is integrated, even one company goes bankruptcy, the world 
economy will be in trouble, the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers Holdings 
stands as an example.  
 
Though the Subprime Crisis sounds the alarm for the regulatory failure of the 
financial markets, a lot of developing countries still need to develop their own 
financial markets to provide external finance to their firms’ growth. Law and 
finance theories predict that legal institutions are determinants of financial market 
development, and prescribe that developing countries shall follow the 
common-law style regulatory framework. Their policy recommendations strongly 
rely on the cross-country regressions, which overlook the model uncertainty 
problem. To shed light on the discussion about the relationship between stock 
market outcomes and legal institutions, this Chapter takes a Bayesian approach to 
evaluate the current empirical literature. Section 2.2 reviews the major law and 
finance studies on the legal institutions that is important to stock market 
development. Section 2.3 surveys the competing theories and empirical evidence. 
And Section 2.4 introduces the Bayesian algorithm. Section 2.5 introduces the 
data set. Section 2.6 presents the empirical outputs, and Section 2.7 presents the 
robustness check analysis with variable selection algorithm stepwise backward 
elimination. And Section 2.8 concludes. 
                                                             
14 Report of the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, Hedge Funds, Leverage, 
and the Lessons of Long Term Capital Management at pp. 31 (April 1999). 
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2.2 Theory of law and financial market development 
If the stock market is an important source of economic growth, one question 
naturally following the above statement is which factor determines its 
development. Over the last decade of studies, the academic seems to locate a 
variety of factors which are associated with the development of stock market. 
Though several reviews have already been done in the literature (La Porta et al., 
2008; Xu, 2011), this section focuses primarily on the empirical evidence, which 
paves the way for the Bayesian analysis. Generally speaking, these factors could 
be disentangled into two categories: One includes time-invariant/predetermined 
factors, which are usually claimed to be exogenous to the financial development, 
while the other includes the time-variant and endogenous ones.  
2.2.1 Legal origins 
The most influential, well-examined and debated exogenous factor identified in 
the literature influencing both the economic growth and financial development 
shall be the legal origins, which some countries receive exogenously and 
involuntarily due to the history of being conquered and colonized. Legal origins 
defined by La Porta et al. (2008) stand for “a style of social control of economic 
life (and maybe of other aspects of life as well)”, and first serve as the 
instrumental variables for the endogenous institutional variables. Mahoney (2001) 
argues that the common law countries have fewer governmental restrictions on 
economic and other liberties, while the civil law countries try to build institutions 
to further the power of the state, the distinction of which is first demonstrated by 
Hayek (1973).  
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The two origin countries, U.K. and France, form their particular style of social 
control of economic life, according to Glaeser and Shleifer (2002), during the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, when they develop their first national court 
systems. They argue that in U.K., the decentralized juries are closely involved, 
while in contrast, the French professional judge dominates the court. However, a 
further investigation by Klerman and Mahoney (2007) trace the divergence to a 
much later date, to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and argue that the 
parties that judges allied with during the revolution determines their power later 
on. In U.K., judges had sided with the victorious Parliament, while their French 
peers lose their power in the wake of the revolution, as they stand against the 
Napoleon’s legal reforms. Their power to make law is eliminated and they could 
only apply the codified rules made by the legislature.  
 
The pervasive explanatory power of legal origins is documented by a series of 
studies conducted by LLSV and their coauthors, who find that legal origins are 
correlated with a wide variety of institutions, such as the shareholder power 
(LLSV, 1998), Anti-self-dealing rules (DLLS, 2008), property rights protection 
(Claessens and Laeven, 2003), and judiciary efficiency (La Porta et al., 2004). La 
Porta et al. (2008) survey such institutions and classify them into procedural 
formalism, judicial independence, regulation of entry, government ownership of 
the media, labor laws, conscription, company and securities law, bankruptcy law, 
and government ownership of banks, which further influence the financial market 
development.  
 
Beck et al. (2003) first empirically test the two competing theories explaining 
why the legal origins influence the financial market development, i.e. the political 
channel that common law countries protect the individual property rights from 
exploitation of states (pro individual), while civil law countries protection 
2 Law Matters?: A Bayesian Analysis of the Empirical Law and Finance Literature 
23 
property rights conditioned on state welfare (pro state), and adaptability channel 
that common law adjust to changes of the market more quickly as it recognizes 
the judge-made law, whereas the legislative-made statute in civil law countries is 
more rigid. They find that the adaptability of the legal system in a given country is 
more important than its political attitude towards property rights in facilitating 
financial market development.  
 
However, the pervasiveness is also regarded as the major caveat that invalidates 
legal origins as the instrumental variables. The exclusion restriction requires that 
the instruments could only influence the outcome variable through the 
instrumented variables, otherwise the estimated coefficient is biased (Bazzi and 
Clemens, 2009). 15  Though legal origins are still exogenous to economic 
outcomes, it is difficult to control for all potential relevant factors. This caveat for 
empirical law and finance studies is the major impetus for this paper, aiming to 
test the validity of the argument that legal institutions matter. 
2.2.2 Law on the book  
Ever since the seminal work “Law and Finance” (LLSV, 1998), the law and 
finance literature tries to establish the notion that legal rules shapes the stock 
market development. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) first argue that the competing 
corporate governance systems “outsider/arm’s-length” v.s. 
“insider/control-oriented” are an efficient response to the legal protection of the 
shareholders. Where shareholders are ill-protected, such as in civil law countries 
France and Italy, they protect themselves through becoming the controlling 
                                                             
15 Without valid instruments, the causal inference based on cross sectional analysis is 
vulnerable, and recent studies start to exploit other identification assumptions, such as 
“quasi-natural experiment”. Haselmann et al. (2009) employ the exogenous shocks imposed 
by European Union to 12 transitional countries in Eastern Europe, which force them to adopt 
the transplanted model law. They show that improvement in collateral regime is of greater 
importance for lenders than in bankruptcy regime. 
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shareholders of the firm. In contrast, where shareholders are well protected, they 
enjoy the status of minority shareholders and the benefits of diversification. This 
theoretical explanation is empirically supported by LLSV (1998), who find the 
negative relationship between ownership structure and the “Anti-director rights 
index”.  
 
The scholarship continues to provide with both theoretical and empirical evidence 
between the “law on the book” and stock market development for nearly one 
decade. Pagano and Volpin (2005, 2006) construct a panel data set of 
“Anti-director rights index” based on the methodology of LLSV (1998), and 
confirm their conclusion that minority shareholder protection facilitates the stock 
market development, though the effect is much smaller. In addition, DLLS (2008) 
argue that the “Anti-self-dealing” rules, which prevent the majority shareholders 
from exploiting the minority shareholders, facilitate the stock market development. 
And Cumming et al. (2011) investigate the trading rules in the major 42 stock 
markets, and find that the stock market activity proxies are strongly correlated 
with the rules for insider trading and market manipulation.  
 
However, country-specific case studies seem to provide challenge evidence. 
Cheffins (2001) looks into the business history of U.K., and suggests that the 
ownership structures of listed firms had already become dispersed long before the 
concept of corporate governance was established. Coffee (2001) further argues 
that the causality is reversed in U.S. that the legal developments came after the 
dispersed ownership arose.  
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2.2.3 Enforcement strategies 
The enforcement strategy is another dimension of the legal system, which 
transforms the threat of the formal rules into punishment, and imposes costs to 
infringers. According to Becker (1968), individuals committing crimes will weigh 
the expected costs and benefits of the behavior. The expected costs of crime equal 
the punishment demand by the “rule on the book” multiplied by the probability of 
getting caught determined by the enforcement strategies.  
 
By enforcement strategies, the author means two distinctive but related issues, the 
enforcement of the contracts and the enforcement of “rule on the book”. Contract 
enforcement is important when some transactions must be arranged 
non-simultaneously, in which the quid is needed at one time or place and the quo 
at another. One influential indicator for the enforcement of contract is the contract 
intensive money (CIM), which is defined as the “ratio of noncurrency money to 
the total money supply, or (M2-C)/M2, where M2 is a broad definition of the 
money supply and C is currency held outside banks” (Clague et al., 1999). Their 
assumption is that where contract is unreliable, the market participants are willing 
to arrange transactions through currencies as they are with discretion, then CIM 
will decrease. In contrast, where contract is well-enforced, the convenience and 
safety of the transactions through banks will make the CIM increase. The 
empirical evidence shows that CIM is positively correlated with the development 
of the industries inherently dependent on contract enforcement, such as the 
insurance and finance sector, which further facilitate investment and growth. 
 
Djankov et al. (2003) survey the 109 countries using the representative case 
studies, and find that the time to collect a bounced check or evict a tenant varies 
significantly across countries. In addition, the Lerner and Schoar (2005) study a 
2 Law Matters?: A Bayesian Analysis of the Empirical Law and Finance Literature 
26 
specific channel, that is “the ability of investors to enter into complex, 
state-dependent contracts”, through which the quality of enforcing contracts shall 
matter for the financial development. The patterns of private equity investment is 
found correlated with the quality of contract enforcement. The funds tend to use 
convertible preferred stock in countries with high quality of contract enforcement, 
while in countries with poor enforcement they tend to use common stocks and 
debts, which result in less efficient results with lower valuation.  
 
On the other hand, the enforcement of legal rules can be divided into two channels: 
one is public enforcement, and the other is private enforcement. For public 
enforcement, studies show that both input and output are important. Bhattacharya 
and Daouk (2002) reveal that the first prosecution of the insider trading across 
different countries matters for market liquidity. They construct the data set on the 
dates when the first prosecution is launched, and observe that a large proportion of 
countries with Anti-insider-trading rules have no enforcement outputs in fairly 
long subsequent years. And the first enforcement rather than the announcement of 
the Anti-insider-trading laws greatly increase the market confidence and liquidity.  
 
Like enforcement outputs, the public inputs are also shown to be correlated with 
the stock market. The inputs contain two aspects, first, the formal power that the 
public authority enjoys, which is investigated by La Porta et al. (2006) and found 
to facilitate the stock market development. And the second, the public resources 
owned by the enforcers, such as the staff number and budget. Jackson and Roe 
(2009) show that the second factor dominates the first in cross-sectional 
regressions.  
 
Another channel is the private enforcement, i.e. the private litigation to sue those 
corporate insiders. Shleifer (2005) argues that pure strategies relying on private 
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litigation and public regulation have great social costs, but the combination of the 
two could greatly reduce the costs. The success of the strategy relies on two 
crucial conditions: first, the quality of information disclosure requirement, and 
second, the efficiency of the judiciary system. La Porta et al. (2006) also 
investigate the disclosure standards and argue that it is more prominent in 
determining stock market development, the result of which is confirmed by 
Jackson and Roe (2009) that disclosure standards are not dominated by the 
resource-based input index. However, there are no direct studies on the efficiency 
of courts in solving the disputes relating to the financial disputes. Only Djankov et 
al. (2003) shows that there is significant divergence in each country’s practice, 
both in duration and formalism, to enforce the contracts.  
2.2.4 Property rights protection 
Protection of property rights has been identified as one of the most important 
features, which common law and civil law countries differ in (Mahoney, 2001). 
Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) and Klerman and Mahoney (2007) both identify the 
individual property rights protection as the source leading to the divergence of the 
priority given to the rights of individual vis-à-vis the states between civil law and 
common law countries.  
 
One part of the literature regard property rights protection as the outcome 
variables, for example, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2003) try to test the 
hypothesis of historical determinants of property rights among the three 
alternative theories, i.e. the legal origins, endowment and culture, and discover 
that the legal origins and the endowment theories are both significant in 
explaining the divergence in property rights protection. One more recent paper by 
Ayyagari et al. (2008) using survey data on entrepreneur’s perception of the 
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security of property rights, finds that legal origins and the geographical 
characteristic (latitude) explain most part of the cross sectional variance of the 
property rights. Ayyagari et al. (2013) employing a more robust technique, the 
Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) methodology, to disentangle the complex causal 
relationship among different historical determinants, and find that the ethnic 
fractionalization dominates other factors in explaining the property rights. 
 
The other part of literature tries to explain why property rights are crucial to 
financial outcomes. Johnson et al. (2002) provide empirical evidence that secure 
property rights are both necessary and sufficient condition in determining firms’ 
reinvestment rate. Firms’ willingness to invest determines both the economic 
growth rate, and the demand for external finance, hence the development of 
financial market. Claessens and Laeven (2003) suggest that security of property 
rights also influences firms’ asset structure: Firms in countries with weak property 
right protection invest more in the fixed asset, whereas firms in countries with 
strong one, invest more in tangible asset. The distortion especially impedes the 
investment in innovation, which determines the economic growth. 
2.3 Alternative theories of financial market development 
Obviously, the law and finance theories are only part of the discussion on 
determinants of financial market development. Other studies also find empirical 
correlations between financial market outcomes and colonization strategies, 
political factors and culture respectively. These competing theories make the 
cross-sectional analysis suffer from omitted variable biases if the model 
specification fails to incorporate these alternative explanatory variables as 
controls. This section reviews the competing influential theories on financial 
market development. 
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2.3.1 Colonization strategies 
Other than legal origins, the colonization strategies are another aspect that 
influences the quality of transplanted legal rules. These literature identifies three 
specific mechanisms: First, it is argued that the quality of the transplanted rules 
persists and determines the later economic outcomes. Second, the transplant 
process, which relates to the transplanted countries’ familiarity with the legal rules 
and adaptability of the rules to its own environment, is very important. Third, not 
only the legal rules, but the other colonization policies could determine the 
financial market outcomes. 
  
First, Acemoglu et al. (2001) investigate the settlement strategies of the European 
colonizers, and argue that rather than the types of “social control of economic 
life”, the quality of the institutions established by the colonizers determines the 
quality of current institutions and hence influence the economic outcomes. They 
further propose that prosperous regions with high population density or 
urbanization level are established with the “extractive institutions” by settlers, 
while in those poor areas, they develop the institutions of “private property” 
(Acemoglu et al. 2002). Beck et al. (2003) use the data from 70 former colonies 
and run a “horse race” between the quality of transplanted institutions and legal 
origins to see which determine the financial market development. Their results 
seem to support that both of the exogenous factors are correlated with the 
financial development, yet the quality of transplanted institutions has greater 
explanatory power.  
 
One of the crucial assumptions taken by both legal origins theory and pattern of 
colonization theory is that the previous transplanted institutions will influence the 
current ones, that is to say, there is high path-dependence with respect to 
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institutions even they are not efficient. The assumption is questionable on the 
basis of the Coase Theorem, which argues that if the property rights are 
well-defined and there are no transaction costs, economic and political transaction 
will create great incentive for achieving most efficient political and institutional 
outcomes, at least approximately (Coase, 1960). In a subsequent paper, Acemoglu 
(2003) suggests that the conflict of interests between those politician making 
policies and social welfare, could lead to adoption of inefficient policies. The 
caveat that no enforceable contracts between the politics and voters could be 
written prevents the potential to reach the efficient outcomes advocated by 
Political Coase Theorem.  
 
Second, Berkowitz et al. (2003a, 2003b) argue that the law and finance literature 
emphasizes the role of the transplanted “law on the book”, but fail to pay attention 
to the transplanted process, which is defined as the “transplant effect”. They first 
distinguish the origin countries from the transplanted ones, which is important 
since legal origins should be exogenous only to those transplanted countries in 
contrast to the origin countries, which develop their own legal origins. For those 
transplanted countries, the transplantation process matters as the local legal 
authority and intermediaries ought to develop respective mechanisms to enforce 
the formal rules and meeting the local demand. They measure the “transplant 
effect” based on the familiarity about the transplanted rules, and the adaptation to 
the local situation. The transplantation process proves to be highly influential to 
the legality of the given country, which directly influence the economic outcomes. 
 
Third, Klerman et al. (2011) propose another interpretation of the colonial history, 
i.e. the legal traditions are only part of the institutions imposed by the origin 
countries, and as a result, its universal explanatory power may take the advantage 
of other policies, such as education or health policies. They re-codify both the 
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legal origins and colonial origins using much more detailed criteria. Their 
identification strategy depends on the incomplete overlaps between British 
colonies and countries with British legal origins. They argue that if the legal 
origins are the crucial determinants, British colonies with mixed legal systems 
shall perform worse than those common law British colonies.  
2.3.2 Political factors 
The most influential competing theory to the legal explanation of stock market 
development is the political theories. The intuition is straight forward, as financial 
development exerts heterogeneous effects on different social groups, those having 
power to shape the policies will react accordingly to protect their benefits. The 
path-breaking research comes from Rajan and Zingales (2003), who argue that the 
time-invariant factors, such as legal origins, fail to incorporate the dynamics in 
financial development. Some of the countries with advanced financial markets in 
the beginning of 1900s become countries with less developed financial markets.  
 
They argue that external finance is crucial for new entrants and innovation in the 
product markets. And hence the industrial and financial incumbents, who have 
established close alliance, and have natural advantage than dispersed small firms 
and individuals suffering from collective action problem, will use their political 
power to shape the public policies towards entry-deterring. The integration of the 
local economy to that of the world would significantly reduce these incumbents 
power to influence the policy formation, and hence facilitate economic growth.  
 
Pagano and Volpin (2006) propose a political model to investigate how power of 
shareholders could influence the stock market development. In their model, when 
the power of the shareholders rises, they will vote for pro shareholders rule, and as 
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a result, lowers the costs of external finance. The growing number in shareholder 
group will increase their political power in the state, and subsequently increase 
shareholder protection. The feedback loop will generate positive relationship 
between shareholder protection and stock market development. 
 
Two articles follow the line of trade matters and investigate further the role of the 
affiliated political groups that influence the financial development. Do and 
Levchenko (2007) look into the demand side of the financing market and propose 
that the comparative advantage in trade will affect the technologies involved in a 
country’s production process, and therefore influence its demand for external 
finance. To deal with the simultaneity problem, they employ a 2SLS gravity 
regression, using instrumental variable the “predicted external finance need of 
exports” for a given country. The country having a comparative advantage in the 
sectors, which heavily rely on the external finance, end up with more developed 
financial market.   
 
Braun and Raddatz (2008) instead try to identify the different industrial sector as 
promoter or opponents of financial market development according to its influence 
on their private rents. They employ the trade liberalization as the source of 
variation, and transfer the attitude into the real power to influence the policy using 
the proxy “strengthening of promoters”, which reflect the changes of the private 
rents before and after the event. The variable is proven to be a good predictor of 
the development of subsequent financial depth.   
 
Roe (2006) argues that the dichotomy between common law and civil law 
countries in density and intensity of stock market regulation is elusive as 
measured by the number of staff and the budget of public regulators. The 
countries with both origins regulate the economy, but in different aspects: 
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Common law countries regulate the stock markets, while civil law countries 
regulate their labor markets. The labor protection index constructed by Botero et 
al. (2004) is found better predicting the stock market development (Roe, 2006). 
Such effects are ascribed to the World War II that devastates the family wealth in 
the civil law countries, while leaves those in common law countries intact. As a 
result, the human capital account for a larger proportion of the family wealth in 
civil law countries, and hence the regulation relatively protects labor, while in 
contrast, the common law countries employ regulations to protect stock market. 
 
In a later article, Roe and Siegel (2011) further provide evidence that the political 
instability caused by social inequality could lead to weak stock market. The major 
channel, through which instability influence the stock market development, lies in 
that sound institutional arrangements, such as legal protection of shareholders or 
courts and regulations, could not function well in an unstable environment. 
2.3.3 Culture 
The most prominent and established story supporting the role of culture in 
facilitating the capital market development is that charging interest can be a sin in 
one religion but not in another (Stulz and Williamson, 2003). They first 
empirically investigate the role of religion on various financial outcomes, and find 
that religions have larger explanatory power than legal origins in explaining 
banking sector, and Catholic countries have smaller banking sector relative to 
GDP than that of Protestant ones. Guiso et al. (2006) provide theoretical 
reasoning on the mechanism through which culture influences the economic 
outcomes and argue that culture is crucial in determining the expectation and 
preference, which determines the level of trust that influence the economic 
outcomes.  
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Except religions, the social attitude towards uncertainty also shapes the 
development of the financial market. Using the culture proxies constructed by 
Hofstede (2001), Kwok and Tadesse (2006) find that the “Uncertainty avoidance 
index” significantly predicts the cross-country relative importance of stock market 
to bank sectors. In addition, the “Individualism index” is established to be 
correlated with the stock market trading pattern (Chui et al., 2010). They 
especially find that the return of the momentum portfolio significantly and 
positively relates to the index, which is consistent to the theoretical concern that 
investors in different cultures interpret information in different ways and are 
subject to different biases. 
2.4 Bayesian approach 
This section takes a different approach, the Bayesian analysis, from the traditional 
empirical studies. It is confusing that different empirical specifications come with 
diverse empirical explanations for the stock market development. Since legal 
origins are no longer valid instruments, the problem of model uncertainty, which 
is overlooked by the literature, now becomes prominent. The cross-sectional 
results are fragile in the sense that they are sensitive to inclusion of new relevant 
regressors. Though normally empirical articles will incorporate a section named 
“Sensitivity Analysis”, it differs from the concept of “global sensitivity analysis” 
considered by Leamer (1983, 1985). The uncertainty problem could easily be 
solved if the sample size grows to infinity, which allows all the potentially 
important determinants of stock market development included in the model 
specification. However, for macro data, the sample size is normally small and the 
precious degrees of freedom limits inclusion of too many variables.  
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To account for the model uncertainty, this paper admits that the “true” model is 
unknown and attaches probability to each possible model. This approach of 
dealing with the problem of variables selection is known as Bayesian Model 
Averaging (BMA), which has already been extensively applied in the growth 
empirics.16 The technique averages the model-specific estimates of parameter 
according to Bayesian weights. The algorithm developed by Magnus, Powell, and 
Prüfer (2010, hence forth MPP) and De Luca and Magnus (2011) is adopted. To 
illustrate the problem, a generic representation of the linear cross-country stock 
market development regression is given as follows: 
y=α+Xβ+ε=α+X1β1+X2β2+ε                                        (1) 
Where y is a vector of the proxies for the stock market development, and α is a 
vector of intercepts. The X is a set of determinants of stock market development, 
which usually comprises two parts, the free variables X1, and the controlling 
variables X2, where the model uncertainty arises.
17  
 
As the law and finance theories do not provide enough guidance to specify the 
structural model, the empirical practice sometimes includes discretional sets of X2 
according to the investigators’ preferences. The focus variables in previous studies 
now and then do not enter as controls in others. For example, property right 
protection are shown to be correlated with the stock market development 
(Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005), yet both La Porta et al. (2006) and Jackson and 
Roe (2009) discussing the enforcement strategies, fail to include it as controls.  
                                                             
16 For earlier applications of modified version of “extreme bounds analysis” in the growth 
regressions, see Levine and Renelt (1992), and Sala-i-Martin (1997). For applications of 
BMA, see Brock and Durlauf (2001), Fernández et al. (2001), and Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004). 
17 The free variables usually contain more than focus variables, see Leamer (1983) for 
discussion about the terminologies of the focus variable, free variable and doubtful variable. 
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2.4.1 BMA algorithm 
The Bayesian thinking differs from the classic statistics in that the parameters in 
the regression are deemed to be uncertain, which therefore have probability 
densities. So BMA aims to find the best possible model, rather than the best 
possible estimate, of which the “true” value is not observable. Each model 
estimated will contribute to the knowledge of the distributions of the parameters, 
and a systematic way of averaging is applied to combine all the information.  
 
The paper focuses on the linear approximation, which is represented by Equation 
(1). Suppose that there is a sample of n countries, whose stock market 
development proxies are grouped in the vector y( 1n ). The matrix of explanatory 
variables X is divided into two submatrices as mentioned in Section 1, X1 
(n×(k1+1))and X2 (n×k2), which comprises (k1+1) free variables (including the 
intercept α) and k2 doubtful variables. In addition, both k1 and k2 are assumed to 
be equal or larger than 0, with k1+k2 ≤ n-1, and X is assumed to have full 
column-rank.  
 
The model uncertainty arises as whenever a different subset of X2 is excluded. The 
exclusion of doubtful variables means that the corresponding elements of β2 are 
set zero (Raftery, Madigan, and Hoeting, 1997). Generally speaking, the number 
of possible models to be considered is 22kI  , the ith of which is denoted by Mi, 
and given by Equation (2) 
y=α+X1β1+X2iβ2i+ε                                               (2) 
where X2i is an n×k2i matrix of observations on the included subsets of k2i doubtful 
variables, and β2i denotes the corresponding k2i subvector of β2. Also, Equation (2) 
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could be regarded as Equation (1) subjected to restrictions that (k2-k2i) 
components of β2 equal zero.  
 
The model space I is given by the number of doubtful variables, k2. For example, 
if the research is directed to test whether the endowment or legal origins theory 
robustly correlates with the stock market development, a simplified research 
question investigated in Beck et al. (2003), in this case k2=2. Further, suppose that 
there are no free variables except for the constant and k1=0. The model space is 
then I=22=4: one with only intercept, one with intercept and both endowment 
proxies and legal origins, the rest two with intercept and either endowment 
proxies or legal origins. 
 
The BMA algorithm employed is developed by MPP (2010), and the rest of the 
subsection presents the algorithm deducing estimates of both 1


and 2


, and 
their variances, which differs from traditional estimators in that it is the 
expectation of the stochastic beta, in Bayesian sense, conditional to the observed 
data. Unlike the classic estimator of the parameters, the BMA considers every 
estimate of the parameters of interest conditional on the model space, and then 
computes the unconditional estimate as a weighted average of the conditional 
estimates. The estimators for the coefficients of free variables are given by   
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The estimators for the coefficients and variances of doubtful variables are similar 
to those of the free variable, except that a selection matrix Ti is involved. 
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where Ti is (k2×k2i) selection matrices defined by )0,(
2ik
T
i IT  . As a result, Tiβ2i 
is the k2×1 vectors setting to zero the elements of β2, which are excluded from 
model Mi. The λi in these Equations are the weights derived from the Bayes’ rule 
conditioning on the observed data set, which is given in next subsection. 
2.4.2 BMA weights λi 
The weights λi of parameter estimates in the model space equal the corresponding 
posterior probability for the model Mi, and is of the form 
i = )( yMp i =
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The independent priors are assigned equally to each model meaning that p(Mi) 
equals 22 k . The marginal likelihood, p(y|Mi), is an integral of the multiplication 
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of the prior probability of parameters and the sample likelihood ratio, and given 
by 
)( iMyp =
2
21
2
21
2
21 ),,(),,,(  dddMpMyp iiiii . 
 
To get the joint prior distribution p(β1, β2,σ2| Mi), MPP adopts the conventional 
non-informative prior on the free parametersβ1 and error variance σ2, together 
with an informative Gaussian prior on the doubtful parameters β2i, which assumes 
that conditional on the parameter β1, variance and the model space, β2i follows the 
normal distribution. And as a result, the conditional joint prior is of the form  
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where V0i is a positive definite k2i×k2i matrix.
 18 The uninformative prior reflects 
the setting of the model that free variables X1 are always included in the model, 
while the informative priors assume that the conditional distribution of β2i is 
normal.  
 
The other component of λi, the marginal likelihood of model Mi, which is derived 
from the sample likelihood function, is of the form  
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in  , where εi is the residual of the ith 
model.  
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2.5 Data set and variables 
The data set consists of cross sectional observations of the 48 countries and 
districts, which is a subsample of the one in DLLS (2008).19 The definitions, 
sources and descriptive statistics are shown in Table 2.1. The 48-country sample 
has two advantages: first, it is investigated more thoroughly than other larger data 
sets. Though studies keep coming out with new determinants of the stock market 
development, most of them do not share the same sample. Hence, there is a 
trade-off in selecting the most appropriate data set, which usually means fewer 
variables enter the BMA analysis as the sample size increases. Second, according 
to La Porta et al. (2006), the sampled countries account for the majority share of 
the world stock market capitalization in the beginning of the 1990s.  
 
To make our work comparable to DLLS (2008) and reduce the computational 
burden, the restricted model is set according to their basic specification, including 
“Anti-self-dealing index (ANTISDI)”, “Time to collect a bounced check 
(CHECK)”, and “GDP per capita (GDPPERCAPITA)”. These three independent 
variables and the intercept are the free variables consisting of X1 in Equation (1). 
Furthermore, 26 doubtful variables identified in the previous literature are 
included and form X2. Finally, the dependent variables are proxies for the stock 
market development, including “Market capitalization to GPD (CMMKT)”, “Ln 
of Number of listed firms (LISTED)”, “IPO value to GDP (IPO)”, and the market 
liquidity proxy “Stock traded to GDP (STRADED)”. The stock market liquidity 
proxy STRADED is not included in DLLS (2008), though it is a very important 
characteristic.20 The descriptive statistics and data sources are shown in Table 2.1. 
                                                             
19 The sampled countries and districts are the same as those employed in LLSV (1998), 
except that Taiwan is excluded because its data is extremely fragile. 
20 Earlier studies have indentified that high stock market liquidity stimulates productivity 
growth (Levine and Zervos, 1998) and affects firm performance and operating profitability 
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2.6 Discussions of outputs 
2.6.1 Estimation with only restricted variables 
I first replicate the prior analysis of ANTISDI reported in Table 6 of DLLS (2008) 
with the smaller sample of 48 countries to show that the sampling problem is not a 
source of bias. The outputs are shown in Table 2.2. The specification only 
includes the free variables and follows the one that DLLS employ. Unsurprisingly, 
ANTISDI is significant in the three regressions with dependent variables 
CMMKT, LISTED, and IPO, yet insignificant in the regression with the 
dependent variable TRADE, which is not included in DLLS (2008). 
2.6.2 Bayesian model averaging  
The outputs of BMA analysis with 26 doubtful variables and 4 free variables 
(including the intercept) are reported in Table 2.3. The model space is 226 
(approximately 6.7*107) for each Panel, and every Panel has three columns. The 
first two report the posterior mean of coefficients given by Equation (3) and (4), 
and the related Bayesian “t-statistic”, while the third one reports the posterior 
inclusion probability (PIP) of the respective variables, according to which the 
doubtful variables are ranked. A regressor is seen as robustly correlated with the 
dependent variable, if the corresponding t-statistic is greater than 1 in absolute 
value, or PIP is larger than 0.5, in which case the adjusted R2 shall rise after 
inclusion of the corresponding regressor (MPP, 2010; De Luca and Magnus, 
2011).  
                                                                                                                                                                       
(Fang et al., 2009). And Cumming et al. (2010) only discuss the role of exchange rules on 
stock market liquidity.  
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2.6.2.1 Robustness of “Anti-self-dealing index” 
As stated at the beginning of this Chapter, one of the major purposes is to test the 
robustness of the established positive correlation between “on-the-book” 
Anti-self-dealing rules and the stock market development considering the model 
uncertainty. To check if the free variables have robust correlation with the 
dependent variables, we have to rely on the t-statistics since the PIP is always 1. 
In sharp contrast to its high significance in regressions of restricted specification 
and the one in DLLS (2008), ANTISDI has only one robust correlation with the 
dependent variable CMMKT. The previous identified correlation seems to be 
fragile. The fragility of the relationship is actually reflected in DLLS (2008) when 
they add the variable “Tax evasion”, the results of which are reported in Table 12 
of their paper. ANTISDI quickly loses its explanatory power, which DLLS ascribe 
to the fact that the variable is “a subjective variable highly correlated with 
perceptions […] of the quality of corporate governance as proxied by the 
perceived incidence of insider trading” (DLLS, 2008: 456). 
2.6.2.2 Doubtful variables significantly correlated to stock market 
development 
Several of the doubtful variables also emerge as the robust determinants of stock 
market development according to the criteria proposed before (PIP>0.5, or 
statistict  >1). Unlike in economic growth regression, the popular proxy for 
stock market development usually reflects one dimension of the market, and 
hence one of interesting observations in Table 2.3 is that the doubtful variables are 
not ranked in the same order across different Panels. Frequently in the empirical 
studies, the investigators would control for the same set of variables for different 
proxies of the stock market development, though they recognize the dependent 
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variables represent different aspects of the stock market. The BMA analysis 
suggests that the “one-size-fit-all” specification in these cross-country analyses 
may be inappropriate.  
 
In Panel A, none of the doubtful variables are robustly correlated with the 
dependent variable CMMKT, although TRADEOPENNESS has the highest 
ranking and much larger PIP than the rest ones. According to Rajan and Zingales 
(2003), TRADEOPENNESS reflects the political power of incumbent industrial 
and financial groups, which exert great influence on the formation of the financial 
policies, and thus determines the stock market development. The other one with 
relative high t-statistics is the NANALYSTS, which implies that private 
information disclosure is also very important. 
 
The public enforcement strategies, STAFF (Jackson and Roe, 2008) is shown to 
be significantly and robustly correlated with the LISTED in Panel B. The 
resource-based enforcement proxy is confirmed to dominate the formal 
enforcement power of the public agency PENFORCEMENTLLS (La Porta et al., 
2006) as shown in Jackson and Roe (2008). Two proxies for information 
disclosure, DISCLOSURE (La Porta et al., 2006) and NANALYSTS (Chang et al., 
2000), which are fundamental to private enforcement, do not correlate with 
LISTED. However, the result suffers from a caveat of reverse causality as the 
variable STAFF is constructed for the year 2005. In addition, another robust 
variable is the dummy variable CATHOLIC. It seems that Catholic countries are 
with relative smaller number of listed firms. 
 
In Panel C, COMMONLO robustly correlates with the dependent variable IPO as 
the legal origins theory suggests. Rather than serving as the instruments for the 
endogenous explanatory variables, the legal origins are treated as the legal 
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endowment. The BMA analysis confirms the superiority of the equity finance 
market in common law countries in. As commented in the previous section, the 
dummy variables of legal origins adopted are the re-codified ones in Klerman et 
al. (2011).21 The competing theories, for example, quality of the transplanted 
institutions (LATITUDE), the transplanted process (UNRECEPTIVE), the 
colonial legacies (EDUCATION1960), are not robustly correlated with the 
dependent variable. 
 
In Panel D, the proxy for market/private information disclosure NANALYSTS 
(Chang et al., 2000) is significantly correlated with the dependent variable 
STRADED. The results indicate that the information disseminated in the market is 
important for the market sentiment, which determines the investors’ participation 
rate. The analysis oppose to the results in Frost et al. (2006), who use the stock 
exchanges disclosure requirements and finds that the public disclosure 
requirements are crucial and dominate the market disclosure force. In contrast, the 
BMA analysis reveals that the private information is crucial. 
2.7 Robustness check 
It is possible that the Bayesian algorithm may be biased as it is just one of the 
several variable selection methods. To check the robustness of the conclusion that 
“Anti-self-dealing index” is not significantly correlated with the three of the 
dependent variables except CMMKT, another variable selection algorithm 
stepwise backward elimination realized by Lindsey and Sheather (2010) is 
adopted. Table 2.4 shows the robust variables select out of the variables shown in 
Table 2.1, which include both the free and doubtful variables. 
                                                             
21 Klerman et al. (2011) classify five countries, which are in the common-law group in LLSV 
(1998), to mixed legal origins, which are Israel, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, 
Zimbabwe. 
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The variable selection algorithm stepwise backward elimination works as follows: 
It starts from a general model with all the candidate regressors. Then it eliminates 
regressor one by one to the point that elimination will deteriorate the information 
criteria. Three information criteria are employed: Adjusted R-squared, Bayesian 
information criterion (BIC) and Akaike information criterion (AIC). Theoretically, 
Adjusted R-squared and AIC will include more regressors and make the model 
bigger. However, even in these bigger models, ANTISDI is not included as 
predicted by the law and finance theory that has positive effects on stock market 
development. 
2.8 Conclusion  
This Chapter examines the robustness of cross-country relationship between the 
“on-the-book” anti-self-dealing rules and stock market outcomes considering the 
model uncertainty. The analysis is highly important as legal origins are no longer 
valid instruments for endogenous legal variables, which finds that the established 
positive relationship between the “Anti-self-dealing” rules and stock market 
development in DLLS (2008) are fragile and no longer significant. Another 
interesting observation from the analysis is that the enforcement strategy, 
especially the outcome of enforcement, is highly relevant in determining the stock 
liquidity. Finally, the significance and ranking of the doubtful variables are 
different across regressions the four dependent variables. The result indicates that 
the usually adopted “one-size-fit-all” specification strategy with respect to the 
different characteristics of stock market is inappropriate.
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Tables 
Table 2.1 Variable definitions, data sources, and descriptive statistics 
The Table presents the variables, their descriptions, sources and descriptive statistics. The 48 sampled countries are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, 
Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, U.K., U.S., Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. 
Num Variable Name Obs Descriptions and sources Mean Std. Dev. 
Dependent Variables 
1 
 
 
cmmkt 
 
 
Market 
capitalization to 
GPD 
48 
 
 
Average of stock market capitalization to GDP for the period 1999-2003. From World 
Development Indicators 2011. 
 
74.6164 
 
 
68.528 
 
 
2 
 
listed 
 
Ln of Number of 
listed firms 
48 
 
Natural logarithm of the average of domestic firms listed to its population (in millions) 
for 1999-2003. From World Development Indicators 2011. 
23.90832 
 
28.13407 
 
3 
 
ipo 
 
IPO value to GDP 
 
48 
 
Average ratio of equity issued by newly listed firms (in thousands) to GDP (in millions) 
over 1996-2000. From La Porta et al (2006), DLLS. (2008). 
2.820875 
 
3.037239 
 
4 trade Stock traded 48 Average of the total value of stocks traded as the percentage of its GDP over 50.81341 57.01448 
2 Law Matters?: A Bayesian Analysis of the Empirical Law and Finance Literature 
47 
    1999-2003. From World Development Indicators 2011.   
Independent Variables (Free Variables) 
1 
 
antisdi 
 
Anti-self-dealing 
index 
48 
 
Average of ex ante and ex post private control of self-dealing. From DLLS. (2008). 
 
0.476 
 
0.2531081 
 
2 
 
check 
 
Time to collect on a 
bounced check 
48 
 
Logarithm of the length (in calendar days) of the judicial procedure to collect on a 
bounced check. From DLLS. (2008).  
5.18761 
 
0.710899 
 
3 
 
gdppercapita22 
 
Log of GDP per 
capita 
48 
 
Logarithm of GDP per capita in 2003. From World Development Indicators 2011. 
 
3.83306 
 
0.6355589 
 
Independent Variables (Doubtful Variables) 
1 
 
 
itprosecution1999 (1996)23 
 
 
Insider trading 
prosecution 1999 
(1996) 
48 
 
 
Dummy variable, equals 1 if the country files any prosecution against insider trading 
before 1996/1999. From Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002). 
 
0.6458333 
(0.4166667) 
 
0.4833211 
(0.4982238) 
 
2 
 
rantid2003dlls 
 
DLLS’ Revised 
Anti-director rights 
48 
 
Revised Anti-director rights index for 2003. From DLLS. (2008). 
 
3.510417 
 
1.132168 
 
                                                             
22 Though “IPO value to GDP” is averaged over period 1996 to 2000, DLLS. (2008) still use “Log of GDP per capita” in 2003 as controlling variable. To make the 
best comparable results, we follow their practice. 
23 Since “IPO value to GDP” is averaged over period 1996 to 2000, the author constructs the dummy variable “itprosecution1996” for year 1996 separately to 
accommodate the different time interval covered by the dependent variable. “itprosecution1996” is used only in regressions with dependent variable “IPO value to 
GDP”, and its mean and variance are shown in the parentheses. 
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  index      
3 
 
onevote 
 
One share equals 
one vote 
48 
 
Dummy variable, equals 1 if the Company Law or Commercial Code requires that 
ordinary shares carry one vote per share. From LLSV (1997). 
0.2291667 
 
0.4247444 
 
4 
 
frenchlo 
 
French legal origin 
 
48 
 
Dummy variable, equals 1 if the country has the French legal origin. From Klerman et 
al. (2011). 
0.3958333 
 
0.494204 
 
5 
 
commonlo 
 
Common legal 
origin 
48 
 
Dummy variable, equals 1 if the country has the Common law legal origin. From 
Klerman et al. (2011). 
0.2708333 
 
0.4490929 
 
6 
 
germanlo 
 
German legal origin 
 
48 
 
Dummy variable, equals 1 if the country has the German legal origin. From Klerman et 
al. (2011). 
0.1041667 
 
0.3087093 
 
7 
 
mixedlo 
 
Mixed legal origin 
 
48 
 
Dummy variable, equals 1 if the country has the mixed legal origin. From Klerman et 
al. (2011). 
0.1458333 
 
0.356674 
 
8 
 
catholic 
 
Catholic dummy 
 
48 
 
Dummy variable, equals 1 if the country’s primary religion is Catholic. From Stulz and 
Williamson (2003). 
0.4166667 
 
0.4982238 
 
9 
 
protestant 
 
Protestant dummy 
 
48 
 
Dummy variable, equals 1 if the country’s primary religion is Protestant. From Stulz 
and Williamson (2003). 
0.25 
 
0.437595 
 
10 
 
muslim 
 
Muslim dummy 
 
48 
 
Dummy variable, equals 1 if the country’s primary religion is Muslim. From Stulz and 
Williamson (2003). 
0.1458333 
 
0.356674 
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11 
 
buddhist 
 
Buddhist dummy 
 
48 
 
Dummy variable, equals 1 if the country’s primary religion is Buddhist. From Stulz and 
Williamson (2003). 
0.0833333 
 
0.2793102 
 
12 
 
 
rulelaw 
 
 
Rule of law 
 
 48 
Assessment of the law and order tradition in the country. Average between 1982 and 
1995. Scale from 0 to 10, with lower scores for less tradition for law and order. From 
LLSV (1997). 
6.811806  
 
    
2.645197 
 
 
13 
 
staff24 
 
Staff per million 
population 
48 
 
The 2005 size of the securities regulators’ staff, divided by the country’s population in 
millions. From Jackson and Roe (2009). 
13.6647 
 
15.37414 
 
14 
 
penforcementlls 
 
Public enforcement 
index of LLS 
48 
 
Public enforcement index for year 2000. From La Porta et al. (2006). 
 
0.4976167 
 
0.224029 
 
15 
 
disclosure 
 
Disclosure 
standards 
48 
 
Disclosure standards. From La Porta et al. (2006). 
 
0.5937542 
 
0.2373446 
 
16 
 
nanalysts25 
 
Number of analysts 
 
48 
 
Number of analysts providing an annual earnings forecast per firm, averaged in each 
country for the year 1996. From Chang et al. (2000). 
11.71938 
 
8.874205 
 
17 education1960 Education1960 48 Education in 1960. From Barro and Lee (1994) and Klerman et al. (2011). 0.8952083 0.1696804 
                                                             
24 The variables have two missing observations for the Venezuela and Zimbabwe, which is filled by Stata®’s built-in predictive mean matching imputation algorithm. 
The algorithm is a partially parametric method that matches the missing value to the observed value with the closest predicted mean or linear prediction (Little, 
1988).  
25 To maintain the largest possible sample size, we take the assumption mentioned by Chang et al. (2000) that if one country is not covered by IBES, there is no 
analyst following this country. 
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18 
 
lifee1960s 
 
Life expectancy 
1960s 
48 
 
Life expectancy in 1960s. From Barro and Lee (1994) and Klerman et al. (2011). 
 
60.77083 
 
10.56544 
 
19 
 
unreceptive 
 
Unreceptive 
transplant 
48 
 
Dummy variable, equals 1 if a transplant neither has familiarity nor transplants with 
significant adaptation. From Berkowitz et al. (2003a, 2003b).  
0.5625 
 
0.501328 
 
20 latitude Absolute latitude 48 Equals Abs (latitude of capital)/90. From LLSV (1999). 0.3478604 0.2074438 
21 property Property right 48 Property right protection index 1997. From http://www.heritage.org. 72.5 16.82197 
22 
 
steps 
 
Steps to start new 
business 
48 
 
The number of steps to start a new business. From Djankov et al. (2002). 
 
8.375 
 
3.922792 
 
23 
 
ethonolinguistic 
 
Ethonolinguistic 
fractionalization 
48 
 
The average value of five different indices of ethonolinguistic fractionalization. Its 
value ranges from 0 to 1. From Easterly and Levine (1997), and La Porta et al. (2006) 
0.2572146 
 
0.2567331 
 
24 
 
tradeopenness1999 
(1996)26 
Trade openness 
1999 (1996) 
48 
 
Equals the total import and export of goods and services as the percentage of GDP in 
1996/1999. From World Development Indicators 2011. 
75.64507 
(72.96944) 
60.36629 
(59.5433) 
25 
 
employment 
 
Employment law 
index 
48 
 
Measures the protection of individuals by labor and employment laws. From Botero et 
al. (2003). 
0.4544646 
 
0.1858396 
 
26 newspaper Newspaper 48 Logarithmic of newspapers and periodicals circulation per thousand inhabitants in 2000 4.73839 1.036523 
                                                             
26 Since “IPO value to GDP” is averaged over period 1996 to 2000, the author constructs the dummy variable “tradeopenness1996” for year 1996 separately to 
accommodate the different time interval covered by the dependent variable. “tradeopenness1996” is used only in regressions with dependent variable “IPO value to 
GDP”, and its mean and variance are shown in the parentheses.  
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  circulation  (or closest available). From DLLS. (2008)   
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Table 2.2 OLS estimation of restricted models 
The regressions estimated is: Y = a + b * X, where the vector Y contains “Market capitalization to GDP”, “Number of listed firms”, “IPO value to GDP”, or “Stock 
traded”. X are the three free variables, “Anti-self-dealing index”, “Time to collect on a bounced check”, and “GDP per capita”. The regressions are estimated using 
Ordinary Least Squares. 
Dependent variables 
Independent variables CMMKT LISTED IPO TRADE 
Anti-self-dealing index 
 
74.67896* 
(1.9) 
49.24796*** 
(2.89) 
3.786072** 
(2.11) 
-2.996638 
(-0.12) 
Time to collect on a bounced check 
 
-22.80809** 
(-2.32) 
-.2213482 
(-0.04) 
0.399905 
(0.72) 
-29.03414*** 
(-2.88) 
GDP per capita 
 
35.82329*** 
(2.82) 
17.60502 *** 
(4.38) 
2.462884*** 
(4.81) 
38.00484*** 
(3.63) 
Constant 
 
20.07589 
(0.29) 
-65.86654 
(-1.61) 
-10.49623** 
(-2.42) 
57.18273 
(0.93) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3904 0.4422 0.3965 0.4019 
Observation 48 48 48 48 
Notes: a The sample has 48 countries. And the model specification follows the one employed in Table 6 of DLLS. (2008).  
b The robust t-statistics is reported in the parentheses.  
c *, **, *** stand for 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level respectively.
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Table 2.3 Bayesian model average  
The BMA specification employed in this Table is   2211 XXy , where y stands for the stock market development proxies, “Market capitalization to 
GDP”, “Number of listed firms”, “IPO value to GDP”, or “Stock traded”, and   is the intercept,   the error term. 1X  contains the four free variables, 
“Anti-self-dealing index”, “Time to collect on a bounced check”, “GDP per capita”, and “Insider trading prosecution”, and 2X  the rest 27 doubtful variables. The 
“t-stat” is the BMA t-statistics, and “pip” is the posterior inclusion probability, according to which the doubtful variables are ranked. 
Panel A 
Dependent Variable: Market capitalization to GDP 
Panel B 
Dependent Variable: Number of listed firms 
Panel C 
Dependent Variable: IPO value to GDP 
Panel D 
Dependent Variable: Stock traded 
free variables coefficient t-stat pip free variables coefficient t-stat pip free variables coefficient t-stat pip free variables coefficient t-stat pip 
constant -22.04069 -0.18 1 constant -88.43204* -2.03 1 constant -14.25501* -2.63 1 constant 15.40098 0.16 1 
antisd 47.51837* 1.06 1 antisd 6.987161 0.36 1 antisd 0.6696886 0.3 1 antisd -23.71198 -0.6 1 
check -16.37798* -1.15 1 check 5.836915* 1.2 1 check 0.7498757* 1.26 1 check -17.31855* -1.51 1 
gdppercapita 35.40558* 1.45  1 gdppercapita 15.35567* 2.01 1 gdppercapita 2.897989* 2.94 1 gdppercapita 26.04813* 1.21 1 
doubtful variables coefficient t-stat pip doubtful variables coefficient t-stat pip doubtful variables coefficient t-stat pip doubtful variables coefficient t-stat pip 
tradeopenness1999 0.1146631 0.61 0.32 staff 1.04045* 3.97 0.98 commonlo 1.936557 1.26* 0.69 nanalysts 2.10583* 1.3 0.7 
nanalysts 0.588431 0.48 0.23 catholic -12.19825* -1.24 0.69 disclosure 1.357654 0.57 0.3 disclosure 27.52645 0.58 0.3 
staff 0.1888141 0.37 0.16 rantid2003dlls 3.50307 0.81 0.46 unreceptive 0.2917559 0.38 0.16 unreceptive 3.360623 0.29 0.11 
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disclosure 11.90785 0.34 0.14 mixedlo 2.313694 0.37 0.16 catholic -0.1455378 -0.3 0.12 frenchlo -2.158561 -0.26 0.1 
ethonolinguistic 10.16932 0.32 0.13 frenchlo -1.448568 -0.31 0.13 nanalysts 0.008751 0.28 0.11 itprosecution1999 2.007948 0.24 0.09 
buddhist -4.512173 -0.27 0.1 penforcementlls 2.662321 0.29 0.12 staff 0.0034295 0.23 0.09 steps -0.251564 -0.25 0.09 
unreceptive 1.898548 0.19 0.07 protestant -1.137637 -0.26 0.11 penforcementlls 0.1877507 0.22 0.08 catholic -1.547994 -0.22 0.08 
itprosecution1999 0.9443972 0.15  0.06 buddhist -1.489662 -0.27 0.1 tradeopenness1996 0.000657 0.22 0.08 education1960 -5.360982 -0.22 0.08 
frenchlo -1.154244 -0.17 0.06 disclosure 1.774544 0.24 0.09 mixedlo -0.0763027 -0.15 0.07 commonlo 1.497174 0.2 0.07 
mixedlo 1.23288 0.15 0.06 itprosecution1999 0.6124258 0.21 0.08 buddhist -0.081936 -0.17 0.06 buddhist -1.933187 -0.2 0.07 
steps -0.146909 -0.17 0.06 tradeopenness1999 0.006995 0.21 0.08 education1960 0.137286 0.12 0.06 penforcementlls 2.44377 0.19 0.07 
protestant -0.573443 -0.1 0.05 education1960 -2.008833 -0.18 0.07 rantid2003dlls 0.0171399 0.14 0.05 ethonolinguistic 2.72993 0.19 0.07 
employment -1.368267 -0.1 0.05 nanalysts -0.019458 -0.14 0.06 frenchlo -0.0240038 -0.09 0.05 protestant 0.9652846 0.18 0.06 
newspaper -0.607065 -0.14 0.05 latitude -1.22737 -0.17 0.06 muslim 0.036282 0.12 0.05 tradeopenness1999 -0.0063675 -0.15 0.06 
rantid2003dlls 0.0660745 0.03  0.04 property -0.013451 -0.16 0.06 lifee1960s -0.002609 -0.11 0.05 germanlo 0.7874785 0.13 0.05 
onevote -0.243888 -0.06 0.04 ethonolinguistic 0.8004598 0.17 0.06 steps -0.0033929 -0.11 0.05 mixedlo -0.1745659 -0.03 0.05 
commonlo 0.2353943 0.04 0.04 onevote -0.261007 -0.15 0.05 ethonolinguistic 0.0555477 0.11 0.05 staff 0.0119343 0.09 0.05 
germanlo 0.1360662 0.02 0.04 muslim -0.115045 -0.05 0.05 itprosecution1996 0.0092042 0.05 0.04 lifee1960s -0.0614734 -0.14 0.05 
catholic -0.361680 -0.08 0.04 rulelaw -0.057106 -0.12 0.05 onevote 0.0084434 0.05 0.04 latitude 1.763799 0.13 0.05 
muslim -0.078358 -0.02 0.04 steps -0.024694 -0.1 0.05 germanlo 0.0148165 0.06 0.04 newspaper 0.3036959 0.11 0.05 
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rulelaw 0.0895621 0.07 0.04 newspaper -0.149763 -0.12 0.05 protestant 0.0072657 0.04 0.04 rantid2003dlls 0.053371 0.03 0.04 
education1960 -0.328210 -0.02 0.04 commonlo -0.087208 -0.05 0.04 rulelaw 0.0009054 0.01 0.04 onevote -0.2147583 -0.06 0.04 
lifee1960s -0.051093 -0.1 0.04 germanlo -0.074126 -0.04 0.04 latitude 0.0477634 0.07 0.04 muslim -0.2090408 -0.05 0.04 
latitude 0.0224759 0 0.04 lifee1960s 0.0075086 0.06 0.04 property 0.000316 0.04 0.04 rulelaw -0.0371693 -0.04 0.04 
property -0.002950 -0.02 0.04 unreceptive 0.1544736 0.08 0.04 employment -0.02406 -0.04 0.04 property 0.013416 0.09 0.04 
Notes: a The sample has 48 countries.    
b The variable ANTISD, CHECK, GDPPERCAPITA and the intercept are fixed in the model specification.  
c * stands for “t-statistics” is larger than 1 in absolute value. 
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Table 2.4 Robustness check 
Panel A 
Dependent Variable: Market capitalization to GDP 
Adjusted R2 BIC AIC 
variables coefficient t-stat variables coefficient t-stat variables coefficient t-stat 
constant 59.41471 1.11 constant -33.7347* -1.71 constant 21.16889 0.53 
commonlo -59.9105** -2.36 buddhist -55.8888* -2.01 commonlo -42.4113* -1.85 
catholic -52.1069** -2.05 disclosure 79.89962** 2.23 catholic -47.3812* -1.89 
protestant -36.609 -1.33 nanalysts 2.686142*** 3.04 protestant -36.022 -1.3 
muslim -39.954 -1.45 tradeopenness1999 0.450629*** 3.41 muslim -43.3275 -1.58 
buddhist -105.144*** -3.27    buddhist -106.558*** -3.29 
rulelaw 9.195305* 1.83    rulelaw 6.279413 1.64 
staff 1.116014 1.47    disclosure 85.46097* 1.97 
disclosure 98.30448** 2.25    nanalysts 2.212807* 1.94 
nanalysts 2.204876* 1.95    tradeopenness1999 0.45314*** 3.27 
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tradeopenness1999 0.297112 1.66    employment -98.682* -1.96 
employment -93.8719* -1.84       
newspaper -13.7239 -1.2       
Adjust R2 0.5683  Adjust R2 0.4977  Adjust R2 0.5604  
Panel B 
Dependent Variable: Number of listed firms 
Adjusted R2 BIC AIC 
variables coefficient t-stat variables coefficient t-stat variables coefficient t-stat 
constant -52.6161** -2.13 constant -99.7535*** -5.67 constant -52.6161** -2.13 
itprosecution1999 11.40569* 1.99 rantid2003dlls 8.915743 4.18 itprosecution1999 11.40569* 1.99 
rantid2003dlls 8.728089*** 4.2 commonlo -31.2495 -3.96 rantid2003dlls 8.728089*** 4.2 
commonlo -24.6719*** -2.9 catholic -21.5114 -3.78 commonlo -24.6719*** -2.9 
germanlo 14.96768** 2.22 protestant -13.9758 -2.28 germanlo 14.96768** 2.22 
mixedlo 16.55024* 1.77 buddhist -46.2469 -5.02 mixedlo 16.55024* 1.77 
catholic -20.9389*** -2.89 rulelaw 3.131044 2.14 catholic -20.9389*** -2.89 
protestant -17.0137** -2.43 staff 1.191637 7.25 protestant -17.0137** -2.43 
muslim -10.5038 -1.32 disclosure 49.51001 3.75 muslim -10.5038 -1.32 
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buddhist -56.0862*** -6.01 nanalysts -0.97982 -3.08 buddhist -56.0862*** -6.01 
rulelaw 4.611868*** 3.05 education1960 -71.4729 -3.06 rulelaw 4.611868*** 3.05 
staff 1.337108*** 7.9 lifee1960s 2.451915 5.34 staff 1.337108*** 7.9 
disclosure 42.06503*** 2.89 latitude -67.2939 -3.87 disclosure 42.06503*** 2.89 
nanalysts -1.1556*** -3.39    nanalysts -1.1556*** -3.39 
education1960 -99.8255*** -4.18    education1960 -99.8255*** -4.18 
lifee1960s 2.313538*** 4.94    lifee1960s 2.313538*** 4.94 
latitude -67.064*** -3.97    latitude -67.064*** -3.97 
ethnolinguistic -17.7994 -1.58    ethnolinguistic -17.7994 -1.58 
newspaper -5.0717 -1.47    newspaper -5.0717 -1.47 
Adjust R2 0.8417  Adjust R2 0.8159  Adjust R2 0.8417  
Panel C 
Dependent Variable: IPO value to GDP 
Adjusted R2 BIC AIC 
variables coefficient t-stat variables coefficient t-stat variables coefficient t-stat 
constant -24.3101*** -5.24 constant -20.1848*** -4.72 constant -24.31009*** -5.24 
antisdi -3.52686* -1.8 check 1.709457*** 3.12 antisdi -3.52686* -1.8 
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check 2.082582*** 3.86 frenchlo 3.272567*** 3.11 check 2.082582*** 3.86 
itprosecution1999 1.619699* 2 commonlo 4.204305*** 4.56 itprosecution1999 1.619699* 2 
frenchlo 3.141777** 2.64 germanlo 2.79923** 2.47 frenchlo 3.141777** 2.64 
commonlo 4.106025*** 3.75 catholic -2.478*** -2.82 commonlo 4.106025*** 3.75 
germanlo 2.646634** 2.38 disclosure 4.164101** 2.35 germanlo 2.646634** 2.38 
catholic -1.7207 -1.66 education1960 7.70932*** 3.37 catholic -1.7207 -1.66 
protestant 1.563097 1.46 latitude 5.575062*** 3.32 protestant 1.563097 1.46 
buddhist -1.841 -1.46 tradeopenness1999 0.014955** 2.47 buddhist -1.841*** -1.46 
disclosure 5.906486*** 2.8    disclosure 5.906486*** 2.8 
education1960 8.496303*** 3.23    education1960 8.496303*** 3.23 
unreceptive 1.98643* 2    unreceptive 1.98643* 2 
latitude 7.028197*** 3.06    latitude 7.028197*** 3.06 
tradeopenness1999 0.021763*** 3.08    tradeopenness1999 0.021763*** 3.08 
employment -3.3294 -1.4    employment -3.3294 -1.4 
Adjust R2 0.6416  Adjust R2 0.5762  Adjust R2 0.6416  
Panel D 
Dependent Variable: Stock traded 
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Adjusted R2 BIC AIC 
variables coefficient t-stat variables coefficient t-stat variables coefficient t-stat 
constant -22.3137 -0.24 constant -188.496** -2.69 constant -22.8643 -0.24 
check -18.8161* -1.98 germanlo 41.00248** 2.05 check -17.6743* -1.86 
itprosecution1999 25.07133 1.62 buddhist -52.9213** -2.24 itprosecution1999 22.36984 1.46 
rantid2003dlls -11.2484* -1.71 disclosure 97.51184*** 3.21 rantid2003dlls -11.8733* -1.8 
germanlo 48.97889** 2.58 nanalysts 2.742327*** 3.1 germanlo 47.02773** 2.47 
Buddhist -50.6591** -2.16 lifee1960s 2.100479** 2.2 buddhist -50.4366** -2.14 
disclosure 90.40719** 2.67 unreceptive 38.6921** 2.05 disclosure 93.6075*** 2.76 
nanalysts 2.077311** 2.05    nanalysts 2.218267** 2.2 
education1960 -59.4014 -1.15    lifee1960s 2.043627** 2.17 
lifee1960s 2.918097** 2.42    unreceptive 64.19493*** 3.23 
unreceptive 67.03828*** 3.36    steps -4.31911** -2.22 
steps -4.02736** -2.06    tradeopenness1999 -0.18249 -1.6 
tradeopenness1999 -0.172 -1.51       
Adjust R2 0.6078  Adjust R2 0.5404  Adjust R2 0.6041  
Notes: a The sample has 48 countries.    
b No variables are fixed in the model specification.  
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c *, **, *** stand for 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level respectively. 
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3 Minority shareholder protection, underpricing, and the 
decision to issue external equity 
3.1 Introduction 
This Chapter focuses on the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders in 
public corporations on firms’ equity financing decisions (initial public offering and 
seasoned equity offering).27 Following the seminar work “Law and Finance” by 
LLSV, the academics have formed the view that shareholder protection has positive 
effects on various stock market outcomes. The documented cross-country evidence 
shows that better shareholder protection is associated with higher percentage of 
long-term finance (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998), higher proportion of 
external finance and more dispersed ownership structure (LLSV, 1997, 1998), higher 
valuation of firm (LLSV, 2002), larger market capitalization and number of listed 
firms (Pagano and Volpin, 2006; DLLS., 2008), and greater market liquidity 
(Cumming et al., 2011), and more efficient resource allocation (Mclean et al. 2012).28  
 
Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002, henceforth SW) provide an influential general 
equilibrium theory resting on the intuition that better legal protection of the minority 
shareholders imposes larger costs on tunneling activities and hence reduces the costs 
of external finance. SW incorporate the “crime and punishment” strategy (Becker, 
1968) into the framework of agency problem between majority shareholder and 
minority shareholder in corporate finance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and argue 
                                                             
27 The literature seems to assume homogenous effects of different legal institutions on stock 
market outcomes. One of the most influential index “Anti-director rights index” by LLSV (1998) 
is shown to be positively correlated with multiple stock market outcomes in cross sectional studies. 
However, recent researches have already began to notice that the agency problems in different 
countries are heterogeneous, see Martynova and Renneboog (2011). For the remainder of the 
Chapter, we refer interchangeably to "minority shareholders" and "investors". 
28 See two survey articles La Porta et al. (2008) and Xu (2011). And several empirical studies 
complements to this literature that the protection of minority shareholders is effective only if they 
are enforced, see Bhattacharya and Daouk. (2002) for an analysis of insider trading rules, and 
Linciano (2003) for an event study of Italy. 
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that with better investor protection, more firms go public, more funds are raised and 
also channeled to higher-productivity projects. This crime and punishment framework 
is also applied by LLSV. (2002) and Durnev and Kim (2005) in discussing the 
corporate valuation and corporate governance.  
 
However, the empirical proposition of “law matters” has been challenged ever since it 
comes out as an explanation for the anomaly that U.K. and U.S. have dispersed 
ownership structure (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Both business histories of U.K. and 
U.S. suggest that the shares of listed firms have become diffused long before relevant 
legal institutions are established (Cheffins, 2001; Coffee, 2001). Data on American 
firms suggest that though they do not have controlling shareholders, but the 
percentage of firms having block shareholders is similar to that of other countries 
(Holderness, 2009). And for British listed firms, the dispersed ownership was already 
prevalent at the beginning of the 20th century, which is driven mainly by mergers 
(Franks et al., 2009). Furthermore, the workhorse of these empirical researches, cross 
sectional regressions with legal origins as instrumental variables, is rejected since it 
fails to satisfy the exclusion restrictions (La Port et al., 2008; Bazzi and Clemens, 
2009). Thirdly, the methodology of constructing the indices is questioned, and 
recoding of the index or newly constructed index fails to find significant results 
(Spamann, 2010; Armour et al., 2009).  
 
Finally, shareholder’s interests are not homogenous and conflicts of interests exist 
especially between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. It is 
unrealistic to assume that the interests of minority shareholders are in alignment with 
those of the shareholder groups. Anabtawi (2005) suggests that minority shareholders 
will use their disproportionate influence, if they have, to seek rent and pursue their 
private benefits rather than maximize the interests of the firm. Belloc (2013), basing 
on the “team production” theory of Blair and Stout (1999), finds that minority 
shareholders conferred with strong control power tend to discourage firms’ innovative 
activities, which requires specific sunk investment with little salvage value. The 
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incentives for the minority shareholders to hold up after the commencing of the 
projects induce the suboptimal level of majority shareholders’ investment. 
 
Hence, the empirical foundation of the theory that law matters for stock market 
development is at least doubtful, which is shown in the previous Chapter. Following 
this spirit, this Chapter considers a subset of narrower stock market development 
outcomes, the IPOs and SEOs markets, and focuses on the effects of corporate 
governance rules regarding the division of power between corporate insiders and 
minority shareholders on these outcomes. Firm-level empirical studies suggest that 
newly listed firms have concentrated ownership regardless of the level of investor 
protection (Foley and Greenwood, 2010), and hence in a fair long period after IPO the 
major agency problem will be that between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders, rather than that between directors and shareholders group. 
Over-empowered minority shareholders may reduce controller’s private benefits to a 
level below the efficient one, which fails to compensate for controller’s costs of 
creating and implementing projects and monitoring managers, and some ex ante 
efficient firms with positive NPV projects may not be formed. 
 
The theoretical part introduces private costs to controllers in addition to the costs of 
external equity. For example, according to Ritter (1987), the costs of underpricing and 
underwriting takes approximately 30 percent of the total raised funding. Of course, 
only the underpricing costs are endogenous to the power of minority shareholders and 
will influence the marginal firms’ decision to undertake IPO. The benefits come from 
the net present value (NPV) brought about by the new project.  
 
Financial studies on the underpricing are proliferative.29 The most relevant theory 
rests on the agency problem analyzed by Jensen and Meckling (1976). The controllers 
underprice the shares to maintain their control and avoid monitoring by large block 
                                                             
29  See Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) for an excellent discussion on the literature of 
underpricing.  
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shareholders (Brennan and Franks, 1997). By underpricing, the issuer ensures that 
shares are oversubscribed, and rations the shares to dispersed investors to prevent 
formation of large block shareholders. When investors are conferred with greater 
power to challenge and monitor controller’s decisions, controllers will underprice the 
“asset in place” more to induce excess demand, which results in greater ownership 
dispersion. This is the major assumption involved in this study. 
 
Furthermore, the minority shareholder protection is assumed to be homogenous across 
different firms and determined exogenously by public rules. The literature shows that 
firms may actively bind themselves with better governance practices than the 
minimum legal requirements, for example, through drafting binding covenants in 
corporate charter (Klapper and Love, 2004). And the high quality governance rules 
indeed increase firms’ valuation, as shown in Gompers et al. (2003), who construct a 
“Governance Index” incorporating 24 components proxy for the shareholder rights 
against management.30 However, the strategy is justified from two perspectives. First, 
Bebchuk (2002) points out that listed firms lack incentives to write optimal charter 
provisions, and proposes that when considering the asymmetric information, the firms 
will offer inefficient IPO corporate charters, and the mandatory protections of 
investors are important. Second, Doidge et al. (2007) carry out a cross-country 
empirical analysis and find that country-specific characteristics account for more than 
two thirds of variance in governance rating, indicating the importance of macro 
institutions. The reason that country-level characteristics matter so much lies in its 
influence on the costs and benefits that firms incur to bond themselves to good 
governance. To convince investors that firms perform high-quality governance system 
and hence reduce the costs of external finance, they have to credibly commit 
themselves to such governance arrangement, which is expensive in countries with 
                                                             
30 Bebchuk et al. (2009) show that six of the twenty-four components have already accounted for 
most of the explanatory power of “Governance Index”, and propose an “Entrenchment Index” 
including six components: “staggered boards”, “limits to shareholder bylaw amendments”, 
“poison pills”, “golden parachutes”, and “supermajority requirements for mergers and charter 
amendments”.  
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poor investor protection. For example, the audit system could be too weak to check 
the quality of disclosure of listed firms. 
 
The comparative statics analysis indicates that the controller’s post-IPO wealth 
negatively correlates with the level of investor protection. Hence, the controllers of 
the marginal firms intending to undertake IPO could decide to stay private when 
minority shareholder protection improves, because they are worse off undertaking the 
IPO. In contrast, two factors, the preemptive rights and dispersed ownership of listed 
firms, distinguish seasoned offerings from IPOs, which should still have positive 
relationship with minority shareholder protection. As a result, the dynamic effects of 
minority shareholder protection on marginal firms’ issuance decisions are not 
monotonous.    
 
To empirically test these predictions, this paper employs two stock market outcomes, 
the number of listed firms and stock market capitalization, as the dependent variables. 
In addition, a newly assembled index for protection of minority shareholders in listed 
companies in 25 countries for 11 years is used as the independent variable of interest 
(Armour et al., 2009). The author adopts the GMM-sys estimator, which exploits the 
internal generated instruments, to control for endogeneity. The outputs show that 
estimates dealing with fixed and dynamic effects, contradict with those using standard 
OLS technique. The over-optimistic cross sectional empirical results are probably due 
to the omitted variable bias. The empirical outputs confirm the negative correlation 
between minority shareholder protection and number of listed firms, which is due to 
the reduced number of new entrants to the stock market. Nevertheless, it still 
positively correlates with the market capitalization, which indicates that costs of 
underpricing are insignificant to the controllers of listed firms, and seasoned offering 
is facilitated by improved minority shareholder protection.  
 
The rest of this Chapter is arranged as follows: Section 3.2 discusses and extends the 
law and finance theories on the IPO markets, and Section 3.3 proposes the model, 
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which conducts a comparative static analysis on firms’ decision to undertake IPO 
under different level of minority shareholder protection. Section 3.4 briefly introduces 
the dataset. Section 3.5 presents the empirical outputs using GMM-sys estimator. And 
Section 3.6 concludes. 
3.2 Complicating the law and finance theories of IPO market 
Previous cross-country empirical studies often overlook variances along the time 
dimension. A leading work argues that the within variance is important to 
understanding stock market development is Rajan and Zingales (2003), who point out 
that legal origins could not accommodate the changes in the relative development of 
the stock market during the 20th century. In addition, Franks et al. (2009) exploit the 
variation of “Anti-director rights index” along time in U.K., and find that ownership 
of British firms does not become more dispersed when shareholder protection is 
improved. This section analyzes the long-term variation of IPO markets in U.K. and 
U.S., and argues that the empirical positive relationship between IPO markets and 
minority shareholder protection is untenable. 
3.2.1 Case studies: IPO markets in United Kingdom and United 
States 
Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2, which present the shareholder protection level and annual 
IPO number in U.K. and U.S. respectively from 1975 to 2005, illustrate the concern 
that the missing within-country variance may greatly bias our understanding of the 
relationship between IPO number and shareholder protection. For example, in Figure 
3.1, the level of shareholder protection in U.K. is improving, but in contrast, the 
number of firms undertaking IPO on the market is changing drastically. In addition, 
there is hot market in the period between 1996 and 2000 with average 109 annual 
IPOs, and cold market between 1989 and 1993 with average 27 annual IPOs. Similar 
phenomena could also be observed in U.S. as is shown in Figure 3.2 that there are 113 
3 Minority shareholder protection, underpricing, and the decision to issue external equity 
68 
annual IPOs between 1984 and 1988 on average, and only 17 annual IPOs between 
1989 and 1992. In the beginning of 20th century when Enron scandal is revealed, the 
American legislature passed the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, which greatly improves the 
protection to investors. The act was enacted on 30th July, 2002, which did not bring 
about immediate increase in the number of firms trying to list on the market. The 
number recovers to about half the level before the crisis until 2004. 
 
 
Data on the annual number of IPOs were drawn from Chambers and Dimson (2009, IPO 
Underpricing over the Very Long Run. Journal of Finance 64(3): 1407-1443), and data on 
shareholder protection index were provided by Professor Deakin 
(http://www.cbr.cam.ac.U.K./research/projects/project2-20output.htm). The IPO number excludes 
introductions, closed-end funds (known in the U.K. as investment trusts), transfers from a junior 
market, and by firms already quoted on another exchange, “penny” stock IPOs, defined as those 
with an offer price of two shillings or less (10 pence or less after decimalization in 1972), and 
government privatizations, which there were relatively few, mainly in the 1980s. The “shareholder 
protection index” is comprised of 60 sub-variables, of which 42 measure the shareholder 
protection against directors and senior management and 18 measure the protection against other 
controlling shareholders. 
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Figure 3.1 Time series of IPO number and shareholder protection level in U.K. 1975-2005 
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Data on the annual number of IPOs were provided by Professor Ritter 
(http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/IPOs2012Statistics.pdf), and data on shareholder protection 
index were provided by Professor Deakin 
(http://www.cbr.cam.ac.U.K./research/projects/project2-20output.htm). IPO number excludes 
those with an offer price smaller than $5.00, excluding ADRs, unit offers, closed-end funds, REITs, 
partnerships, small best efforts offers, banks and S&Ls, and stocks not listed on CRSP (CRSP 
includes Amex, NYSE, and NASDAQ stocks). The “shareholder protection index” is comprised 
of 60 sub-variables, of which 42 measure the shareholder protection against directors and senior 
management and 18 measure the protection against other controlling shareholders. 
 
The volatility of IPO number over time raises several questions about studies relying 
only on the cross-sectional variations. First, the straightforward intuition that more 
firms will go public when equity financing becomes cheaper due to improved 
shareholder protection is elusive. Second, for cross sectional analysis, the “window” 
picked to measure the IPO number is crucial. For example, LLSV (1997) employ the 
IPO number of a sample of countries between July 1995 and June 1996, and La Port 
et al. (2006) and DLLS (2008) employ the average number over 1996 to 2000, all of 
which from are in a period of hot market for U.S. and U.K..   
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Third, there must be omitted variables bias for cross sectional studies as the IPO 
number changes so volatile and follow a different pattern from that of the shareholder 
protection. Usually the cross sectional analysis will control for GDP growth rate, or 
other legal institutions such as disclosure standards or enforcement intensity, the 
common variables examined extensively in the financial literature on determinants of 
IPO volume, such as market sentiment, is not controlled. As a result, the rest of this 
section investigates both the supply and demand side of the equity financing market, 
and complicates the law and finance theory on the determinants of IPO market 
development. 
3.2.2 A united theories of market participants’ response to variations 
in shareholder protection 
It is implicitly assumed in most law and finance theoretical studies that once equity 
becomes cheaper due to better minority shareholder protection, ceteris paribus, firms 
will consume more equity finance.31 Actually, the way of thinking assigns a passive 
role to firms in deciding whether to take the external finance. However, the two 
figures presented before show that this may not be the case as minority shareholder 
power is not the only factor influencing firms’ IPO decisions.  
 
Two theories on firms’ financial choices suggest that they actively choose whether to 
issue external equity. The first one comes from Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers 
(1984), who consider the asymmetric information between firms and investors about 
“asset in place”, and argues that equity finance signals to the market that the firm is of 
low quality. Hence, firms may follow the pecking order to employ more 
information-insensitive sources of finance, such as retained earnings, even if equity 
                                                             
31 For example, LLSV (2002: 1147) argue that “by limiting expropriation, the law raises the price 
that securities fetch in the marketplace. In turn, this enables more entrepreneurs to finance their 
investments externally, leading to the expansion of financial markets”. 
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finance becomes cheaper. As a result, firms may stick to debt financing when costs of 
adverse selection are huge.  
 
Second, Baker and Wurgler (2002) provide evidence that firms’ capital structure is 
determined by past attempts to time the market. By timing the market, they mean that 
issuers sell the shares when their valuation is high and buyback when their valuation 
is low. In their view, the leverage ratio results from these cumulative choices for both 
IPO and seasoned offering. The issuer’s intent to time the market during IPO is 
documented in the literature. Rajan and Servaes (1995) find that for American 
companies undertaking IPO, the average market to book ratio of the same industry is 
8 percent higher than the average over the surrounding 5 years and 18 percent higher 
than the average for all public firms. Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998) find that the 
industrial market to book ratio significantly explains the reason why Italian firms 
undertake IPO. Hence the next two subsections consider both the supply and demand 
side of the equity financing market respectively.  
3.2.2.1 The demand side of equity market 
By demand side of equity market, this paper means the investors, who buy the 
securities, i.e. the shares, and provide finance to issuers. A possible channel through 
which investor protection encourage investors to participate is that it is positively 
correlated with the market sentiment. Shleifer and Summers (1990) emphasize the 
role of “noise traders”, who are uninformed and chase the trend of stock market. 
Lowry (2003) conducts a time series analysis of the IPO market in U.S. and finds that 
market sentiment significantly explains the IPO volume, which is also negatively 
correlated with both raw IPO post-issue returns and post-issue market return, hinting 
that investors buy shares at a relative high level. Then, if increased (decreased) 
investor protection could ignite an over- optimal (pessimistic) sentiment, it is possible 
that the number of IPO will positively correlated with the level of investor protection.  
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To shed light on whether market participants become optimistic once the legal power 
conferred upon them increases, the author gathers the U.S. market sentiment data, 
which is shown in Figure 3.3 together with the shareholder protection level. 
 
 
Data on the investor sentiment were provided by Professor Wurgler 
(http://people.stern.nyu.edu/jwurgler/), and data on shareholder protection index were provided by 
Professor Deakin (http://www.cbr.cam.ac.U.K./research/projects/project2-20output.htm). The 
sentiment index is the principal component of six factors: “Value-weighted dividend premium”, 
“IPO volume”, “First-day returns on IPOs”, “Closed-end fund discount”, “Equity share in new 
issues and NYSE turnover”, all of which are transformed to be orthogonal to macro outcomes 
(Baker and Wurgler, 2006). The “shareholder protection index” is comprised of 60 sub-variables, 
of which 42 measure the shareholder protection against directors and senior management and 18 
measure the protection against other controlling shareholders. 
 
In Figure 3.3, it is observed that before 1990s the shareholder protection and investor 
sentiment co-move together, hinting that legal institutions could influence the 
investors sentiment. However, the relationship is not so obvious after 1990s, 
especially between 2000 and 2005, when the corporate governance scandals in U.S. 
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broke out. Though the legislature enacted the Sarbanes–Oxley Act on July 30, 2002, 
the investor sentiment is not recovered immediately.  
3.2.2.2 The supply side of equity market 
The supply side of the equity market, i.e. the issuer of securities, is much more 
complex considering their active role in choosing whether to issue external equity. 
Firms are taken public with different purposes. For example, most of the prevalent 
models, such as Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002), LLSV (2002), assume that firms are 
controlled by insiders, who will exploit private benefits of control. Therefore, how to 
maintain his controlling status will be the major concern for the issuer. In contrast, 
some firms are taken public to sell and the insiders will maintain a marginal amount 
of shares (as block shareholders), where valuation will be the only concern. Burkart et 
al. (2003) provide a framework to understand the reasons why such concern on 
valuation is optimal in countries with efficient minority shareholder protection. 
However, if private benefits of control are significant, even firms taken public to sell 
may end up with higher valuation, if the controllers could sell the cash flow and 
control rights separately (Zingales, 1995). 
 
As a result, it is argued that protection of minority shareholder influences IPO 
decisions through two channels: One is increasing valuation of the shares sold, the 
other is undermining the dominant shareholder’s control. Previous studies only focus 
on the beneficial side of shareholder protection, and overlook the costs of issuing 
equity, which according to Loughran et al. (1994) could reach 80.3% of the capital 
raised. The costs of underpricing will reduce the controller’s wealth, as shown by 
Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) that controllers will employ more costly promotion 
strategies to reduce the magnitude of underpricing. 
 
IPO underprcing could be due to various reasons, at least theoretically. The researches 
on underpricing of shares during IPO start from the effects of asymmetric information, 
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which though is exogenous to the model presented below, but relevant in the 
empirical part. Normally the IPO process involves three participants: Issuers, 
investment banks, and investors. Rock (1986) starts to model underpricing as 
compensation to uninformed investors and protecting them from the “winner’s curse”. 
Further studies regard underpricing as information production costs. Allen and 
Faulhaber (1989) and Welch (1989) employ a signaling model where firms with high 
quality projects signal to the market of their type to achieve a separating equilibrium. 
Sherman and Titman (2002), in contrast, regard underpricing as the costs to induce the 
investors to reveal their price and demand information. Hence the IPO clustering, 
observed in both Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 may due to the fact that the economy of 
scale in valuing securities. Finally, there are also agency problem between issuer and 
investment banks, which may not try to maximize the issuer’s wealth. Loughran and 
Ritter (2004) find that investment banks use the underpriced shares as side payments 
to their long-term customers for future business.  
 
Minority shareholder power will influence the controller borne costs of underpricing 
through two channels based on the principal-agent theory.32 The first one focuses on 
the monitoring role provided by the blocking shareholders, which greatly increases 
the valuation of outside shares. Stoughton and Zechner (1998) model the relationship 
by assuming that shareholders differ in their abilities to monitor the controllers, and 
large shareholders have the comparative advantage in doing so. To exploit the 
externality of their monitoring efforts, shares are rationed towards large shareholders 
forming block shareholders. The level of underpricing will be negatively correlated 
with the minority shareholder power as fewer benefits will be generated from 
monitoring activities in efficient regulated markets. 
 
                                                             
32 Smith (1776) first think about the effects of agency problem on corporate governance: “The 
directors of such companies, however, being the managers rather of other people’s money than of 
their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious 
vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own” (Book 
5, Ch. 1.3.1.2). 
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Optimal monitoring is studied by several papers in other contexts. Pagano and Roell 
(1998) model that controllers will choose the optimal ownership structure to induce 
the optimal amount of the monitoring from block shareholders, which is due to the 
fact that controllers’ bearing all the agency costs. They face the trade-off between over 
monitoring and costs of going public. Burkart and Panunzi (2006) instead argue that 
legal protection may be substitute or complement to block shareholder monitoring. As 
a result, the relationship between shareholder protection and the optimal ownership 
structure is not monotonous. 
 
The second channel is proposed by Brennan and Franks (1997) and focuses on private 
control, which is taken as the major concern in the next section. Taking firms public, 
the controllers then face monitoring of outside investors, which will prevent them 
from gaining private benefits of control. Ex ante they have an incentive to underprice 
their shares to induce subscription of the dispersed investors and ration the shares to 
minority shareholders. Hence, underpricing is an instrument to entrench the 
managerial control and prevents the amassing of block shareholders. When outside 
investors are conferred with greater power and consequently minority monitoring 
become more easily, controllers will underprice the shares to a greater magnitude to 
induce more subscription of shares and more dispersed shareholding post-IPO. The 
model predicts a positive relationship between the magnitude of underpricing and the 
level of shareholder protection. 
 
Consequently, the relationship between the magnitude of underprcing and minority 
shareholder power is an empirical issue. Smart and Zutter (2003) compare the IPO 
underprcing between single and dual-class companies, and controlling for other 
factors, dual-class companies underprice 2.9 percentages less. As dual-class shares 
separate the cash flow rights from the voting right, they are comparatively more 
protected from market acquisition and minority monitoring. When undertaking IPO, 
controllers will care less about forming a dispersed ownership structure, and so the 
magnitude of underpricing is smaller. 
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Another recent empirical work by Boulton et al. (2010) employs a large firm-level 
data set of 4462 IPOs across 22 countries, and confirms the positive relationship 
between minority shareholder protection and the magnitude of underpricing. When 
the outsiders are more easily to monitor insiders due to better legal protection, the 
issuer underprices the “asset in place” more to amass a more dispersed ownership 
structure. As a result, in the following section, the author assumes net positive effects 
of minority shareholder power on magnitude of underpricing. 
3.3 Theoretical Considerations 
This section analyzes the effect of minority shareholder protection on the post-IPO 
wealth of the firm’s controller, in the presence of underpricing of “asset in place”, and 
generates the testable hypotheses. The model is closely related to those employed in 
Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002), LLSV (2002), and Durnev and Kim (2005).  
3.3.1 A simple model 
Consider a representative firm in a given country, which is privately owned by a 
single controller with an “asset in place” standardized to one unit, and has a project 
requiring investment e with the productivity rate g∈[0,  ), which is known to all 
stakeholders. Also the firm is assumed to be cash constrained, so any amount invested 
must be raised through outside equity.33 For simplicity, all stakeholders are assumed 
to be risk neutral and there is no transaction cost. In addition, following Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and SW, the controller is assumed to divert the asset of the firm to 
himself. If he diverts, he is assumed to be caught with probability k[0,1], where the 
parameter k reflects the level of minority shareholder protection (Becker, 1968). The 
higher value of k corresponds to better minority shareholder protection.  
                                                             
33 Firms with accumulated financial slacks, which are known to outsiders, shall not change the 
main results. And we follow the literature assuming that firms could not switch between equity 
and debt finance. For example Bharath et al. (2009) show that the level of asymmetric information 
will change of firms’ propensity to use debt to finance its deficit. 
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The model has two dates, which is shown in Figure 3.4. At date 1, the firm is assumed 
to actively decide whether to undertake IPO, and i(k), the required rate of return for 
equity finance, is assumed exogenous to the firm, which equals market interest rate 
plus a premium of agency costs (Lombardo and Pagano, 1999). Better minority 
shareholder protection limits the managerial discretion and reduces the agency costs, 
and thus i(k) is a decreasing function of k. The leading role taken by the firm 
considers the fact that it could follow “pecking order”, and pass the equity finance 
even if it becomes cheaper, and stick to less information-sensitive sources of finance, 
such as retained earnings (Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
 
If the controller takes the firm public to raise the funding e for the new project, he 
deliberately values the “asset in place” to an underpriced amount of u(k) to create 
excess demand for the shares. The underpricing of “asset in place” is the model’s 
major difference from previous ones. The magnitude of underpricing is a decreasing 
function of the legal protection of minority shareholder, k. Consequently, the 
controller’s share of firm post IPO is x=u(k)/(u(k)+e).  
 
Figure 3.4 The sequence of events 
               Initial stage      IPO       Tunneling and realizing the payoff 
 
0              1              2           T 
 
At date 2, the project generates g return, and the controller is assumed to tunnel a 
share, d(k), of the assets of the firm to himself (SW, 2002; LLSV, 2002; Durnev and 
Kim, 2005). If the owner is caught diverting, he is forced to return the diverted 
amount to the firm, and additionally, to pay a fine, p(d) share of the valuation of the 
firm at the end of period, to the authority. In this scenario, the entire revenue is 
distributed as dividend. Consequently, the controller’s expected wealth after the 
realization of the project’s revenue is given by   
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F(k) = {k[x-p(d)]+(1-k)[x(1-d(k))+d(k))]}* [1+e*(g+1)] 
 
The assumptions about the general properties of the ownership function x(.), diversion 
function d(.), and penalty function p(.) are made as follows: 
 
Assumptions The ownership function x(.), diversion function d(.), and penalty 
function p(.) are assumed to satisfy 
(A1) p(0)=0, p(.)≥0, d(.)≥0, x(.)≥0 
(A2) ∂d/∂k <0, ∂u/∂k <0 
(A3) ∂p/∂d > 0, ∂2p/ ∂2d >0 
 
First, (A1) requires that if the controller does not divert, there will be no penalty, and 
both p(.) and d(.) are non negative, as both penalty and diversion cannot take the 
negative amount. In addition, controller’s ownership x(.) is assumed to be nonnegative. 
Second, the first term in (A2) requires that the diversion amount is a decreasing 
function of the level of investor protection. Controlling for other factors, the better is 
the minority shareholder protection, the fewer of firm’s assets are diverted by the 
controller. Also as is explained before, the underpricing magnitude is assumed to be 
an increasing function of the minority shareholder protection. Finally, the first part of 
(A3) follows that the penalty is an increasing function of the diverted amount, since a 
higher fine will be paid to the authority as the controller diverts more firms’ resources 
to himself. The second term of (A3) implies that the marginal fine increase with the 
diverted amount.  
 
Proposition 1. At the equilibrium, the firms undertaking IPO shall satisfy the both of 
the following two conditions: 
(P1) g ≧i(k) 
(P2) F(k)|d* ≧1  
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Proposition 1 is the decision rule for the controller, and the proof of this proposition is 
straightforward. Using backward induction, at date 1 if the controller decides to 
undertake IPO, then at date 2 both the valuation of the firm and the wealth of the 
controller shall be maximized. The first condition (P1) guarantees the maximization 
of firm’s valuation. Since all parties are assumed to have perfect information about the 
project, the negative NPV projects will not be financed by investors. Thus, the 
possibility that controllers gain only from exploiting the minority shareholders are 
excluded. (P2) follows as the controller shall be at least no worse off financing the 
project than doing nothing at all. Consequently, at the end of the period, the wealth of 
the controller shall be no less than the one at the beginning of the period. 
 
Proposition 2. The controller’s ownership of firm’s asset at the optimal diversion 
level at date 2 is a decreasing function of minority shareholder protection. Let f(k)= 
k[x-p(d)]+(1-k)[x(1-d(k))+d(k))], then the ownership function f(k) is a decreasing 
function of k at the ex post optimal diversion rate d(.)*. 
Proof: See Appendix A. 
 
By definition, f(k) is defined as the controller’s share of firm’s asset at date 2. 
Proposition 2 indicates that at the optimal diversion rate d(.)*, the controller’s 
ownership, f(k)|d*, decreases as the level of minority shareholder protection increases 
and increases as the level of minority shareholder protection decreases. The reason 
that it is focused on the optimal, rather than any diversion level, is that only the ex 
post optimal level d(.)* enters the controller’s pre-issuance cost-and-benefit analysis.  
3.3.2 Comparative statics analysis  
In this subsection, the previous model is applied to compare firms’ decision to 
undertake IPO at the high level of minority shareholder protection kH with that at the 
low level kL. The market required rate of return is a decreasing function of k therefore 
i(kH)< i(kL). Additionally, by Proposition 2, the controller’s expected wealth F(k)|d* is 
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also a decreasing function of k, which means for any given firm, its controller’s 
wealth F(kH)|d*<F(kL)|d*. Without considering the costs of underpricing, the firm 
should take all the positive NPV projects to maximize its valuation as proposed in SW. 
However, certain positive NPV projects may fail to compensate the controllers for the 
value they give up at IPO. Hence, the minority shareholders protection shall not exerts 
homogenous effects on firms with different characteristics.  
 
The universe of the firm could be partitioned to four groups. The firms’ decisions to 
undertake IPO in first two groups will not be influenced by minority shareholder 
protection. The first group is the one which will never undertake IPOs. They are either 
with extremely productivity rate, i.e. g< i(kH), or with extremely low private benefits 
to the controller, i.e. F(kL)|d*<1. The attributes of firms in the third subgroup are more 
complicated, satisfying both i(kH)≤g< i(kL) and F(kH)|d*<1≤F(kL)|d*. When minority 
shareholder protection is low, the productivity rate is smaller than the market required 
rate of return, though the controller could get positive benefits from financing the 
project. In contrast, when minority shareholder protection is high, the project brings 
positive NPV to the firm, but the controller fails to get positive benefits. 
 
The second group of firms will always undertake IPO regardless the level of minority 
shareholder protection. They have both the productivity rate no smaller than the 
market interest rate at low minority shareholder protection level, and the “asset in 
place” no larger than than the controller’s private benefits at high level minority 
shareholder protection, i.e. both g≥ i(kL) and F(kH)|d*≥1. 
 
The influence of changes in interest rate is relatively straight forward, while that of 
the controller’s wealth merits some explanations. Rearranging the condition (P2) 
yields: 
(P2’) f(k)|d**e*g 1- f(k)|d**(1+e) 
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The left hand side of (P2’) is controller’s expected benefits from the project, and the 
right hand side is the controller’s private costs due to financing the project. (P2’) 
requires that the controller’s private benefits are no smaller than the private costs from 
financing the project. Though the productivity rate is larger than the market required 
rate of return, the expected NPV could be low, so the net benefits generated from the 
project to the controller may fail to compensate him for the value he gives up.  
 
The other two groups of firms, whose decisions to undertake IPO depend on the level 
of minority shareholder protection, are defined as the marginal firms. For the first 
group of firms, the productivity rate is lower than the market interest rate at the low 
level of minority shareholder protection, but still higher than the market interest rate 
at the high level, i.e. i(kH)≤ g< i(kL). At the same time, the controllers could benefit 
from the project regardless of the level of minority shareholder protection, i.e. 
F(kH)|d*≥1. Consequently, the cost of the external finance is the major obstacle to 
taking the external equity finance. Hence, when minority shareholder protection 
increases (decreases), the required market rate of return decreases (increases) to a 
level smaller (larger) than the productivity rate, then the firm will change from staying 
private (undertaking IPO) to undertaking IPO (staying private). The change in the 
number of firms undertaking IPO due to different interest rates is defined as the 
interest rate effect, which is positive in the sense that the number is an increasing 
function of the minority shareholder protection. 
 
In contrast, for the second group of firms, the project’s productivity rate is very high 
and not the concern for financing the project, i.e. g≥i(kL). Due to the fact that the 
controller’s post-IPO wealth is a decreasing function of minority shareholder 
protection, its improvement could reduce the controller’s wealth to a level that is 
smaller than the “asset in place”, though he is able to benefit from the project at low 
level of minority shareholder protection, i.e. F(kH)|d*<1≤F(kL)|d*. In this scenario, the 
controller’s private benefit is the major obstacle to taking the external equity finance. 
Hence, when minority shareholder protection increases (decreases), the controller’s 
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post-IPO wealth decreases (increases) to an amount smaller (larger) than the “asset in 
place”, then the firm will change from undertaking IPO (staying private) to staying 
private (undertaking IPO). And this change in the number of firms undertaking IPO 
due to different level of controller’s private benefits is defined as the private benefit 
effect, which is negative in the sense that the number of firms is a decreasing function 
of the minority shareholder protection. 
3.3.3 The decision to make seasoned offering 
Another important source of external equity finance is seasoned offering. It is also 
well documented that seasoned equity finance exerts negative impacts on the share 
prices of listed firms,34 as equity finance signals to the market that they may 
undertake low-quality projects (Myers and Majluf, 1984).  
 
However, two factors distinguish the seasoned equity finance from IPO. First, 
generally speaking the ownership structure of listed firms is much more dispersed 
than that of the firm intending to undertake IPO (Franks et al., 2009; Foley and 
Greenwood, 2010).35 The costs of underpricing “asset in place” are shared among 
controllers and outside investors, while benefits due to tunneling from a larger firm 
are enjoyed by the controller alone. At this moment, the insider resembles 
professional managers. One extreme example is when the controller is professional 
manager, who holds no equity in the firm. Therefore, issuing external equity imposes 
no costs on him. Following condition (P2), any private benefit of control will induce 
the controller to make seasoned offering.  
 
In addition, the controller could not dilute the shareholdings of block shareholders 
during seasoned offering, as the company law in most countries offers shareholders 
                                                             
34 Asquith and Mullins (1986) measure that announcement of equity issuance results in around 3 
percent negative shock to the stock price. 
35 For seasoned offering, the decision is made by controlling minority shareholders (Bebchuk, 
Kraakman, and Triantis, 2000), who own only a minority of cash flow rights, but controls greater 
votes. 
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preemptive rights, which grant shareholders the first opportunity to buy the new 
issues of stocks. Underpricing no longer serves as a tool for controllers to induce 
more subscription, since they cannot ration shares to dispersed investors. Hence, the 
assumption about the positive relationship between the magnitude of underpricing and 
the minority shareholder protection is no longer hold in seasoned offering. 
Consequently, for seasoned offering, it is expected that the interest rate effect is the 
major concern, and minority shareholder protection is positively correlated with the 
amount of seasoned offering. 
3.3.4 Testable hypotheses 
To test the net effect of minority shareholder protection on the marginal firms’ 
decisions to issue external equity, the author employs two stock market outcome 
variables. The number of listed firms is sensitive to the number of new entrants to the 
stock market, while the stock market capitalization is mainly influenced by the 
seasoned offering of those listed firms. Two testable hypotheses are as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1. Null Hypothesis (H0): The number of listed firms is positively 
correlated with the minority shareholder protection, and the interest rate effects 
dominate. 
Alternative Hypothesis (H1): The number of listed firms is negatively correlated with 
the minority shareholder protection, and the private benefit effects dominate. 
 
Hypothesis 2. Null Hypothesis (H0): The stock market capitalization is positively 
correlated with the protection of minority shareholder, and the interest rate effects 
dominate. 
Hypothesis (H1): The stock market capitalization is negatively correlated with the 
protection of minority shareholder, and the private benefit effects dominate. 
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3.4 Data 
The panel dataset of the minority shareholder protection, “Shareholder protection 
index (SPI)”, which comes from the “Law, Finance and Development” project at the 
Center for Business Research at the University of Cambridge and covers 25 countries 
for 11 years from 1995 to 2005, is employed to serve as the proxy for the minority 
shareholder protection level k.36 In the sampled countries, SPI converges to the 
generally accepted norms of corporate governance “best practice” (Armour et al., 
2009), and most of the countries constantly improve their standards. 
 
The reasons to choose this data set are as follows: First, SPI is a panel data set, which 
offers the opportunity to cope with both dynamic effects and the fixed effects. The 
cross-sectional analysis without valid instruments is severe biased due to its failure to 
deal with these effects. Second, the index incorporates both court decisions and 
default rules in addition to the “law on the book”, which is an advantage to the coding 
strategies employed by LLSV (1998).  
 
Finally, SPI considers both legal techniques aiming at solving agency problem 
between management and shareholders, and controlling shareholder and minority 
shareholder.37 The formal data set usually concentrates on a single aspect of the 
agency problems facing in different countries, and such empirical specification 
employs lethal bias. Bebchuk. and Hamdani (2009) argue that agency problems 
between the minority shareholders and management are major concerns for firms with 
                                                             
36 SPI mainly covers rules concerning shareholder protection in listed countries, which consists of 
ten components, for a detailed discussion about the codification approach of the index, see Lele 
and Siems (2007). 
37 In criticizing DLLS (2008), Conac et al. (2007: 494) argue against measuring quality of 
corporate governance using American criteria that “[I]t is in fact tempting to compare corporate 
laws by taking one benchmark jurisdiction, typically the US, and to assess the quality of other 
countries’ corporate law systems depending on how much they replicate some prominent features 
of American law, such as for example Delaware Courts’ emphasis on approval of self-dealing 
transactions by a majority of the minority shareholders.” 
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dispersed ownership structure, which is prevalent in both U.S. and U.K. listed firms.38 
Hence, the SPI is important to complement the current empirical analysis, which 
covers ten sub-indices incorporating mechanisms against both agency problems. In 
addition, these sub-indices use both binary and non-binary coding, and hence 
accommodate greater variation among countries.  
 
The dependent and controlling variables come from the World Development 
Indicators 2011 of World Bank. Two outcome variables include the “Natural 
Logarithm of the number of domestic firms listed in a given country to its population 
(LNLIST)”, and “Ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP (CMMKT)”. Most of 
the regressions perform techniques dealing with the fixed effects, and hence many 
variables measuring the country-specific characteristics are not included as controls. 
Following the previous literature, two controlling variables, “Logarithm of GDP per 
capita (LNCAPITA)” and “Trade openness (OPENNESS)” (Rajan and Zingales, 
2003), are included. Table 3.1 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables, while 
the definitions and sources of the variables are shown in Table B1 of Appendix B.  
3.5 Empirical results 
This section uses the data just described to empirically test the hypotheses presented 
in Section 2. To incorporate the dynamic effects, I follow the specification suggested 
by Pagano and Volpin (2006) and include the lagged dependent variable.39 The 
generic model is presented as Equation (1), where yi.t is the vector of dependent 
variables, including CMMKT and LNLIST, and yi.t-j is the vector of j
th lag of the 
dependent variable, j ranging from 1 to p. In addition, xi,t is the vector of independent 
variables, including SPIi,t, OPENNESSi,t and GDPi,, and a0 is the constant term, aj and 
                                                             
38  Bhagat et al. (2008) also caution to employ the Anglo-Saxons criteria to measure the 
governance systems across countries, which implicitly assumes that “one-size-fit-all” governance 
system fits all countries.  
39 Some studies include lagged independent variable instead of the lagged dependent variable, for 
example, see Haselmann et al. (2010) for inclusion of the lagged proxy for creditor rights. 
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β are coefficients. Finally, ui is the country dummy, vt the time dummy, and ɛi,t the 
idiosyncratic error term. 
ittiti
p
j
jtijti vuxyy   

 ,
1
,0,                                  (1) 
 
Ideally, the estimation shall base on Equation (1), the concern that the dependent 
variables may be nonstationary and have unit root asks for some diagnostic tests. 
Consequently, the unit root test by Im et al. (2003) is applied to both CMMKT and 
LNLIST. After subtracting the panel means to control for the cross sectional 
dependence, the test fails to reject the null hypothesis that LNLIST has a unit root 
process, but rejects that CMMKT has a unit root with p-value 0.0713. Consequently, 
the dynamic regressions with dependent variable LNLIST use the first-difference 
data. 
3.5.1 Minority shareholder protection and number of listed firms 
This subsection tests the Hypothesis 1, that SPI is negatively correlated with LNLIST. 
Table 3.2 presents the regression outputs where LNLIST is employed as dependent 
variable, SPI the explanatory variables of interest, and OPENNESS and LNCAPITA 
controls. In column 2, the static OLS estimator without dealing with fixed effect is 
reported as the baseline. The coefficient for SPI is positive in magnitude but 
insignificant. In the third column, the lagged dependent variable and full set of 
country and time dummies are included. But the time dummies are all insignificant. 
Unlike the results reported in the second column, the SPI is highly significant, with 
the coefficient -0.0728. The dynamic-panel Fixed Effect is biased, which is hence not 
reported, because the transformed residual is correlated with the differenced lagged 
dependent variable (Hisao, 2003).  
 
Since the panel unit root test indicates that LNLIST has a unit root process, the 
Equation (1) is transformed with the first difference. To cope with the endogenous 
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variables bias, the internal generated instruments of the independent variables 
suggested by the system GMM techniques is employed (Arellano and Bond, 1991; 
Blundell and Bond, 1998). The result is shown in the fourth column of Table 3.2. The 
application of the GMM-sys estimator merits some clarifications. First, the difference 
transformation could only expunge the country-specific fixed effect ui therefore time 
dummies should be included in the model.40 Second, the variance matrix is severely 
downward biased, and the Windmeijer’s finite-sample correction for the two-step 
GMM covariance matrix should be performed (Windmeijer, 2005; Roodman, 2009). 
Third, except for the time dummies, all other independent variables are instrumented 
in the GMM style, that is they are instrumented with their lags (level and differenced). 
 
The estimated coefficient of SPI is about -0.1, which is larger in magnitude than the 
one reported in the third column, and is regarded as the consistent estimate of SPI’s 
effect on LNLIST. The Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation for the residuals is 
reported at the bottom of the column 4, and fails to reject the null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation of order two in the transformed error term. The coefficient of SPI is 
the semi-elasticity between the standardized number of listed firms and the minority 
shareholder protection. One point increase in SPI is associated with about 10 percent 
decrease in the standardized number of firms listed on the stock market. The negative 
effects of SPI on LNLIST rejects the Null hypothesis of Hypothesis 1 that LNLIST is 
positively correlated with SPI, and proves that the private benefit effects dominate. 
3.5.2 Minority shareholder protection and stock market 
capitalization 
This subsection tests the Hypothesis 2 whether SPI is positively correlated with 
CMMKT. Table 3.3 presents the estimated results. Still in column 2, the static OLS 
estimator without time and country dummies is reported. The SPI is shown to be 
significantly correlated with CMMKT, and positive in magnitude. Due to the fact that 
                                                             
40 However, in this specification, the time dummies are all insignificant and not included. 
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some time- and country- dummies are insignificant and boost the estimated variance, 
in column 3 only significant dummies are included in addition to the lagged 
dependent variables. In contrast, the coefficient of SPI is less than half of the one 
reported in the second column, indicating that the later specification ascribes much of 
the explanatory power of the omitted variables to SPI.  
 
To cope with the endogenous variable bias, the GMM-sys estimator is applied to the 
dynamic specification represented by Equation (1) with AR (2) specification. The 
results are shown in the fourth column. The controlling variables LNCAPITA and 
OPENNESS fail to enter the model significantly and hence are excluded. In addition, 
the time dummies are included to control for the common time shock. Finally, the 
lagged dependent variables and the SPI are instrumented in GMM style, and the 
Windmeijer’s finite-sample correction is performed. The coefficient of SPI is reduced 
again and is now around 1.96, less than two thirds of the one reported in column 3, 
and is significant at 5 percent. The Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation confirms 
that there is no first order autocorrelation in the error term. The results support that 
listed firms increase their seasoned offering as the minority shareholder protection 
improves. 
3.5.3 Comments 
The empirical outputs reported in Table 3.2 and 3.3 confirms the opposite effects of 
SPI on two proxies for stock market outcomes, which is not common in previous 
studies, and seems to be controversial. However, it reflects the heterogeneity resided 
in the sources of variation of the stock market outcomes. As the theoretical part shows 
that the equity financing decisions of those firms intending to list on the market and 
those already listed on the market depend on different costs and benefits caculations. 
The costs of underpricing during IPO are major obstacles for the controllers of private 
firms, but are no longer the concern for controllers of listed firms making seasoned 
offering, because of the preemptive rights and dispersed ownership structure. 
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Therefore, once the external equity becomes cheaper, the listed firms will increase 
their seasoned financing. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This Chapter presents a simple model to investigate if the rules of minority 
shareholder protection affect firms’ decision to issue external finance homogenously. 
The level of minority shareholder protection influences firms’ decisions through two 
channels: The cost of external finance and the private benefits of controller. Using the 
dynamic panel specification and GMM-sys estimator, this study confirms that the 
minority shareholder protection could imposed heterogeneous effects on stock market 
outcomes. The additional costs imposed on controllers of private firms reduce their 
incentives to undertake IPO, while the decreased costs of external finance facilitate 
listed firms to make seasoned offering.  
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Tables and Appendices 
Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Variable  Mean Standard 
deviation 
Number of 
observation 
Number of 
countries 
LNLIST 2.330769 1.205751 275 25 
CMMKT 72.80757 61.46514 275 25 
SPI 4.916887 1.620371 275 25 
OPENNESS 64.90363 39.90047 275 25 
LNCAPITA 8.914121 1.280728 275 25 
The panel spans the 1995-2005 intervals and includes 25 countries. SPI is the proxy for minority 
shareholder protection, and from CBR at Cambridge University. All the rest variables, LNLIST, 
CMMKT, OPENNESS, and LNCAPITA are drawn from the World Development Indicator 2011. 
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Table 3.2 Shareholder protection and number of listed firms 
Dependent variable: Natural Logarithm of the number of domestic firms listed in a given 
country to its population 
 
Pooled Cross 
Section 1 
Pooled Cross 
Section 2 
GMM-sys 
 
First lag of Natural Logarithm of the 
number of domestic firms listed  
 
 
0.7927019*** 
(8.61) 
 
 
    
Shareholder protection index 
 
0.0460594 
(1.19) 
-0.0728308 ** 
(-2.50) 
-0.0998476*** 
(-2.26) 
Trade openness 
 
0.0102013*** 
(11.72) 
-0.0004477  
(-0.21) 
-0.0024874 
(-0.84) 
Logarithm of GDP  
per capita 
0.5001806*** 
(10.28) 
-0.0344501 
(-0.15) 
1.050082* 
(1.91) 
Constant 
 
-3.016472*** 
(-6.43) 
1.509016  
(0.69) 
 N/A 
 
Time dummies No Yes No 
Country dummies No Yes No 
AR (1) test p-value N/A N/A 0.048 
AR (2) test p-value N/A N/A 0.720 
R-squared 0.4378 0.9779 N/A 
N 275 275 275 
1) The OLS estimator is applied in the second and third column. “Pooled Cross Section 1” does 
not include any dummies, “Pooled Cross Section 2” includes both lagged dependent variable and 
the country and time dummies. 
2) In the fourth column, GMM-sys estimator is applied to the first differenced data, and the 
empirical model is: ΔLNLISTi,t = a1ΔSPIi,t+a2ΔOPENNESSi,t+ a3ΔLNCAPITAi,t+vt+ɛi,t.  
3) “N” stands for the sample size. The robust t-stat is reported in the parentheses in the second and 
third columns, and the z-stat in the fourth one. 
4) *, **, *** stand for 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level respectively. 
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Table 3.3 Shareholder protection and stock market capitalization 
Dependent variable: Ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP 
Independent Variables  
Pooled Cross  
Section 1 
Pooled Cross 
Section 2 GMM-sys 
First lag of ratio of stock market 
capitalization to GDP  
0.5686416 *** 
(4.01) 
0.7324995*** 
(5.90) 
Second lag of ratio of stock 
market capitalization to GDP  
0.0923254 
(1.13) 
0.1551219** 
(2.29) 
    
Shareholder protection index 
 
8.145911***  
(5.15) 
3.117039***  
(2.98) 
1.958098** 
(2.36) 
Trade openness 
 
0.3726716***  
(4.13) 
0.0263593 
(0.52) N/A 
Logarithm of GDP per capita 
 
17.39538***  
(7.36) 
8.222245*** 
(2.69) N/A 
Constant 
 
-146.4972  
(-7.87)   
Time dummies No Yes Yes 
Country dummies No Yes No 
AR (1) test p-value N/A N/A 0.069 
AR (2) test p-value N/A N/A 0.345 
R-squared 0.2673 0.8899 N/A 
N 275 275 275 
1) The OLS estimator is applied in the second and third column. “Pooled Cross Section 1” does 
not include any dummies, “Pooled Cross Section 2” includes both lagged dependent variable and 
the country and time dummies. 
2) In the fourth column, GMM-sys estimator is applied to the empirical model: CMMKTi,t = 
a0+a1CMMKTi,t-1+a2CMMKTi,t-2+ a3SPIi,t+vt+ɛi,t. 
3) “N” stands for the sample size. The robust t-stat is reported in the parentheses in the second and 
third columns, and the z-stat in the fourth one. 
4) *, **, *** stand for 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level respectively. 
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Appendix A 
Proof of Proposition 2.  
 
To prove that f(k)is a decreasing function of k at the optimal diversion rate d(.)* is 
equivalent to prove that (∂f/∂k)|d* is negative. 
 
First, follow the assumption (A3) that ∂u/∂k <0, and the controller’s ownership after 
IPO at date 1 is given by x=u/(u+e) 
=> ∂x/∂k<0. 
 
Second, the optimal diversion rate is given by the first order condition ∂f/∂d* =0  
=> -k*∂p/∂d*+(1-k）(1-x)=0 
=> ∂p/∂d*=(1-k)(1-x)/k 
Notice that the optimal diversion function d(.)* is still a function of level of minority 
shareholder protection k. 
 
Third, rearrange f(k)=x(1-d+kd)+(1-k)d-kp(d) 
 
So ∂f/∂k=∂x/∂k(1-d+kd)+x(-∂d/∂k+d+k*∂d/∂k)-d+(1-k)*∂d/∂k 
        -p(d)-k*(∂p/∂d)*(∂d/∂k) 
 
At the optimal diversion level, replace ∂p/∂d* with (1-k)(1-x)/k, 
(∂f/∂k)|d*=∂x/∂k(1-d*+kd*)+x(-∂d*/∂k+d*+k*∂d*/∂k)-d+(1-k)*∂d*/∂k 
        -p(d)-(1-k)(1-x)(∂d*/∂k) 
=∂x/∂k(1-(1-k)d*)-(1-x)d*-p(d*) 
Follow assumption (A1), then -p(.)≦0. 
 
Because x is the controller’s share of firm at date 1, by definition it is smaller than 1, 
and together with (A1), -(1-x)d*≦0.  
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As is proved ∂x/∂k<0, and k is the probability of getting caught, and by definition, it 
is smaller than 1, and hence (1-(1-k)d*)≧0. Together, ∂x/∂k(1-(1-k)d*)≦0. 
 
Since the three terms above will not equal zero together, (∂f/∂k)|d*<0. Hence, f(k) is a 
decreasing function of k at the optimal diversion rate d(.)* 
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Appendix B 
Table B1 Definitions and sources of the variables 
Variables Description Sources 
CMMKT Ratio of stock market 
capitalization to its GDP from 
1995 to 2005. 
Source: World Development Indicators at 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/. 
LNLIST Natural Logarithm of the 
number of domestic firms listed 
in a given country to its 
population (in millions) from 
1995 to 2005.  
Source: World Development Indicators at 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/. 
SPI Shareholder protection index 
from 1995 to 2005.  
Source: "Law, Finance and Development" 
Project by Deakin et al. at 
http://www.cbr.cam.ac.U.K./research/projects/pr
oject2-20output.htm. 
LNCAPTIA Logarithm of per capita GDP 
(in 2000 U.S. dollars) from 
1995 to 2005. 
Source:  World Development Indicators at 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/. 
OPENNESS Proxy for the political power in 
a given country, measured by 
the sum of exports and imports 
of goods and services divided 
by GDP, measured from 1995 
to 2005. 
Source: World Development Indicators at 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/. 
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4 The over-empowered controlling shareholder and the 
stagnant Chinese stock market: The mismatched means and 
ends of corporate governance 
4.1 Introduction 
The governance structure between shareholder group, and board and management in 
public corporations41 attracts great attention from scholars in corporate law42 and 
corporate governance43. Recent studies on shareholder activism44 see it as a cure to 
the agency problems arising from the dispersed ownership structure and separation of 
                                                             
41 The central feature of public corporation is the separation of ownership and control as 
identified in current corporate governance literature. For example, Stout, (2013: 2005) 
characterizes public corporation as “large, publicly listed company with professional management 
and dispersed shareholders”. And Acharya et al. (2011: 689) argue that public corporation “is 
commonly viewed as an organization run by CEOs and monitored by a board of directors on 
behalf of shareholders.” 
42 The corporate law discussed in this paper is defined broadly and includes the “law that 
articulates company structure and regulates relationships among shareholders and between 
shareholders and corporate managers” (Black and Kraakman, 1996: 1919). For example, the 
source of American corporate law contains the state corporation statutes; the common law of 
fiduciary duty; the provisions of the securities laws that regulate insider liability, shareholder 
voting, and control contests; and stock exchange listing standards that impose governance 
requirements on listed companies. And British corporate law law contains statutory company law, 
the common law of fiduciary duty, the listing rules, and the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers. 
For Chinese corporate law discussed in this Chapter, it includes the statutory Company Law and 
Security Law, the decrees and opinions issues by the State Council, the regulatory documents 
issued by ministries and security regulators, and the judicial interpretations issued by the Supreme 
People's Court. 
43 There are also multiple definitions with respect to corporate governance. The Cadbury Report 
(1992) defines corporate governance as “the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled” (Section 2.5). Shleifer and Vishny (1997: 737) deliver the definition from the 
perspective of investor protection, with “corporate governance deals with the ways in which 
suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment.” 
Such definition is shared by Denis and McConnell (2003: 2), who define corporate governance as 
“the set of mechanisms-both institutional and market-based-that induce the self-interested 
controllers of a company (those that make decisions regarding how the company will be operated) 
to make decisions that maximize the value of the company to its owners (the suppliers of capital).” 
See the recent special issue of The Review of Financial Studies on the cutting-edge corporate 
governance researches, and the introductory article by Bebchuk and Weisbach (2010). 
44 Low (2004: 165) provides a general description of shareholder activism, that is, “the exercise 
and enforcement of rights by minority shareholders with the objective of enhancing shareholder 
value over the long term”. Cheffins and Armour (2011) distinguish the defensive shareholder 
activism from offensive activism basing on whether the shareholder has accumulated a sizable 
stake before initiating their proposals.  
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ownership and control, which is first documented by Berle and Means (1932) for 
listed firms in U.S.. The two largest economic entities, U.S. and European Union 
(E.U.) both enact rules increasing the shareholder power. For example, the American 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Reform 
Act) gives the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) the power to grant 
shareholders with “proxy access”, i.e. shareholder nominees for directors are included 
in the proxy materials sent to all of its shareholders before the annual meeting, and 
“say on pay”, i.e. shareholders give nonbinding vote on compensation packages of the 
company’s directors and top executives. Similarly, the EU Directive 2007/36/EC 
explicitly recognizes that “effective shareholder control through shareholder activism 
is a prerequisite to sound corporate governance and should therefore be facilitated and 
encouraged” (Ginevri, 2011: 588). 
  
This Chapter is dedicated to discussions of allocation of rights and duties between 
shareholders and directors against the back ground of shareholder empowerment.45 
The economy of China has been in fast development for more than 30 years ever 
since its enforcement of the Reform and Opening Up Policy in 1978, trying to 
transform China from a centralized economy to a market economy. However, such 
spectacular economic achievements rest on its weak legal protection of its investors 
(Allen et al., 2005), which the law and finance literature emphasizes as the 
                                                             
45 A recent debate on shareholder empowerment among the U.S. corporate law scholars manifests 
its importance. Bebchuk (2005, 2006) holds that the allocation of the initiation rights of all major 
corporate decisions with the board is inefficient and self-interested directors will block adoptions 
of value-enhancing governance arrangements. Hence, shareholders should be allowed to make 
decisions on the “rule-of-game” issues including amendment of the corporate charter or changes 
in the company’s state of incorporation, and the “game-ending” ones including decisions to merge, 
sell all assets, or dissolve the company, and the “scaling-down” ones, including cash or in-kind 
distribution.  
Such view is criticized by a series of papers supporting director control. Theoretically, the 
shareholder interests are heterogeneous (Anabtawi, 2005) and in conflict (Strine, 2006), the 
dispersed ownership structure makes the centralized decision making by directors fully exploit the 
benefits of authority, which will be disrupted by shareholder activism (Bainbridge, 2005). 
Empirically, Bainbridge (2006) points out that the charter clauses increasing the control of 
shareholders are not provided by listed companies on the free markets, which indicates that 
shareholders may not value such changes. Listokin (2010) conducts an empirical analysis on the 
adoption of anti-takeover governance rules, which finds that the variation of altering rules and 
degrees of shareholder power among the states in U.S. has no effects on the outcomes. 
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fundamentals for economic growth. In 2006, the new Company Law and Security Law, 
which transplants the “best practice” corporate governance institutions in 
Anglo-Saxons countries, are enacted to support sustainable growth in domestic stock 
markets (Weng, 2012). However, these rules and standards seem to be futile, and the 
stock market stays fragile and plays less important role in financing business 
enterprises (See Figure 4.1).46 
 
 
 
A series of studies have been carried out looking into the failure of corporate law and 
corporate governance system in China. Clarke (2006) observes that the problem with 
                                                             
46 During the last few years, China has been trying to establish its multi-layer financial markets 
catering the needs of companies in different scales. After opening two main stock exchange, 
Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange, in the earlier 1990s, it opened the growth 
enterprise market for high-growth firms in 2009 and the centralized over-the-counter market for 
small and media high-tech firms in 2012. This paper is devoted to discussion on the CLG of those 
firms on the main markets, that is, on the Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange.  
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the corporate governance system of Chinese listed firms is the high agency cost, i.e. 
some of these firms are controlled by the State and others by private parties. Those 
SOEs controlled by the State lacking any meaningful owners, who will monitor the 
management (suoyouzhe quewei).47 In contrast, for those listed firms controlled by 
private parties, the controllers use their power to exploit the minority shareholders 
(yigu duda).  
 
In addition, corporate rules are not well enforced. Both public enforcement by public 
regulators and private enforcement in the form of security litigation are limited. For 
example, Huang (2013) documents that the aggregated number of private litigations 
against the misrepresentation is around 65 cases from 2002 to 2011, which is due to 
the incompetency of the court system, while, at the same time, 192 administrative 
penalty decisions for misrepresentation are made by China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC).48 Clarke (2010) further argues that not only the court system, 
other institutions supporting the implementation of the corporate rules, such as 
accounting firms or law firms as gatekeepers, are generally weak, which is in 
accordance with the transplant effect theory that emphasize the familiarity with and 
adaptation of the foreign rules (Berkowitz et al., 2003a, 2003b).  
 
I am sympathy with the great contribution of principal-agent model to the corporate 
governance reform in China, however, it overlooks the dual nature of public 
corporations discussed by Eisenberg (1988). The model of team production, also 
represents an important feature of the firm. The sole focus on the principal-agent 
                                                             
47 The State ownership has a complex effect on the corporate governance, which, according to 
Denis and McConnell (2003), represents an interesting hybrid of dispersed and concentrated 
ownership. See also Bolton (1995), for a discussion of the State ownership (collective ownership) 
on the performance of firms during the earlier phase of the reform in China.  
48 In 2002, the Supreme People’s Court permitted courts to accept civil cases arising from 
misrepresentation, but not from other forms of market misconduct, such as insider trading or 
market manipulation. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shouli Zhengquan Shichang Yin 
Xujiachengshu Yinfa de Minshi Qinquan Jiufen Anjian Youguan Wenti de Tongzhi [The Notice of 
the Supreme People’s Court on Relevant Issues of Filing of Civil Tort Dispute Cases Arising from 
Misrepresentation on the Securities Market] (Jan. 15, 2002). This approach is recognized by the 
new Security Law enacted in 2005.  
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model makes other costs and benefits overlooked by the decision maker, such as the 
specific investment and organizational capital. This Chapter argues that the more 
fundamental drawback of the current Chinese CLG system is that the mandated means 
and ends of corporate governance by the corporate law in China are mismatched.49 
Unlike the enabling regime of the corporate law in both U.S. and U.K., most of the 
articles in Chinese corporate law could not be opt-out by corporate constituencies. 
Hence, without touching this fundamental inefficient arrangement in corporate law, 
the reform aiming to protect the interests of minority shareholders is futile. 
 
The corporate law in China is explicit about its mandatory means and ends of the 
governance system. The ends or objective of the firm is to maximize shareholder 
wealth, as measured by the share price. The Article 3 of the Company Law explicitly 
recognizes the personalhood of the firm and its own interests. In addition, article 1 of 
the The Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Firms in China in 2002 indicates 
that shareholders are owners of the listed firms. The two together suggests that 
Chinese corporate governance system still follows that shareholders are the owners of 
the corporate entity, hence the firm should be managed to the ends of shareholders. 
However, as a socialist country, its legislature and regulators could not leave interests 
of other stakeholders off the table. The article 43 of the 2002 Code of Corporate 
Governance for Listed Companies in China requires that directors should treat the 
interests of all shareholders equally, and pay attention to the interests of other 
stakeholders when decisions are made, which is similar to the ESV emerging recently 
in U.K.. 
 
In the dimension of means, firms are controlled by shareholder meeting rather than 
board of directors. The Company Law in China explicitly rejects any de jure 
                                                             
49 The basic framework to discuss the means and ends of corporate governance is established by 
Bainbridge (2002b). The studies on means of CLG try to answer the question who hold the 
ultimate decision making power, while the ones on ends answer the question the interests of which 
group(s) of corporate constituencies should prevail. 
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separation of ownership and control.50 A broad spectrum of corporate decision rights 
are allocated with the shareholder meeting.51 The Article 38 of Company Law 
allocates with shareholder meeting the formal authorities on the following issues: “(1) 
determining the company’s operation guidelines and investment plans; (2) electing 
and changing the directors and supervisors elected by non-representatives of the 
employees, and determining the matters concerning their remuneration; (3) 
deliberating and approving the reports of the board of directors; (4) deliberating and 
approving the reports of the board of supervisors or the supervisor; (5) deliberating 
and approving annual financial budget plans and final account plans of the company; 
(6) deliberating and approving profit distribution plans and loss recovery plans of the 
company; (7) making resolutions on the increase or decrease of the company’s 
registered capital; (8) making resolutions on the issuance of corporate bonds; (9) 
adopting resolutions on the assignment, division, change of company form, 
dissolution, liquidation of the company; (10) revising the articles of association of the 
company; (11) other functions as specified in the articles of association.” Of these 
decision rights enjoyed by shareholder meeting, two are most powerful: the rights to 
raise capital and to make investment. 
 
Meanwhile, the board of directors mainly performs the functions of initiation and 
implementation, and subjects to the direct control of the shareholder principal. Article 
47 of Company law allocates with the board the authority on “(1) convening 
shareholders’ meeting and reporting on the status of work thereto; (2) carrying out the 
resolutions made at the shareholders’ meeting; (3) determining the operation plans 
and investment plans; (4) working out the company’s annual financial budget plans 
                                                             
50 The corporate law in U.S. and U.K. differ in their attitudes towards shareholder-centric 
corporate law system: American corporate law adopts the manager-centric system, while British 
corporate law the shareholder-centric one (Harper Ho, 2010; Rock, 2013). In both countries, the 
corporate law recognizes director’s decision rights. For example, the Delaware code requires that 
the corporation’s business and affairs “shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of 
directors.” See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001). Similarly, Article 3 of the 2013 British 
Model Articles for Public Companies allocates directors with the power to manage the company’s 
business and for this purpose “they may exercise all the powers of the company”.  
51 Lin (2012) also observes that shareholder meeting enjoys broad decision power, which reduces 
the managerial discretion and is protected from the review of board of supervisors.  
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and final account plans; (5) working out the company’s profit distribution plans and 
loss recovery plans; (6) working out the company’s plans on the increase or decrease 
of registered capital, as well as on the issuance of corporate bonds; (7) working out 
the company’s plans on merger, division, change of the company type, dissolution, 
and etc.; (8) making decisions on the establishment of the company’s internal 
management departments; (9) making decisions on hiring or dismissing the 
company’s manager and his remuneration, and, according to the nomination of the 
manager, deciding on the hiring or dismissing of vice manager(s) and the person in 
charge of finance as well as their remuneration; (10) working out the company’s basic 
management system; and  (11) other functions as prescribed in the articles of 
association.” 
 
Consequently, there is no specialization and separation of the decision roles and 
residual risk bearing roles within the Chinese public corporation, which is an efficient 
arrangement and the unique feature of such organizational form (Fama, 1980; Fama 
and Jensen, 1983a). Fama and Jensen (1983b) argue that the decision process could be 
decomposed into four steps: initiation, ratification, implementation and monitoring, 
with the initiation and implementation belonging to the decision management function 
and ratification and monitoring to the decision control function. For small and 
medium enterprises, decision management function is delegated to subordinate 
managers and the residual claimants maintain the decision control role. However, 
such governance structure no longer suits the large public corporations with dispersed 
ownership structure, and residual risk bearing should be separated from decision 
rights. The efficiency gains are due to the fact that decision agents no longer have to 
be those with both wealth and willingness to bear the risks and specialized knowledge, 
and the risk bearer could enjoy the benefits of diversification.  
 
To analyze the current Chinese CLG arrangements, the framework proposed by 
Bainbridge (2002b) is employed to examine the means and ends of CLG in China. 
This paper argues that there is a more fundamental mismatch between the de jure 
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means and ends of CLG in China, which leads to the stagnant development of stock 
market. The corporate governance system overemphasizes the accountability 
dimension52, and resides both formal (due to the Company Law) and real (due to the 
concentrated ownership structure) authority in the hands of shareholder principal of 
the listed corporations.53 The agent directors lack real authority, which is crucial to 
encourage them to make value-increasing investments, such as relation-specific 
investments, and collection of optimal level of information to make efficient decisions. 
Baker et al. (1999) argue that the formal authority is always held by the principal 
shareholder, while the real authority is occasionally delegated to the agent directors 
informally, which could be retracted by principal controlling shareholders at will. As 
such informal contracts are never enforceable by external authorities, the principal 
needs to establish the reputation that such delegation will not be retracted so as to 
encourage the agents to invest.  
 
The controlling shareholders54 of Chinese listed firms seem to have little interests in 
establish the reputation that directors are delegated with the real authority to decide, 
and frequently makes the decision directly. With the concentrated ownership structure, 
the accountability to shareholder principal transforms to the accountability to the 
controlling shareholders. What makes the problem worse is that the State shareholders 
not only hold controlling stakes, but also controls the public policies, which are 
                                                             
52 Another dimension of the corporate governance is authority. Arrow (1974) first discusses the 
tradeoff between authority and accountability in decision making, and Dooley (1992) applies the 
framework to discussions on corporate governance. 
53 The decision authority, according to Simon (1951), means the right to select actions affecting 
part or whole of an organization, and is a reference point to appreciate the hierarchical structure 
within the firms. The formal authority is further distinguished from the real authority in corporate 
decisions, which is held by the parties with information (Aghion and Tirole, 1997). Even if 
principals are allocated with the formal decision rights, informed agents will enjoy real authority 
over corporate affairs if shareholders, as wealth-maximizers, have less information. 
54 Article 217 of the Company Law gives a definition of the controlling shareholder of Chinese 
firms, i.e. a shareholder holding 50% or more of the total capital of a limited liability company, or 
a shareholder who holds more than 50% of the total equity shares of a joint stock limited company, 
or a shareholder though holding less than 50% of the voting rights outstanding, enjoying a voting 
right large enough to impose significant impacts upon the resolution of the shareholders’ meeting 
or the shareholders’ assembly. The criterion are far looser than that employed in the academic 
literature, which according to Enriques and Volpin, (2007), a controlling shareholder is usually 
identified with the criteria that it owns more than 20 percent of a company’s voting rights. 
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important to the success of the business enterprises. The market power of directors is 
even weaker considering a huge proportion of their human capital is related to 
bureaucratic, which depreciates quickly if they change their jobs to private sector. 
Agent directors seldom disobey the will of the State principal (usually the higher level 
government officials), which according to Marino et al. (2010), is an important source 
of real authority. As a result, the de jure allocation of decision rights to shareholder 
meeting transfers to the de facto real authority maintained by controlling shareholders. 
 
The rest of the Chapter is arranged as follows: Section 2 reviews the complex 
ownership structure of the listed firms on Chinese stock markets, and the problem 
with the separation of cash flow rights from control rights. Section 3 argues that 
though shareholder wealth maximization is still the ends of corporate governance 
mandated by corporate law, ESV has emerged and should be the legitimate ends for 
corporate governance. In addition, Section 4 argues that the means of corporate 
governance of listed firms in China are shareholder control, which mismatches ends 
of maximizing the valuation of the firm. As both Section 3 and Section 4 discuss the 
means and ends of CLG, the economic theories of the firm that highly involved in 
these discussions are first introduced and discussed in each section.55 And Section 5 
concludes the Chapter.  
4.2 The ownership structure of Chinese listed firms and its 
effects on performance 
The economic reform in China aims to transform a planned economy to socialist 
market economy, and follows the governance system, regionally decentralized 
authoritarian (RDA) system, which features as the “highly centralized political and 
                                                             
55 All these models are contractual in nature and follow Coase’s path-breaking paper “The nature 
of the firm” on why firms emerge. From his view, using price mechanism is expensive and 
involving transactional costs, and firms will “tend to expand until the costs of organizing an extra 
transaction within the firm become equal to the costs of carrying out the same transaction by 
means of an exchange on the open market or the costs of organizing in another firm” (Coase, 1937: 
395). 
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personnel controls at the national level, and a regionally decentralized administrative 
and economic system” (Xu, 2011: 1082). The reform in state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) follows the policy of zhuada fangxiao, i.e. the state only keeps control of 
medium to large enterprises with strategic importance and the rest are privatized. The 
first step of such privatization process is the corporatization of SOEs. Aivazian et al. 
(2005) investigate a sample of central government-owned national public firms and 
show that even without privatization, the corporatization process improves the 
performance of SOEs. The sources of such benefits are due to the establishment of the 
modern governance structure and partial delegation of authorities from the 
government to internal governance organs in those firms corporatized. 
4.2.1 The share issuing privatization process 
Two national stock exchanges are created to carry out the corporatization of SOEs, 
where the large SOEs are partially privatized through share issuing privatization (SIP), 
that is, a public offering of common stock by a firm with state ownership (Dewenter 
and Malatesta, 1997). To provide appropriate incentives to local governments and 
ministries, a quota system, the manifestation of decentralized economic governance 
approach, is employed to select the well-performed SOEs to list on the domestic 
markets from 1993 to 2000 (Pistor and Xu, 2005). The regional governments and 
ministries compete for allocation of the quota each year based on the performance of 
SOEs selected previously, and the competition serves as the institutional substitute for 
the sound legal institutions. As a result, relative competent firms are selected to list on 
the market. Such quota system is abolished by CSRC at the beginning of the new 
millennium. 
 
The privatization process is investigated by Huyghebaert and Quan (2009), who find 
that the fraction of shares sold to the general public at SIP relative to the total number 
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of shares outstanding, positively correlates with the leverage ratio before 1999,56 
suggesting that the stock market is regarded as an alternative sources of finance at the 
beginning of the process.57 After 1999, however, the proportion of public allocation 
is positively correlated with the investment opportunities. Across the whole period, 
increasing operating efficiency is never a concern for the State.  
 
In addition, after SIP the government ownership evolves endogenously to the features 
of the firm and the market rather than being kept stable. For those SOEs undertaking 
IPO during 1994 to 1999, the five-years-post-SIP State ownership decreases from 
57.34% right after SIP to 50.35 %, while the average proportion of shares held by the 
general public rises from 27.77 to 33.89 (Huyghebaert and Quan, 2011). The dilution 
of the State ownership is either through share issuance (rights issuance and seasoned 
equity offering), motivated by reduction of leverage, or divestment (private 
negotiations with non-state-owned institutions), motivated by the needs to introduce 
external monitors. 
 
Due to its way of privatization, the government maintains substantial ownership of the 
privatized firms, and listed firms generally have a concentrated ownership. However, 
governmental control of the privatized firms seems prevalent across the world. 
Bortolotti and Faccio (2008) look into the ultimate controllers of firms in OECD 
countries privatized before 1997 and document that through either direct ownership, 
or leveraging devices or golden shares58, governments maintain control of almost 
                                                             
56 The year is critical because the quota system is abolished and substituted by the approval 
system. See Huyghebaert and Quan (2011) for detailed discussion.  
57 Chen (2013) proposes a similar argument that the stock markets are used to provide new source 
of finance to the trouble SOEs. 
58 The golden share is defined as “the set of the state’s special powers and statutory constraints on 
privatized companies. Typically, special powers include (1) the right to appoint members in 
corporate boards; (2) the right to consent to or to veto the acquisition of relevant interests in the 
privatized companies; and (3) other rights such as to consent to the transfer of subsidiaries, 
dissolution of the company, ordinary management, etc. The above mentioned rights may be 
temporary or not. On the other hand, statutory constraints include (1) ownership limits, (2) voting 
caps, and (3) national control provisions” (Bortolotti and Faccio, 2008: 2918). 
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two-thirds of privatized firms (the average percentage of voting rights controlled by 
the State around world is 52.18% in 2000). 
 
The most prominent institutional feature of corporate governance in Chinese listed 
firms is its concentrated ownership structure and high stakes held by the government. 
Table 4.1 shows the stockholding distribution of several developed industrialized 
countries, among which the Italian government and banks hold the highest stakes, 
around 40%, in the listed firms. In accordance with the models of capitalism, the 
government and banks in continental Europe, such as France, Germany, and Japan 
generally hold significant percentage of shares in the listed firms. However, the stakes 
held by the government and banks in these countries are significantly lower than that 
held by Chinese government five years post SIP as reported by Huyghebaert and 
Quan (2011).  
 
Table 4.1 International comparison of the ownership structure of listed firms 
 
Country Individuals Institutional 
investors 
Banks and 
government 
Holding 
company 
Foreign 
Australia  20% 34% 4% 11% 31% 
Canada 15% 38% 8% 14% 25% 
France 23% 12% 14% 14% 37% 
Germany 17% 15% 17% 39% 12% 
Italy 18% 14% 40% 18% 10% 
Japan 20% 21% 23% 28% 8% 
Sweden 23% 30% 8% 9% 30% 
Netherlands 14% 21% 1% 23% 41% 
U.K. 19% 58% 5% 2% 16% 
U.S. 51% 41% 3% 0% 5% 
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The existence of the large shareholder may mitigate the agency problem between 
shareholder group and management (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, 1997). However, the 
concentrated ownership structure, especially the involvement of the State as the 
controller, makes the situation different. The concentrated ownership held by the State 
fails to compromise the agency problem between shareholders and management, but 
rather government officials collude with the management exploiting minority 
shareholders. The next subsection describes the ownership structure of the listed firms 
in China. 
4.2.2 Ownership structure of the listed firms 
Since the Chinese government employs the partial privatization strategy, the 
governance structure of listed SOEs is far from separation of ownership and control, 
which is prevalent in U.S. market and first documented by Berle and Means (1932). 
The State holds controlling stakes in a large proportion of listed firms.59 Holderness 
(2009) argues that the concept that listed firms in U.S. have dispersed ownership 
structure is a myth, though the insider ownership is rather small. Most of the sampled 
firms in his study have block shareholders, who on average hold 39 percent in 
aggregate (median 37 percent) and the average stakes held by the largest shareholders 
are 26 percent (median 17 percent), which is far smaller than the stakes held by the 
controlling shareholders in the Chinese listed firms. Similarly, Franks et al. (2001) 
reports that the largest individual shareholder in a given firm holds around 13.7 
percent and the largest five shareholders hold 30.4 percent in aggregate in British 
listed firms. In contrast, most of the China’s listed firms have a single dominant 
shareholder holding about 43% of the total outstanding shares, the second largest 
about 9%, and the third one about 4% (Conyon and He, 2011).  
 
Though ownership structure of listed firms in both U.S. and U.K. shows some 
concentration, the listed firms in China have a quite different structure. Shares issued 
                                                             
59 Omran (2009) also reports that the State maintains on average 35% ownership of the privatized 
firm in the partial privatization process of Egypt. 
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by Chinese listed firms could be classified according to the exchange where they are 
listed. The most common ones are those issued in the domestic markets denominated 
with the local currency (A share). Furthermore, shares denominated by foreign 
currencies (B share) are also issued to cater the financing needs of listed firms and 
listed in the domestic markets. In addition, shares could be traded in Hong Kong (H 
share), Singapore (S share), or New York through IPO or American Depository 
Receipts (N share).60 According to the Article 85 of the Articles of Association of 
Companies Seeking a Listing outside the PRC Prerequisite Clauses, a list of 
mandatory articles that firms seeking to list on foreign exchanges must adopt, 
“shareholders of domestic investment shares and those of foreign investment shares 
listed outside of the PRC are regarded as shareholders of different categories”. The 
rights of these different categories of shares could be diverse since the shareholder 
meeting of different categories should be held differently. 
 
The control rights and cash flow rights are separated in listed firms in China for both 
SOEs and firms controlled by private parties. The State holds a large proportion of 
shares of the listed firms in China, though the concentration has been reduced through 
the partial privatization process. The control rights arising from the State shareholding 
are delegated to and exercised by government bureaucrats, who hold little personal 
benefits in these firms, while the cash flow rights are theoretically owned by all the 
citizens in the country. At the same time, in private firms, the largest shareholders in 
privately controlled firms have a 54% (51%) mean (median) cash flow rights to 
voting rights of the largest owner (Fan et al., 2005). 
 
For those shares listed on the domestic markets, the ownership identities are officially 
classified into three categories: the State, legal person, and individual, which reflects 
                                                             
60 243 Chinese firms have listed in the U.S. markets by 2011, which account for 73.33% of the 
market share among all the foreign listings firms (Ritter, 2011). Meanwhile, 194 Chinese firms 
(165 on the Main board and 29 on the Growth Enterprise Market) are listed on the Hong Kong 
markets at the end of 2010 (Luo et al., 2012). 
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in some extent their incentives in monitoring the management.61 The State share and 
legal person share are not tradable on the market before the 2005 Split Share 
Reform.62 The non-tradable shares account for about two thirds of the total number of 
outstanding shares in the February 2005 (Firth et al., 2006a; Beltratti et al., 2012). 
They could be transferable to domestic institutions upon the approval of CSRC, and 
the share block is often transferred with a discount rather than premium (Chen et al., 
2008; Huang and Xu, 2009). In 2002, the State and legal persons on average hold 
16.4% and 28.4% of the total shares respectively (Delios et al., 2006). In contrast, the 
management and employees hold trivial amount of shares of the listed firms. 
According to Wei et al. (2005), the ownership of senior management and directors, is 
around 0.015% and employee shares account for 1.75% of total shares in 2001.  
 
The official classification is ambiguous in that it does not reflect the ultimate 
controller of the listed firms. The legal person shares could also be owned by the State, 
since the State may be the controller of the legal person holding the shares. Delio et al. 
(2006) propose a new classification based on the identities of the ultimate owners, 
which includes three categories: the government shareholding, marketized corporate 
shareholding, and private shareholding.63 The government holds around 11.8%, the 
marketized corporate 28.8%, and private parties 59.3% of the total shares. The high 
stakes held by the State result in that almost 27% of the CEOs in a sample of 790 
newly partially privatized firms in China are ex- or current-government bureaucrats 
(Fan et al., 2007). 
 
                                                             
61 The legal person is identical to institutions, which includes domestic mutual funds, insurance 
companies, government agencies, and other enterprises. Some of these institutions are also owned 
by the State, making the official classification ambiguous.  
62 The non-tradability of the State share and legal person share is the major accuse for the various 
corporate governance problems of China’s listed firms.  
63 The government shareholding represents those controlled by bureaucrats, the marketized 
corporate shareholding by marketized state owned enterprises that though owned by the state but 
have undertaken a transition towards the market-oriented structure for profit, and private 
shareholding by private entities. 
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Even within the groups of SOEs, those controlled by the local government and those 
by central government are managed differently. The local government tends to grab 
assets from minority shareholders through related party transactions, while, in contrast, 
the central government provides helps to the listed firms, which benefit the minority 
shareholders, though both subgroups of listed firms have no difference in their 
operational efficiency (Cheung et al., 2010). In addition, the central government as 
the controlling shareholders exerts greater pressure on the listed firms to maximize 
their profits and has performance related pay scheme for CEOs (Firth et al., 2006a). 
Lucky, according to Fan et al. (2005), the voting rights and cash flow rights are not 
separated in listed SOEs controlled by local government, though corporate pyramids 
are common.64 Such arrangement is in sharp contrast with that of private firms, which 
has a 54% (51%) mean (median) cash flow rights to voting rights of the largest owner 
(Fan et al., 2005). 
 
As a result, bureaucrats and corporate insiders tend to collude and expropriate the 
assets of listed firms, which results in high corruption. Further, the bureaucrats have 
different goals other than maximizing the value of the firm. On one hand, the political 
targets, such as maintaining employment rate or the social stability, could have higher 
priority. On the other, since the State and legal person shares are not tradable on the 
market, the firms are managed towards maximizing accounting-linked performance 
indicators, such as free cash flow, rather than market-linked ones, such as share price, 
as the free cash flow is easy to exploit (Cao et al., 2011). Finally, even bureaucrats try 
to maximize corporate valuation, they invest less than optimal monitoring efforts 
since they do not share the success and the private costs are larger than benefits, not to 
mention the possibility that bureaucrats have less specific knowledge than that of the 
top managers.  
 
                                                             
64 They do not report the situation of pyramidal structure of the listed firms controlled by the 
central government. 
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However, government connection does not impose pure costs on firms, at least 
theoretically.65 Listed firms connected with politics are wide-spread across the world, 
and this connection brings larger benefits than costs to the given firm (Faccio, 2006). 
Politically connected firms enjoy friendlier environment, such as paying lower tax 
rate and enjoying higher leverage, than their nonconnected peers, though their 
performance measured by accounting data is worse (Faccio, 2010). For example, 
Goldman et al. (2009) show positive abnormal return after a politically connected 
director is elected, which could be due to the favorable allocation of future 
procurement contracts. Khwaja and Mian (2005) show that politically connected firms 
borrow 45 percent more than those comparable firms without political connections in 
Pakistan, though the former class of firms has a 50 percent higher default.  
 
The benefits of governmental connection seems to be extremely intriguing 
considering the highly regulated business environment. Li (1996) investigates the 
organizational form of the non-state sector in China and finds that the Township and 
Village Enterprises, the biggest part of the non-state sector, are arranged as the 
collective firms, whose property rights are ambiguous, i.e. the ownership is not clearly 
specified and poorly protected. To introduce the government as the co-owner of the 
firm, the entrepreneur gains protections from the local government to overcome the 
high transactional costs, such as contract enforcement, due to the market imperfection. 
Another case in point for Chinese listed firms is discussed by Calomirisa et al. (2010), 
who find that governmental connection is especially beneficial to firms located in the 
special economic zones to protect them from the “grabbing hand”, where the local 
government discretion is large.  
                                                             
65 The discussion of the benefits of governmental connection is restricted to the given firm rather 
than the general benefits and costs to the society. Some of the researches seems to overlook such 
argument, for example, Tian and Estrin (2008: 75) concludes that “[I]n addition to preferential 
treatment from the government, we suggest that state-based governance may be superior to a 
governance vacuum under dispersed shareholding structures.” However, their observed U-shape 
relationship between the State ownership and firm valuation could be a result of firms maximizing 
valuation under the constraint of current poor institution. It is quite plausible that though the given 
firm derives net benefits (costs) from such connection, the society could suffer from net costs 
(benefits).  
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4.2.3 The problem with separation of control rights and cash flow 
rights 
The large stake held directly by various levels of government and governmental 
related institutions, is probably a curse rather than bless for listed companies. Clarke 
(2006) reports that those SOEs controlled by the State lacking any meaningful owners, 
who will monitor the management. As a result, the State ownership is documented 
with lower market valuation. The State as the controlling shareholder is shown to 
have negative effects on the performance of listed firms (Sun and Tong, 2003; Liu and 
Sun, 2005). 66  The Tobin’s Q of the listed firms has a significantly negative 
relationship with the percentage of State shares (Wei et al., 2005). Chen et al. (2008) 
further show that though the State tend to transfer the control of listed firms with poor 
profitability to private parties, these firms managed by private parties improves their 
performance. In contrast, the control transferred to state entities generates no 
performance improvement. 
 
Generally speaking, The State control reduces the external market constraints on the 
governance of listed SOEs. First, public regulators lack appropriate incentives to 
monitor and enforce regulations against government related listed firms.67 When the 
State maintains high influence on the appointment of directors, who are usually the 
bureaucrats or civil servants, these directors are lack of incentives and expertise 
monitoring the management. In addition, governance reform proposed by public 
regulators is deemed to have fewer influences on government-related firms, as these 
rules are not enforced against them. Berkman et al. (2010) study three consecutive 
corporate governance reforms aiming at improving protections to minority 
shareholders between 2001 and 2002. In their event study, the shares of listed firms 
                                                             
66 Tiana and Estrin (2008) show that this relationship is U-shape and non-monotonic. Exceeding 
certain threshold, the State ownership increases with the valuation of the firm.   
67 Also, the State acts as the trustee holding the dominant stakes in SOEs also lacks incentive to 
monitor management. Lin (2012) points out that government officials tend to collude with 
corporate managers, and hence the agency problems within SOEs are two folds: i.e. between 
manager and shareholder, and controlling shareholder and minority shareholder.  
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with government connections show no positive abnormal return, in contrast with those 
of privately controlled firms, which enjoy high abnormal return after the reform.  
 
Second, the SOEs tend to overinvest compared to their peers suffering from market 
constraint due to the soft budget and agent conflicts between minority shareholders 
and majority shareholders, who may maximize the assets under its control. On one 
hand, private firms have difficulties in accessing the capital markets. Chen et al. (2011) 
document the discrimination of the public regulators on access to the capital market 
for non-state-owned firms. At the end of 2008, there were 1,593 listed firms in China, 
of which 713 were controlled by private parties. However, the total market 
capitalization of these 713 firms accounted for only 21% of the capitalization of the 
stock markets, hinting that most of them are small.  
 
On the other, Chen et al. (2011) find that, generally speaking, state ownership reduces 
the sensitivity of investment expenditure to investment opportunities, which means 
that SOEs tend to overinvest. They employ the political connectedness of CEO as the 
proxy for government intervention and found negatively related to the sensitivity of 
investment expenditure in the SOEs. But the negative effects of political 
connectedness of CEO is not present in non-SOEs, which implies that non-SOEs hire 
politically connected CEO based on efficient considerations. In addition, Liu and Siu 
(2012) derive the implicit discount rate used to evaluate investment based on the 
inter-temporal costs and benefits of investment, which is around 15.8% higher for 
those non-SOEs than that for SOEs. The high discount rate means that non-SOEs 
prefer current consumption more than future one due to cash generated by the 
investment and hence ceteris paribus, invest less than their SOE peers.  
 
Finally, the State control distorts the internal corporate governance mechanism of 
listed firms and malfunctions the board of directors. For one thing, those politically 
connected directors appointed by the government shareholders are hard to remove 
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when they behave poorly.68 The empirical evidence documents a significantly inverse 
relationship with the firm performance and CEO turnover (Firth et al., 2006b; Kato 
and Long, 2006; Chang and Wong, 2009; You and Du, 2012). But the State ownership 
tends to compromise such link and the State is reluctant to dismiss the CEO when the 
firm performs poorly (Kato and Long, 2006), indicating that such dismiss is not in a 
timely pattern. Usually, the top management connected with State is protected from 
the threat of removal and hence suffers from no effective monitoring (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1989). It is likely that the top management of the listed firms is selected based 
on their ability to realize the political agenda or relationship with the higher 
government officials, which renders the State to be reluctant to remove the selected 
management when they behave poorly.  
 
Based on the behavior theory of organizational search that firms focus on targets in 
performance evaluation and shareholders tend to discipline the top management only 
if the firm fails to meet the performance target, Shen and Lin (2009) employ the 
industrial median profitability as the reference point and find that the inverse 
relationship between profitability and CEO turnover of SOEs is conditioned on the 
given firm fails the performance target, that is, in the subgroup of firms outperforms 
the median firms, the CEO turnovers have no relationship with profitability. This 
research design is also carried out by Chang and Wong (2009) on study of forced 
CEO turnover, which uses whether the firm incurs any financial losses as the 
reference point and find similar results. Finally, You and Du (2012) identify the 
political connectedness of the individual CEO, and suggest that CEOs with political 
ties are less likely to suffer from forced removal in a sample of listed firms from 2004 
to 2008. As a result, for newly listed firms, those with politically connected CEOs 
(former or current officers of the government or military) consistently underperform 
those similar firms without a politically connected CEOs (Fan et al., 2007).  
 
                                                             
68 Chen et al. (2008) find that when a change of control transaction is carried out by the firm, the 
change in CEO has a positive effect on the post-transaction performance of the listed firms. 
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For another, directors lack appropriate incentives to manage the firm. Though China’s 
listed firms have two-tier boards: a main board of directors and a supervisory board, 
these governance mechanisms seem to fail to discipline the corporate insiders.69 The 
compensation package of the executives are not set through arm’s length bargaining 
between the board and executives, but rather follow the pay scale of the civil servants. 
Conyon and He (2011) find that the State control seems to compromise the executive 
compensation of the directors. CEO share ownership incentive is lower when the 
State is the ultimate owner of the firm. 
 
For those listed firms controlled by private parties, the separation between control 
rights and cash flow rights is still a prominent problem, which, however, is ascribed to 
the stockholding schemes, such as pyramidal ownership, and adversely affect the 
pay-performance relationship. The controlling shareholders tend to set CEO 
compensation to their private interests rather than the wealth of minority shareholders. 
A study conducted about the listed firms on Hong Kong markets sheds light on the 
private firms, which are controlled by founding families. Cheung et al. (2013) 
document that board of directors closely related to their controlling shareholders are 
discounted by investors and have lower valuation. Such connectedness is associated 
with a poorer corporate governance practice.  
 
The concentrated and governmental ownership of listed firms exacerbates the 
mismatch between means and ends of CLG. Unlike in countries with dispersed 
ownership structure, which results in relative weak shareholders, shareholder control 
of corporate decisions entrench the controlling shareholders, who could exploit the 
minority shareholders easily under current corporate governance regime. Next section 
reviews the ends of Chinese corporate law and compares it with the ESV emerged 
recently. 
                                                             
69 The two-tier board system mimics the governance strategy in Germany, where the supervisory 
board consists of equal half of shareholder-elected and employee-chosen directors in companies 
with employees more than 2000.  
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4.3 Ends of corporate law and governance  
Though nearly all models of CLG admit that the ultimate objectives of the firm should 
be maximization of the social welfare, it is too broadly defined to provide any 
meaningful guidance to corporate practice without resorting to any intermediate 
objectives. As a result, CLG scholars have been naming more specific goals that firms 
should pursue, such as shareholder wealth maximization and stakeholder wealth 
maximization, which could be dated back to the famous debate between Professor 
Berle and Professor Dodd.70  
 
Nearly all the academic discussions caution of assigning multiple goals to the firm. 
Jensen (2001: 34) states that “it is logically impossible to maximize in more than one 
dimension at the same time unless the dimensions are what are known as ‘monotonic 
transformations’ of one another.” The multiple goals of the firm also “leave managers 
so much discretion that managers could easily pursue their own agenda, one that 
might maximize neither shareholder, employee, consumer, nor national wealth, but 
only their own” (Roe, 2001: 2065). 
 
Before looking into details of legal arrangement, it is important to first answer the 
question what is the firm?71 For lawyers, the definition given by Professor Davies is a 
good starting point, “it is an organizational form, provided by the law, through which 
the suppliers of the various inputs necessary to achieve a certain objective can come 
together and coordinate their activities” (Davies, 2010: 2). Hence, the corporate law is 
designed to coordinate three groups of constituencies: shareholders/members, 
directors and senior managers, and the creditors. Kraakman et al. (2011), in addition, 
                                                             
70 See Bratton and Wachter (2008) for a detailed discussion on this debate, which points out some 
misunderstandings in the contemporary debates. 
71 The economic theories of the firm are proliferative. Gibbons (2005) defines and compares four 
theories trying to explain the boundary of the firm, that is, the “make-or-buy” problem, which are 
labeled as the “theory of the firm” in the economic literature. These theories share two common 
features: first, a theory of the firm must define “integration”, and it has to show why it matters (i.e. 
what tradeoff exists between integration and non-integration). The vertical integration is implicitly 
assumed as the unification of control rights. 
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argue that corporate law provides a standard legal form, the corporation, with five 
core-attributes: legal personality, limited liability, transferrable shares, delegated 
management under a board structure, and investor ownership, and try to reduce the 
ongoing costs of organizing business through corporate form. 
4.3.1 Principal-agent theory and shareholder wealth maximization in 
China 
4.3.1.1 Principal-agent theory of the firm 
The principal-agent theory of the firm has a great influence on CLG thinking. It 
argues that the firm is a complex set of contracts72 or “nexus of contracts” (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). The theory rejects the concept of corporate personality as 
anything meaningful and argues that the corporate entity is just for convenience, 
which implies that the firm is not a separate corporate entity or has no corporate 
personalhood.73 
 
According to the principal-agent theory, corporate constituencies hold two types of 
contractual claims to the firm: One with the fixed payoff assuming fixed risks, such as 
employees and suppliers; the other with the residual payoff assuming residual risks, 
and is the equity holders. The asymmetric information between the principals, usually 
the residual holders, and the agents, the delegated management, determines the nature 
of the firm. Hence, the principal-agent theory argues that the firm exists to minimize 
                                                             
72 It would be beneficial to clarify the meaning of contract, which in ordinary language means an 
agreement, while in law, means legally enforceable promise. However, the “nexus of contracts” 
approach may not mean either of the two meanings, but the “reciprocal agreements” (Eisenberg, 
1998). Hart (1989: 1764) distinguishes the economic and legal perspective on contracts: 
“Economists tend to view contracts as relationships characterized by reciprocal expectations and 
behavior; lawyers consider the enforceable legal duties implicit in such relationships and look for 
formalization through the standard indicia of contract formation, such as offer and acceptance.”  
73 See for example, Bainbridge (1993: 1427) “someone owns each input, but no one owns the 
totality.” See also Easterbrook and Fischel (1989: 1425-1426), “‘Limited liability’ means only that 
those who contribute equity capital to a firm risk no more than their initial investments-it is an 
attribute of the investment rather than of ‘the corporation’ … It is convenient to think of the firm 
as, an ‘it’”.  
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the costs in these agency relationships so as to survive on the competitive product 
markets (Fama, 1980).74 
 
The “nexus of contracts” theory of the firm facilitates the contractarian model75 of 
CLG, which is still the dominant model in the contemporary CLG scholarship. The 
model rises as a response to the governmental over-regulation in business affairs 
during the early 20th century. Brudney (1985) regards that the notion of contract was 
to disconnect the enterprise and its "owners" from dependence upon the state 
authority for their power, and therefore from the state regulation.76 Accordingly, 
different organizational forms, such as public corporation or partnership, are regarded 
as different types of “standard forms of contracts”, rather than organizational forms 
created by the government.77  
 
Gulati et al. (2000: 894) argue that the firm only consists of “connected contracts”, i.e. 
the “interrelating agreements and relationships among the participants in a business 
venture”. As a result, the legal analysis of the business organizations should start from 
the features of different corporate contracts rather than from the different legal 
categories, such as partnership and corporation (Klein, 1982). The corporate law 
                                                             
74 Jensen and Meckling (1976) define the agency costs as the sum of the monitoring expenditures 
by the principal, the bonding expenditures by the agents, and the residual loss due to the 
divergence between agents’ decisions and those maximizing the welfare of the principal. The 
agency problems with respect to firms are those between managers and shareholders, controlling 
and minority shareholders, and shareholders and other corporate constituencies, such as creditors 
(Kraakman et al., 2011). The most prevalent agency problem in U.S. listed firms is the one 
between shareholders and management due to separation of ownership and control. However, 
Rock (2013) argues that the agency problem between the management and the shareholders are 
significant reduced by the market mechanisms in U.S.. 
75 However, not all the contractarian models share the “nexus of contracts” view of the firm. For 
example, Gulati et al. (2000: 894) argues “there are no firms, no predetermined hierarchies, no 
organizations with personalities of their own, and no a priori notions of ownership or control; 
there is no shareholder or managerial primacies, and no centralizing ‘nexus’.” 
76 Similar view is shared by Bratton (1988: 432), who claims that “[t]he nexus of contracts 
assertion has a political aspect. The assertion matches the firm’s economic substance with 
individual actors and their respective contracts and classifies the firm’s state created components 
as fictions. The assertion thereby suggests limits on the state’s legitimate role in the corporate 
firm’s life.” 
77 As a result of viewing the firm as “nexus of contracts”, “the personalization of the firm implied 
by asking questions such as ‘what should be the objective function of the firm’ or ‘does the firm 
have a social responsibility’ is seriously misleading” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 311). 
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should facilitate the private contracts and impose no limitation on the freedom of 
contracts. Hence, corporate law shall take an “enabling” approach78 by providing a 
set of default “standard-form” provisions79 to fill the gaps left by the incomplete 
contracts between corporate constituencies, 80  which could easily be opt-out by 
corporate charters and bylaws (Klein, 1982; Butler, 1989; Easterbrook and Fischel, 
1989).81 
4.3.1.2 Shareholder wealth maximization and its application in Chinese 
corporate law 
The shareholder wealth maximization as the purpose of the corporation, i.e. directors 
should maximize the wealth of the shareholders, is still the dominant view in 
academics.82 It is proposed as a cure to the agency problem due to the separation of 
ownership and control. The principal-agent model argues that the shareholder should 
be the exclusive beneficiary of the director’s fiduciary duty, who should manage the 
firm to maximize the wealth of the shareholders, that is, the price of the shares. The 
argument follows the trust metaphor and assigns the position of the beneficiary of the 
                                                             
78 Easterbrook and Fischel (1989: 1418)’s illustration on corporation and corporate law “The 
corporation is a complex set of explicit and implicit contracts, and corporate law enables the 
participants to select the optimal arrangement for the many different sets of risks and opportunities 
that are available in a large economy. No one set of terms will be best for all; hence the ‘enabling’ 
structure of corporate law.” 
79 Listokin (2009) argues that default rules indeed enhance the corporate governance, though they 
could be opted out. Anti-manager rules are more easily opted out by the firm. 
80 For example, Easterbrook and Fischel (1993) comment that the director’s fiduciary duty should 
be designed to fill the gaps left open by the contractual parties and reach the results that parties 
would have bargained for had they anticipated the issues and been able to contract cheaply. 
81 The argument is not without criticism. Brudney (1985) opposes to the assumption that 
contractual parties are fully informed about various costs and benefits of corporate contracts, and 
hence the completely free from government intervention in corporate affairs is not appropriate. 
Bebchuk (1989) focuses on a particular restriction of corporate law on corporate contracts, the 
amendment of corporate charters. He points out that unlike the initial charter the charter changes 
require the board’s initiation and majority shareholders’ approval, which could result in adoption 
of value decreasing corporate charter terms.  
82 Gelter (2013) argues that the rise of shareholder wealth maximization policy is due to the 
change of pension system from the defined benefits to defined contribution, which makes the 
pension directly relates to the investment in capital markets rather than specific firm. Such change 
builds the political foundation for the norm, which is favored by the middle-left voters. 
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director’s fiduciary duties to shareholder groups, which offers shareholders with 
protection from the contractual imperfections.83  
 
The listed firms in Chinese stock markets are mandated to maximize shareholder 
wealth, which, however, are due to the premise that shareholders are the owner of the 
listed companies, and is sometimes referred as the “property” theory (Allen, 1992; 
Allen et al. 2002).84  The article 1 of the 2002 Code of Corporate Governance for 
Listed Companies in China indicates that the shareholders are owners of the firm. The 
argument that shareholders are the owners of the firm is powerful, which directly 
justify both maximizing shareholder wealth and shareholder collectively control of the 
firm.85  The straight observation tells that shareholders provide fund for the firm and 
hire directors for daily business management. They delegate the decision rights to 
directors and have power to elect and replace directors. As a result, the only “social 
responsibility of business is to increase its profits (Friedman, 1970: 32-33)”.  
 
However, this view is under severe attack now. The “nexus of contracts” model 
explicitly rejects that shareholders are owners of the corporation, since the nexus 
could not be owned.86 They only own corporate shares, a type of corporate securities, 
which give shareholders the proprietary right to dividends declared by board of 
directors.87 Ireland (1999: 47) puts forward that “[T]he share is a particular and 
distinctive form of money capital; property in the form of a claim on the company’s 
profits.” The option theory developed by Black and Scholes (1973), who prove that a 
                                                             
83 However, it is often argues that directors are too close to the management or without enough 
expertise and incentives to monitoring the management. To overcome this drawback of board, 
Gilson and Kraakman (1991) argue to form a professional outside director industry, which 
specializes in monitoring the corporate management. The board then may comprise three groups 
of directors: the inside management directors, the outside directors nominated by management and 
the professional outside directors.  
84  See Stout (2002) for detailed examination of the various defendant arguments for the 
shareholder primacy view.   
85 See Velasco (2010) for defend of the concept that shareholders are owners of the firm and the 
various derivative arguments.  
86 A more radical contractual view even rejects the firm as the “nexus”, see Gulati et al. (2000). 
87 For example, Fama (1980) points out that “the ‘ownership of the capital’ should not be 
confused with ownership of the firm.” 
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firm’s equity is equivalent to a call option on the firm having a strike price equal to 
the face value of outstanding debt, further undermines the concept that shareholders 
are owners. Hence, it is also legitimate to argue that the debt holders own the firm and 
issue a call option to corporate shareholders, who could buy the firm by paying out 
the outstanding debts (Blair and Stout, 2001).  
 
A more sophisticated argument put forward by the “nexus of contracts” model bases 
on efficient considerations. Shareholders are regarded as the sole residual claimants88 
in contrast to those constituencies hold fixed claims to corporations. They get paid 
after all other committed fixed claims, such as wages and salaries to employees and 
management, and interest and principal payments to bondholders, are met. Unlike 
other parties, the residual claimants lack such contractual protections.  
 
In addition, a rational shareholder will weigh the costs and benefits of making 
informed decisions on corporate issues. The costs of collecting information and 
participating in the decision process is high, considering the complex business 
problems involved in most public corporations. In contrast, the benefits of informed 
action are quite low and shared among shareholder group, if the shareholder is a 
minority one. 89  Thus, collective action and free ride problem will make them 
rationally apathetic, i.e. they would act passively and vote with their feet if they are 
not satisfied with the management.  
 
Hence, the ownership-like rights, the rights to elect directors and be the beneficiaries 
of the fiduciary duties90, are valued highest by shareholders due to their role in 
                                                             
88 The residual claimants are those constituencies in the firm, who bear the residual risks, which 
according to Fama and Jensen (1983a: 328), is the “difference between stochastic inflows of 
resources and promised payments to agents-is borne by those who contract for the rights to net 
cash flows.” 
89 Attenborough (2013) argues the British shareholders just fit into this framework.  
90 Macey (1998) argues that if the firm is seen as “nexus of contracts”, it would be inconsistent if 
the directors hold fiduciary duty only to shareholders, who are no different from other contractual 
parties of the firm. Hence, he suggests that fiduciary duties are only default rules and could be 
changed by contracts. 
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assuming the residual risks and passivity in corporate management. Through the 
hypothetical bargaining process, these rights should be allocated to shareholders who 
value such rights highest (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991; Coase, 1960)91. 
 
However, there are some self-contradictory features with respect to the nature of the 
firm assumed in the Chinese corporate law are in conflict. The Article 3 of the 
Company Law recognizes the legal personalhood of the company and the property 
rights it holds on its various assets. The article is in accord with the argument 
proposed by Blair and Stout (1999) that shareholders give up their property rights 
when the firm is incorporated. Such view is further illustrated by the Blair (2003), 
who argues that the locking of capital is a major feature of listed firms. As a result, 
shareholders no longer hold property rights over the assets of the firm, and should not 
own the firm. It is also counter-intuitive that an independent legal person can be 
owned by someone else. 
4.3.1.3 Criticisms of shareholder wealth maximization 
The efficient justifications are also criticized from several perspectives. Some 
commentators argue that dispersed ownership and passive shareholders are no longer 
valid assumption for the contemporary American stock market. Black (1990) argues 
against shareholder passivity, and points out that the institutional investors are 
growing more powerful and now actively involves in corporate management, who 
have the advantage of economy of scale due to their professionalizing in investment. 
Rock (2013) share the similar view that shareholdings are relatively concentrated, 
since the largest 100 money managers together hold nearly 60% of all stocks. It is 
time to worry about the governance of the coalition among these largest funds, which 
have significant influence on the decisions of listed firms.  
 
                                                             
91 Brudney (1985) doubts the efficiency of the shareholder bargain and points out that scattered 
stockholders cannot, and do not, negotiate with owners who go public over various terms of the 
contracts, so are they isolated from decisions as election of the directors. 
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In addition, considering the implicit contracts between the firm and its various 
constituencies, the shareholders do not seem to be the only residual claimants (Stout, 
2002). As noticed by Zingales (2000), for constituencies other than shareholder, they 
do not hold the contingent contracts specifying all the possible future outcomes, that 
is to say, their contracts are incomplete and their pay-off is also affected by the 
decisions of the corporation. It would be inappropriate to assume that they are 
indifferent to the management of the corporation, since they are not protected for all 
possible losses.  
 
Finally, Fisch (2005) argues that shareholder wealth maximization is a much narrower 
welfare concept than the valuation of the firm, and hence the treatment with 
shareholder wealth as the proxy for efficiency of CLG is inappropriate.92 Moreover, 
the commonly used proxy for shareholder wealth, the share price, in the empirical 
studies could be biased from the fundamentals of the listed firms. As noted by Stout 
(2005), the argument that stock markets are efficient, i.e. security prices always fully 
reflect all available information, is compromised by modern behavior finance 
studies.93 The limits of arbitrage due to noise trader or irrationality, may result in 
share prices biasing from the fundamental of the firm (Gilson and Kraakman, 2002). 
 
Shareholder wealth maximization could generate considerable negative effects on the 
society, especially when the management focuses on short-term profits that may erode 
the long-term growth prospect (Anabtawi, 2005; Stout, 2013). In some circumstances, 
the interests of stakeholders are in conflict with each other. Adler and Kahan (2013) 
point out that the interests of shareholders and those of creditors sometimes conflict. 
In addition, it has been recognized that shareholders exploit other constituencies 
                                                             
92  Stout (2005) also shares such view and regards the popularity of shareholder wealth 
maximization is a result of the long for an accurate, objective, and easy way to calculate corporate 
performance.  
93 The concept of efficient market is attributed to the Noble Price Laureate Eugene F. Fama. In a 
survey article, Fama (1970) discusses three forms of efficient markets. For weak form efficient 
market, the share prices incorporate all the historical information. For semi-strong form one, the 
share prices incorporate all the public information. For strong form one, the share prices 
incorporate all available information, even the private one.  
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contributing to the corporation by rejecting to honor the implicit contracts between 
firms and stakeholders in the situation of hostile takeover (Shleifer and Summers, 
1988).94 Finally, Armour and Gordon (2013) argue that companies with systemic 
importance focusing only on share prices may fail to take the negative costs they levy 
on other companies into consideration.  
 
Though shareholder primacy norm is regarded as an important norm in U.S., several 
commentators still finds it difficult to apply to other countries. Roe (2001) argues that 
shareholder primacy norm applied in U.S. has a root in its competitive product 
markets. For less competitive markets, directors trying to maximize the wealth of 
shareholders produce less than efficient amount and maintain the monopoly price, 
which results in welfare loss to the society. The inefficiency is not overcomed by 
competitive capital markets.  
4.3.2 Property rights theory of the firm and enlightened shareholder 
value 
A new concept of the objectives of corporate governance, ESV, deriving from 
shareholder wealth maximization becomes more popular in these years, which, 
according to Jensen (2001: 9), focuses “attention on meeting the demands of all 
important corporate constituencies, specifies long-term value maximization as the 
firm’s objective.” It recognizes that to maximize long-term value of the firm, 
managers need to tradeoff among the interests of corporate constituencies, which 
includes sacrificing short-term share prices. This view of maximization long-term 
value of the firm is congruent to the property rights theory of the firm. Though the 
theory is still contract in nature, it recognizes that the firm is comprised of the assets it 
owns. In addition to the physical assets, the organizational assets are also an important 
                                                             
94 Following the hostile takeover movement, a series of legislative acts authorizing directors to 
take the interests of stakeholders into consideration when they make decisions (entity conception) 
are adopted in 28 jurisdictions in U.S. (Allen, 1992: 276). See a debate on this issue. Green (1993) 
on “multi-fiduciary stakeholder”, and Bainbridge (1993) objects his idea, and argues for 
shareholder wealth maximization. 
4 The over-empowered controlling shareholder and the stagnant Chinese stock market 
126 
part of the firm, which provides a rationale to protection of the interests of 
stakeholders.  
 
The concept of property needs to be clarified first, which according to Honoré (1961) 
is the “greatest possible interest in a thing which a mature system of law recognizes”. 
There are two governance models of property rights, i.e. a bundle of in personam 
rights (henceforth in personam rights) and in rem rights (Merrill and Smith, 2001). 
The concept of “in personam rights” is contractual in nature, which is adopted by 
contemporary law and economic scholarship. Such view of the property rights directly 
specifies the governance of use rights between specified individuals, and is accredited 
to Coase (1960), who argues that where contracts between private parties are feasible, 
property rights serve as the baselines for the contractual arrangement, while contracts 
are infeasible, the property rights should duplicate the allocation of use rights that 
would be reached if contracts are feasible.  
 
However, Smith (2002) argue that just because Coase’s focus on bilateral disputes to 
simplify the model, the in personam rights concept abstract away from the "indefinite 
and numerous" feature of in rem rights, which is popular in civil law countries. In the 
in rem rights view, the property right governs the relationship between a person and a 
thing, and is conceived as the right in a thing good against the world, which facilitate 
the use and enjoyment of particular resources. As a result, the governance strategy 
takes two steps: first, it identifies the owner of the particular “things”, and second, the 
owner determines which individuals could enjoy which use rights of the “things”.95 
4.3.2.1 Property rights theory of the firm 
Though Coase (1937) suggests that haggling costs are avoided within the firm 
because bargaining is replaced by authority, he fails to provide the source of such 
                                                             
95 Chang and Smith (2013) compare the concept of property rights in both civil and common law 
system and argue that in civil law system with the in rem rights view, it is always important to 
indentify the owner of a thing, but in common law system with the in personam rights view, the 
notion of ownership could be extended to the holder of any interest.  
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authority and is criticized by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) who argue that the 
presumed power within the firm has no difference from that derived from the market 
contracts. Property rights model of the firm proposes that the source of the authority 
over internal hierarchy is due to the physical assets of the firm. The theory also has a 
contractual nature, yet differs from contractarian view of the firm, which views the 
firm as an empty concept. It starts from the assumption though contractual parties 
could reach agreements upon the division of the surplus ex post,96 these contracts are 
incomplete.  
 
The property rights model takes the in personam view, which is manifested in its 
treatment with the concept of ownership.97 Ownership is identical to the possession 
of residual rights of control over the asset, that is, “the rights to use the asset in any 
way except to the extent that specific rights have been given away in an initial 
contract (Hart, 1988: 124)”.98 So defined ownership influences the ex ante incentives 
to make firm-specific investments99, and hence the boundaries of the firm100. The 
party with ownership will make overinvestment because he could exploit the residual 
profits, while the parties being acquired will make under-investments to avoid 
exploitation by the owner.  
 
                                                             
96 The theory differs from the Transactional Costs Economics (TCE), which argues that the ex 
post opportunism is the major costs to market contracts. However, this difference is obscured by 
two recent works of Hart and Moore (2007) and Hart (2008), who integrate the non-contractible 
division of the ex post surplus. They distinguish between perfunctory performance (performance 
within the letter of the contract) and consummate performance (performance within the spirit of 
the contract). The difference between the two types of performance lies in that the former could be 
enforced by courts, while the latter not. As a result, the long-term contract becomes a reference 
point for contractual parties.  
97 It should be noticed that the concept of ownership involved in property rights model is different 
from the one in the sense of entitlement to an asset’s profit streams.  
98 The ownership is equivalent to the power to exercise control (Grossman and Hart, 1986), and 
confers the owner with the residual control rights to decide all usages of the asset in any way not 
inconsistent with a prior contract, custom, or law (Hart, 1995).  
99 The specific investments could be reciprocal: the owner of the assets needs agents with specific 
investments to manage the assets. Hence, once agents accumulated specific investments, and they 
may have power over the principal. 
100 The property rights model predicts that the party making important firm-specific investments 
should own the assets. 
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Without ownership, i.e. using market contracts, the firm could only fire the contractor 
together with the productive assets. But under integration, the firm could exclude the 
individual employee from the productive assets, and establish authority over these 
employees. Hart and Moore (1990: 1121) conclude that “a person will have more 
‘control’ over an asset’s workers if he employs them (i.e., owns the asset they work 
with) than if he has an arm’s-length contract with another employer of the workers.” 
The above theory leads to the view that the firm is a collection of physical assets (Hart 
and Moore, 1990). 
 
A related reflection of such theory in corporate law is what Hansmann and Kraakman 
(2000) propose as the “affirmative asset partitioning”, which argues that once 
incorporated, the corporate assets is separated from the personal assets of the 
shareholders, and the personal creditors of the shareholder are ranked behind the 
creditors of the corporation. Hansmann and Kraakman (2006) regards that the  
partition function facilitated the rise of organizational form, company. Armour and 
Whincop (2007) argue that such arrangement of corporate law gives the proprietary 
protection of corporate assets to restrict unauthorized dealings by those sharing the 
entitlements of ownership of assets. As a result, the firm is not an empty nexus, but 
holds proprietary rights over its assets. 
 
However, Rajan and Zingales (1998b) argue that the concept of ownership alone may 
induce negative effects on relationship-specific investment. If multiple agents are 
granted access to the assets, they will overinvest “in trying to grab the lucrative 
returns from the more critical or higher value added tasks A, while neglecting the 
socially necessary, but less rewarding, task B” (Rajan and Zingales, 1998b: 415). In 
contrast, they propose “access”101 as the way to allocate authority. The agents who 
get access to a particular asset get the opportunity to specialize their human capital in 
the resource and make themselves valuable. Hence, agents derive power from their 
                                                             
101 Access is defined as “the ability to use, or work with, a critical resource” (Rajan and Zingales, 
1998b). 
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relationship specific investment. In addition, the implicit contracts, which by 
definition are informal and could not enforceable by courts, involved in developing 
these “access” are important assets of the firm. As a result, the reputation for honoring 
such implicit contracts is important to form implicit contracts with other 
constituencies in future. 
 
Consequently, it is too narrow focusing only on the tangible assets (such as physical 
assets) and intangible assets, such as intellectual property or trademark as the sources 
of authority within the firm as advocated by Hart and Moore (1990). Rajan and 
Zingales (1998b) argue that the organizational assets due to these implicit contracts 
are important assets of the firm, which also generate authority over the contractual 
parties.102 The analysis broadens the concept of the entity to including the parties 
who have access to these assets into the corporate entity. Zingales (2000) regards the 
value of implicit contracts between the firm and its constituencies as the reason why a 
firm is worth more than the sum of all its component assets.  
4.3.2.2 Stakeholder interests  
As a result of the above discussion, it is obvious that the interests of stakeholders need 
to be considered to maximize the long-term value of the firm.103 Freeman et al. (2004: 
365) argue that the shareholder wealth maximization norm “involves using the prima 
facie rights claims of one group -shareholders- to excuse violating the rights of 
others.” The interests and benefits of all persons or groups with legitimate interests in 
a firm are equally important.  
                                                             
102 Earlier legal scholars have also emphasized the importance of organizational assets, for 
example, Bratton (1989: 411) comments on the contractual view of the corporate law and offers 
that “It includes not only the discrete, arms-length exchanges that constitute the new theorists’ 
corporation, but also the managerialists’ hierarchical structures.” 
103  Commentators supporting stockholder interests deem stakeholder-oriented corporate 
governance problematic. Macey (1993) summarizes the counter-argument to making stakeholders 
the beneficiaries of the director’s fiduciary duty. The stakeholder theory imposes too many 
masters over the directors. He points out that the rise of the stakeholder argument is in response to 
the tide of hostile-takeover during the 1980s, where the shareholders are winner at the expense of 
the stakeholders. Allen (1992) also shares the similar view, and regards the takeover movement 
puts forward a totally different issue from any day-to-day decision. 
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One of the problem facing the stakeholder theory is lack of a precise definition of the 
stakeholder. Freeman (1994: 46) defines the stakeholders as “any group or individual 
who can affect and is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objective.” 
This is a quite broad definition, which recognizes that the interests of all those 
affected by company’s decisions should be considered when such decisions are made. 
The stakeholders of a company includes, but not restricted to, shareholder group, and 
other parties, such as employees, suppliers, creditors, community, environment and 
the State. A much narrower definition only includes stakeholders “on which the 
organization is dependent for its continued survival” (Freeman and Reed, 1983: 
91).104  
 
Some of the commentators employ a dichotomy approach contrasting the interests of 
stakeholders and stockholders, which reflect the difference of the implicit models 
underlying the value creation. Stakeholder theory emphasizes that economic value is 
created by people who voluntarily come together and cooperate to improve 
everyone’s circumstance, which reflects the benefits of horizontal cooperation. As 
emphasized by Williamson (2005) that governance is concerned with maintenance of 
the going-concern value of contractual relations. Rather, the shareholder value 
maximization only focuses on the benefits of vertical cooperation within the firm. 
Freeman et al. (2004) point out that it is wrong to place the interests of shareholders 
in opposition to those of the stakeholders, as shareholders are still part of the 
stakeholders. Though in certain situations, the stockholders’ interests are in conflict 
with those of other corporate constituencies, most of the time they are in alignment. 
Corporate management catering the interests of stakeholders could make a large pie to 
share.  
 
                                                             
104 A more detailed framework employed to identify stakeholders is provided by Mitchell et al. 
(1997), which bases on the power, legitimacy and urgency of stakeholders to the corporation. 
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The interests of stakeholder is congruent to the model of the firm proposed by Rajan 
and Zingales (1998b), who argue that the firm comprises both the assets created by 
explicit contracts and organizational assets created by implicit contracts. This is a 
broader view of the firm based on the one developed by Grossman and Hart (1986) 
and Hart and Moore (1990), who argue that the physical assets comprising the firm 
generate authority to its owner, i.e. the shareholders holding residual control rights.  
4.3.2.3 The rise of enlightened shareholder value and its application in the 
Chinese corporate law 
The concept of ESV is actually a variant of shareholder wealth maximization, which 
takes the interests of stakeholders into consideration so as to maximize the long-term 
valuation of the firm. According to Harper Ho (2011), the central elements of ESV in 
U.K. are “ (i) an explicit focus on long-term shareholder value as the goal of the 
corporation; (ii) a requirement that corporate directors and officers consider the 
effects of their decisions on "extended stakeholder constituencies," financial and 
non-financial, that are referenced in Section 172; and (iii) a rejection of changes to the 
corporate decision-maker (i.e., the board with shareholder oversight) or the rules that 
give shareholders monitoring and enforcement rights not afforded to other 
stakeholders.”  
 
The legislature success of ESV is a response to a series of review of the Company 
Law in U.K. by the Company Law Review Steering Group, and the final report White 
Paper Modernising Company Law. In the White Paper, it explicitly stick to the 
traditional idea that the primary duty of a company director is to maximize value for 
the company’s shareholders. In addition to the shareholder value, it further argues that 
the interests of employees, customers, suppliers, and local residents, as well as the 
environment and public opinions, all had to be considered when judging what was in 
the interests of shareholders.105 
                                                             
105 The White Paper on Modernising Company Law (2002), pp.7 
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Such movement towards catering stakeholders’ interests successfully make the ESV 
in the section 172 of Companies Act 2006 in U.K., which define the general duty of 
directors.106 The section still gives priorities to the interests of its member, i.e. 
shareholders. However, the section requires that the shareholders as a group should 
benefit from the success of the firm, rather than any particular subgroup of 
shareholders. In addition, it recognizes that the success of the company depends on 
various inputs of its constituencies, whose interests should be considered when 
making decisions. To disclose the quality of directors following the Section 172, 
Section 417 in addition requires that directors must make a business report concerning 
how their duties under the section are performed.  
 
The protection of stakeholder interests also emerges in the rules of Chinese corporate 
law. The Article 43 of the 2002 Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies 
in China requires that directors should treat the interests of all shareholders equally, 
and pay attention to the interests of other stakeholders. Furthermore, the article 33 of 
Company Law mandates that directors hold fiduciary duties to the company and all its 
shareholders, and should maximize the interests of the company. A more fundamental 
question is how to define the interests of the company. According to the “nexus of 
contract” view of the firm, the company is a convenient concept, which holds no 
interests, and hence, it is impossible to maximize its interests. A more congruent view 
                                                             
106 Section 172 requires that “[A] director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good 
faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members 
as a whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters) to— 
(a)the likely consequences of any decision in the long term, 
(b)the interests of the company’s employees, 
(c)the need to foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, customers and others, 
(d)the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the environment, 
(e)the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of business conduct, 
and (f)the need to act fairly as between members of the company. 
(2)Where or to the extent that the purposes of the company consist of or include purposes other 
than the benefit of its members, subsection (1) has effect as if the reference to promoting the 
success of the company for the benefit of its members were to achieving those purposes. 
(3)The duty imposed by this section has effect subject to any enactment or rule of law requiring 
directors, in certain circumstances, to consider or act in the interests of creditors of the company.” 
Such arrangement explicitly recognizes the interests of constituencies other than shareholders. 
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of the interests of the company should be the ESV, which incorporate the interests of 
stakeholders in the path to maximize the long-term valuation of the firm. 
4.4 Means of corporate law and governance  
The means of corporate governance is crucial to achieve the ends mandated by the 
corporate law. In U.S., the governance system explicitly restricts the control of 
corporate affairs by shareholders, while in U.K., the internal governance arrangement 
is left to the articles of association. However, the Chinese corporate law mandates that 
shareholder meeting controls a broad spectrum of decisions, which is in sharp contrast 
to the board-centric corporate governance system adopted in U.S..107 Combined with 
its concentrated ownership structure, such arrangement entrenches the controlling 
shareholders and aggravates the agency problems between controlling shareholders 
and minority shareholders.  
 
The team production theory of the firm provides a solution to such problem. It argues 
that listed firms are separated entities from all their constituencies. Consequently, it is 
important to maintain the director’s authority over corporate affairs and its 
independence from corporate constituencies. To recover the confidence of outside 
investors in listed firms in China, it is critical to restrict the decision rights of 
shareholder meeting, or at least, adopt an enabling approach, which makes it possible 
for investors to opt-out shareholder control over corporate affairs. 
4.4.1 The team production model and director control 
The team production theory of the firm is contractual and congruent to the “nexus of 
contracts” view of the firm, but differs from the principal-agent theory in that it sees 
the team production as the central feature. It rests on the observation that productive 
                                                             
107 Not all scholars share the view that shareholder control should be restricted. McConvill (2007) 
argues that shareholder participation in corporate decisions is an end in itself rather than to pursue 
any ends mandated by corporate law. Shareholder participation becomes a rational choice and 
brings “authentic happiness” to shareholders.  
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activities often require combined investments and coordinated efforts of multiple 
individuals or groups. As a result, the metering problem and protection of specific 
investments of team members in the production process determines the nature of the 
firm rather than the minimization of agency costs (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; 
Williamson, 1971, 1985; Blair and Stout, 1999; Bainbridge, 2002a).108  
 
The team production model of CLG focuses on directors’ independence from 
corporate constituencies and maintenance of their discretions in making corporate 
decisions. Such arrangement is believed to encourage stakeholders to make 
firm-specific investments (Blair and Stout, 2006). There are two variants of the team 
production models, one by Blair and Stout (henceforth “Blair and Stout’s model”), 
and the other by Bainbridge (henceforth “Bainbridge’s model”). The two models 
differ in their attitude towards corporate personality and the objectives of the firm.  
4.4.1.1 Bainbridge’s team production model 
Bainbridge (2002a: 8) suggests that the corporation is “a vehicle by which the board 
of directors hires various factors of production. Hence, the board of directors is not a 
mere agent of the shareholders, as standard contractarian theory claims, but rather is a 
sui generis body-a sort of Platonic guardian-serving as the nexus for the various 
contracts making up the corporation.” Instead of being the agent of shareholders, the 
director embodying the corporate principal, serves as the nexus to the corporate 
contracts and hires various factors of production, which functions similar to the 
“Platonic guardian”.  
 
                                                             
108 Alchian and Demsetz (1972: 783) give an description of the ideal features of the party taking 
monitoring responsibility: “It is this entire bundle of rights: 1) to be a residual claimant; 2) to 
observe input behavior; 3) to be the central party common to all contracts with inputs; 4) to alter 
the membership of the team; and 5) to sell these rights, that defines the ownership (or the 
employer) of the classical (capitalist, free-enterprise) firm.” Blair and Stout (2001: 419) refer team 
production to complex productive activities that “require multiple parties to make contributions 
that are to some extent both team specific and unverifiable to an outside party, such as a court.” 
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The central idea of Bainbridge’s model lies in that corporate decisions should be 
made balancing the authority and accountability. He argues that decision rights should 
be allocated with the directors rather than other corporate constituencies.109 The 
authority and accountability tradeoff is first discussed by Arrow (1974), who suggests 
that centralized decision making process exploits the economy on the transmission 
and handling of information. Such view on decision making is extended by Dooley 
(1992), arguing that any corporate governance framework is a mixture of the 
Responsibility Model and Authority Model. The Authority Model requires that the 
agent directors are independent from any stakeholders of the firm, while the 
Responsibility Model stresses that principal’s interests should be properly protected, 
which sometimes lead to allocation of decision rights with shareholder group.  
 
The authority of decision-maker could be undermined if most of their decisions will 
be reviewed by a strict and continuous organ checking accountability, such as 
shareholder group. The locus of authority will be shifted from directors to 
shareholders. Bainbridge (2004) therefore argues that current American CLG system 
confirms the preference for maintaining authority in directors, which allocates the 
non-reviewable decision rights to directors. The business judgment rule protects the 
decisions of directors from challenges of the shareholders and courts unless certain 
preconditions are met. The arrangement concerns that judges are no better business 
man than professional directors, and hence should not be expected to make more 
efficient decisions. Usually, when judges make business decisions, they suffer from 
hindsight biases. 
 
Such model needs to reconcile the absolute authority with the accountability of the 
decision maker. Bainbridge (1993) argues that, to make directors accountable, the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm should be the objective of the firm. This 
                                                             
109 An alternative governance mechanism is the consensus and accountability, which allocates the 
decision rights to corporate shareholders. Such governance mechanism should function well given 
small number of shareholders having identical interests and information. 
4 The over-empowered controlling shareholder and the stagnant Chinese stock market 
136 
arrangement is similar to Alchian and Demsetz (1972)’s solution to team production 
by assigning the monitoring role to the residual claimants, who have strong incentives 
to maximize the corporate residual income. But shareholders’ power to interrupt 
should be restricted according to Bainbridge’s model.    
 
In addition, several internal and external governance mechanisms assure that 
decisions are made responsibly. First, the decision making function is performed by a 
group of directors rather than the sole director. It is well-accepted that group decision 
making is more accountable than that of individual, who usually suffers from bounded 
rationality, individual biases, and asymmetric information (Bainbridge, 2002a). The 
“mutual monitoring and peer pressure provide a coercive backstop for a set of 
interpersonal relationships founded on trust and other noncontractual social norms” 
(Bainbridge, 2002a: 28). Second, the competition in various markets will discipline 
the directors to make efficient decisions, such as the competition in capital and 
product markets, the internal and external employment markets of directors, and the 
market for corporate control.  
4.4.1.2 Blair and Stout’ team production model 
Blair and Stout’s model highlights the board of directors serving as the “mediating 
hierarchy”, which solves the team production problem of the public corporation and 
preserves firm-specific investments of corporate constituencies. 110  Alchian and 
Demsetz (1972) investigate the organizational team production, which features that it 
is only possible to meter the joint output of the team rather than each effort devoted 
by team member leading to team members shirking and free-riding other parties’ 
efforts. As a result, some parties have to specialize in monitoring the efforts of team 
members and reward them accordingly. The monitoring role hence is allocated with 
the residual claimants, who have strong incentives to maximize the residual income of 
                                                             
110 As Blair and Stout (1999) restrict their model to the group of public corporations, Meese (2001) 
criticizes their model for that the firm specific investments in public corporations have no 
difference from those in private firms, hence, it is inappropriate that principal-agent model suits 
the governance of private firms, while team production model public corporations. 
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the firm. In contrast, Holmstrom (1982) suggests an alternative solution to the moral 
hazard problem inherent in the team production, that is, “the problem of inducing 
agents to supply proper amounts of productive inputs when their actions cannot be 
observed and contracted for directly”, that an outsider balancing the budget for 
incentive schemes, which will force team members to reveal their private information 
on efforts. 
  
Another important feature of public corporation is that its success depends on various 
constituencies making firm-specific investments, which is central to the literature of 
TCE (Williamson, 1971, 1979, 1985). 111  TCE argues that the post-contractual 
opportunistic behaviors will deter contractual parties to make efficient 
relation-specific investment. As a result, it is highly expensive to use market contracts 
when these contracts have to be revised or renegotiated, since parties are locked-in 
due to the ex ante relation-specific investment and are difficult to switch to other 
contractual parties, which lead to haggling and exploitation of what Klein et al. (1978) 
refers as “quasi rents”.112 
 
Firm-specific investments are extremely vulnerable to exploitation facing the hostile 
takeover bids for the reason that the new controller seldom honors the implicit 
contracts between the firm and its various stakeholders, sometimes even deliberately 
break such contracts to make a profit (Shleifer and Summers, 1998). 113  The 
antitakeover defense, according to Stout (2002), increases the independence of 
                                                             
111 TCE explains the integration between different firms as reducing the costs of bilateral 
dependence. Since TCE assumes that parties can make efficient ex ante relation-specific 
investments, but cannot write complete contracts to divide the surplus, it then tries to explain the 
boundary of firms from the perspective of ex post governance of contracts (Gibbons, 2005; 
Williamson, 2002). Integration changes the economic governance between distinct economic units 
to corporate governance within one unit. 
112 The bilateral dependence or lock-in is due to the “Fundamental Transformation”, which is 
defined by Williamson (2002: 176) as “a subset of transactions for which large numbers of 
qualified suppliers at the outset are transformed into what are, in effect, small number of actual 
suppliers during contract execution and at the contract renewal.” 
113 The firm could adopt antitakeover defenses, such as poison pills or staggered board, which 
according to Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramania (2002) significantly reduce the successful 
probability of hostile takeover, and hence, the external monitoring of directors and the welfare of 
shareholders. The discussion on antitakeover defense is discussed in later sections in detail. 
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directors, and meanwhile protects such firm-specific investments and increases the 
wealth of shareholder ex ante.  
 
As a result, Blair and Stout (1999) argue that team members should give up their 
property rights on team inputs, which are transferred to and locked in these firms 
when they incorporate.114 “[B]y forming a corporation, the original team members all 
agree to give up control rights over the output from the enterprise and over their 
firm-specific inputs” (Blair and Stout, 1999: 277). In addition, directors are positioned 
as the “mediating hierarchy”, who is charged with “balancing the sometimes 
competing interests of a variety of groups that participate in public corporations” 
(Blair and Stout, 2001: 408). Such arrangement fits the theoretical model proposed by 
Rajan and Zingales (1998b), who state that allocation of control rights to one party to 
the contract empowers the “owner” to capture rents by exploiting other members’ 
firm-specific investments, rather than encouraging owners to make optimal 
investments. Instead, such exploitation will be alleviated if control rights are allocated 
to a party outside the team, who will distributes the surplus according to ther 
contributions.  
4.4.1.3 Director control in United Kingdom and United States 
As is discussed in the previous sections, the internal governance structure of listed 
firms features that the board of directors assumes the responsibilities on the 
management of the firm, while the shareholder meeting specializes in bearing the 
residual risks. Several commentators argue that such separation of ownership and 
control is the central characteristics of public corporation. For example, Stout, (2013: 
2005) characterizes the public corporation as “large, publicly listed company with 
professional management and dispersed shareholders”. And Acharya et al. (2011: 689) 
state that public corporation “is commonly viewed as an organization run by CEOs 
and monitored by a board of directors on behalf of shareholders.” Though the 
                                                             
114 The function of locking in capital is accredited to the increase of the popularity in organizing 
production with the organizational form of corporation (Blair, 2004).  
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shareholders hold de jure residual control over the firm, the board of directors are de 
facto controllers, as shareholders are rational apathy about corporate decisions.  
 
For those firms listed on U.S. markets, the formal authority over firms’ affairs is 
allocated with the board and senior management, while shareholders enjoy limited de 
jure control over the firm. Delaware code requires that the corporation’s business and 
affairs “shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors.”115 
Shareholders generally have control over the election of directors, amending the 
corporate charter, reincorporating in another state, merging with another company, 
sale of substantially all assets, and liquidation. 116  However, two institutional 
backgrounds make shareholder passive in participating the control of the firm. One is 
the dispersed ownership structure, the other is the obstacles the American corporate 
law lays towards shareholder voting.  
 
Thompson and Smith (2001) observe though shareholder hold legitimate authority 
over corporation decisions, they are actually difficult to make any such decisions. 
Black (1990:523) argues that institutional shareholders in particular are “hobbled by a 
complex web of legal rules that make it difficult, expensive, and legally risky to own 
large percentage stakes or undertake joint efforts.” The procedural and cost bearing 
rules are not on the shareholder’s side. For example, shareholders aiming to elect a 
director or vote on matters of the company’s business is a legitimate reason to inspect 
and copy shareholder lists. The board of directors could delay deliver the lists of 
shareholders to dissenting shareholders and fail to reimburse the costs of proxy fight 
of a losing dissident. Another example is the shareholders willing to add proposals to 
be voted on the shareholder annual meeting. They have to submit the proposal five 
months before the annual meeting.  
 
                                                             
115 See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001). 
116 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 211 (election of directors), 242 (charter amendments), 
251 (merger), 271 (sale of assets), 275 (liquidation) (1983 & Supp. 1988). 
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Though American corporate law adopts an enabling attitude towards shareholder 
control, i.e. it leaves the issues relating to internal governance to the corporate 
constitution, which is the result of the private bargaining of corporate constituencies, 
Danies and Klausner (2001) still find that including those firms with sophisticated 
investors, such as venture capitalists or leverage buyout specialists, around 24.5% of 
their sample adopts charter clauses that preclude shareholders from calling a special 
meeting and acting by written consent, which, according to agency theory, fails to 
maximize the valuation of the firm. Such observation is in accordance with the 
concept that directors serving as the “mediating hierarchy”, which explains the 
anomalies of American corporate law that could not be appropriately explained by the 
principal-agent model.117 
 
In contrast, the legislature in U.K. builds a more supportive environment to 
shareholder control, though it still recognizes that directors is in the central of 
corporate management. The Article 3 of the 2013 Model Articles for Public 
Companies in U.K. adopts a default rule concerning the authority of directors and 
allocates directors with the power to manage the company’s business and for this 
purpose “they may exercise all the powers of the company”. The Section A.3 of the 
Combined Code for Corporate Governance 2006 in U.K. explicitly addresses the 
board balance and independence. It requires that “the board should include a balance 
of executive and non-executive directors (and in particular independent non-executive 
directors) such that no individual or small group of individuals can dominate the 
board’s decision taking.” Hence, the controlling shareholders or shareholder groups 
should not be expected to dominate the decision process. The British corporate law 
adopts an enabling approaches towards the internal governance of the firm, with the 
                                                             
117 Blair and Stout (2006) summarize such anomalies, which includes “(1) the corporate law does 
not grant shareholders the legal rights of principals nor burden directors with the legal obligations 
of agents; (2) corporate law does not treat shareholders of solvent firms as sole residual claimants; 
(3) far from being an empty fiction, legal personality is a key feature of the corporate form; and (4) 
corporate law does not impose any obligation on directors to maximize shareholder wealth”. 
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default rules as director control, and leaves it open to the arrangements of articles of 
association as a result of private bargaining.  
4.4.2 Means of corporate governance in China 
4.4.2.1 Shareholder control  
Though concentrated ownership in China bring value to the firm through its 
monitoring activities, which reduces the agency costs between shareholder and 
directors, Edmans (2014) cautions that they could reduce corporate value through 
their ex ante negative effects on managerial initiatives and reducing the liquidity of 
the stock.118 In addition, there is no guarantee that block shareholders maximize the 
value of the firm rather than their private benefits. The corporate governance practice 
seems to confirm such concern with self-interested block holders. The corporate law 
in China still maintains a mandatory regime, which involves high regulation of the 
State, though it has been improving since the last revision of the Company Law in 
2006. A huge proportion of the management role is mandatorily assumed by 
shareholder meeting, of which the most important is the decision of operation 
strategies and investment plans. The arrangement partially reflects the government’s 
wishes to realize its political goals through the SOEs.  
 
As is mandated in the Article 37 of the Company Law 2006, the shareholder meeting 
of the listed companies maintain the general authority over the firm, including both 
the rights to raise finance and make investment. To fully provide guidance about the 
authority, Article 38 of the Company Law 2006 explicitly cites 10 items that 
shareholder meeting has authority over, in addition to other items mandated in the 
articles of association.119  The allocation of corporate-law-based power between 
                                                             
118 See Hutchison and Alley (2009) for a criticism on shareholder activism, which is regarded to 
bring huge costs to the firms borne ultimately by shareholders themselves. 
119 The article 38 of Company Law allocates with shareholder meeting the formal authorities on 
the following decisions: “(1) determining the company’s operation guidelines and investment 
plans; (2) electing and changing the director and supervisors assumed by non-representatives of 
the employees, and determining the matters concerning their remuneration; (3) deliberating and 
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directors and shareholders is reciprocal. When decision-making authority resided in 
shareholders increases, those in directors decreases, and vice versa.  
 
In addition, the concentrated ownership structure reinforces the formal power enjoyed 
by shareholder meeting, which is most prominent in the decision rights of appointing 
personnel. Lin (2012) also notices that the State actively involves in naming or 
replacing management, which could not be the fittest candidate for the job. The 
concentrated ownership structure combined with the mandatory extensive authorities 
resided in the shareholder meeting makes it easy for controlling shareholder pass 
resolutions harming the interests of minority shareholders.  
 
A case in point reflecting the tight control of dominant shareholders on affairs of the 
listed firms and its detrimental effects on corporate performance is the astonishing 
fundraising plan of a Chinese company Ping An (601318) on 21 January 2008, which 
tries to raise 160 billion yuan without any investment plan. Though the retailing 
shareholders rejected the proposal and voted with their feet, resulting around 1/3 drop 
in the stock prices, the shareholder meeting still pass the proposal with 92% voting 
yes. In another event study conducted by Zeng et al. (2011), the authors find that in 
the split share reform initiated in 2005, in which non-tradable share owners must 
compensate tradable share owners in order to transfer their previously non-tradable 
shares to tradable one, the controlling shareholders successfully collude with 
institutional block shareholders to reduce the compensation ratio of the passed 
proposals, which should be approved by at least two-thirds of all shareholders, who 
participate in shareholder meetings and two-thirds of tradable shares owners, who 
vote. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
approving the reports of the board of directors; (4) deliberating and approving the reports of the 
board of supervisors or the supervisor; (5) deliberating and approving annual financial budget 
plans and final account plans of the company; (6) deliberating and approving profit distribution 
plans and loss recovery plans of the company; (7) making resolutions on the increase or decrease 
of the company’s registered capital; (8) making resolutions on the issuance of corporate bonds; (9) 
adopting resolutions on the assignment, division, change of company form, dissolution, 
liquidation of the company; (10) revising the articles of association of the company; (11) other 
functions as specified in the articles of association.” 
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Shareholder control imposes great agency costs on listed firms. Both academics and 
legislatures have been knowing the high agency costs of concentrated ownership 
structure, especially those due to governmental shareholding. The Chinese legislature 
also attempts to constrain such costs. The Article 8 of 2005 Notice of the State Council 
on Approving and Forwarding the Opinions of China Securities Regulatory 
Commission on Improving the Quality of Listed Companies (2005 Notice) explicitly 
recognizes that improving the independence of listed firms from its controlling 
shareholders or actual controllers is crucial to the improvement of quality of corporate 
governance. Following the spirit of the 2005 Notice, CSRC issues the Administrative 
Measures for the Initial Public Offering and Listing of Stocks (Administrative 
Measures) in 2006, which provide several more detailed standards concerning the 
independence of the listed firms. The entire Section 2, from article 14 to article 20, of 
the Administrative Measures requires that the firms intending to list on the stock 
markets to have independent assets, personnel, financial accounts, agents and business. 
Such regulation on the controlling shareholders and actual controllers is shared by the 
2010 Guidance of the Behavior of Controlling Shareholders and Actual Controllers of 
Listed Firms issued by Shanghai Stock Exchange. The Chapter 2 of the Guidance 
concerning the corporate governance mandates that controlling shareholders and 
actual controllers should behave themselves and not impair the independence of the 
listed firms. 
4.4.2.2 The failure of independent directors monitoring 
Another important attempt to increase the independence of listed firms is the 
introduction of system of independent directors, which is expected to guard interests 
of the company and its retail shareholders.120 There are some weak evidence that 
independent directors could constrain the tunneling activities of the controlling 
                                                             
120 Chinese corporate law adopts a dual board system, which resembles that in German listed 
firms. The supervisory board system is established by the 1993 Company Law and expected to 
carry out the monitoring function.  
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shareholders. Dahya et al. (2008), in a cross country study, find that the fraction of 
independent directors reduces the propensity of controlling shareholders undertaking 
related-party transaction. In 2002, CSRC publish its Guiding Opinion Concerning the 
Establishment of an Independent Directors’ System in Listed Companies (Opinion), 
which aims to improve the quality of corporate governance of Chinese listed firms 
and build the independent director system in China. The Opinion mandates that at 
least 1/3 of the directors of listed companies should be independent directors.121  
 
The Article 1 of Section 1of the Opinion gives a definition of the independent director 
that “a director who does not hold any position in the company other than director and 
who has no relationship with the listed company engaging him or its principal 
shareholders that could hinder his making independent and objective judgments.” In 
addition, the Section 3 of the Opinion gives a detail description on the restrictions of 
persons being directors of listed firms aiming to provide detailed criterion of 
independence, which includes “(i) a person who holds a position in the listed 
company or its subordinate affiliates as well as the direct relatives of, and those with 
important social connections to, the former; (ii) a person, or the direct relative of a 
person, who directly or indirectly holds at least 1% of the company’s stock or is 
among the top ten shareholders of the company; (iii) a person, or the direct relative of 
a person, who is employed by an entity that directly or indirectly holds at least 5% of 
the company’s stock or is among the top five non-natural person shareholders of the 
company; (iv) a person about whom any of the above conditions have been met within 
the last year; (v) a person who supplies accounting, legal, consulting, or other similar 
services to the company or its subordinate affiliates; (vi) any other person specified in 
                                                             
121 Article 1 to 3 of Section 4 of the Opinion provides a procedure for electing independent 
directors. First, any of the (i) incumbent member of the board of directors; (ii) incumbent member 
of the board of supervisors; or (iii) a shareholder who owns more than one percent equity interest, 
could nominate candidates for independent directors. Second, the listed firm should file the 
nomination documents to CSRC, while CSRC maintains the rights to reject such nomination. 
Third, the approval will be made by resolution of the shareholder meeting.  
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the company’s articles of association; and (vii) any other person specified by the 
CSRC.”122 
 
The independent directors are protected from discretionary removal to maintain its 
independence. It is relatively difficult to remove the independent directors prior to the 
expiration of his term of office without good reasons. Article 5 of Section 4 of the 
Opinion mandates special disclosures for dismissal of independent directors, and 
independent directors dismissed could make declarations, both of which are negative 
sign for the internal governance system of the listed firms, and could affect the share 
prices negatively. However, the pure independence has no guarantee for good 
corporate performance, since completely independent directors are hard to get inside 
information.  
 
A more relevant concept with respect to safeguarding the interests of minority 
shareholders is the disinterested directors, which is introduced to curb the power of 
controlling shareholders or actual controllers in arranging transactions with conflict of 
interests, for example, transactions between “a corporation and one of its directors or 
officers, or between a corporation and another entity in which one of its directors or 
officers has an interest, or the taking by corporate officers of business opportunities 
that arguably belong to the corporation” Clarke (2006: 165). It is worthy noticed that 
independent directors could be interested, if, for example, the transaction is between 
the listed firm and another entity that the independent director has an interest. 
 
                                                             
122 It should be noticed that according to the Section 3 of the Opinion, not all non-executive 
directors, who are not members of the senior management team, are independent directors. For 
example, if the non-executive directors hold relationship with the listed company or its principal 
shareholders, which could impair their independent judgment, they may not be classified as 
independent directors. See Clarke (2007) for a detailed discussion on the definition of 
independence, which point out that 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires that the independent 
directors serving in the audit committee in American listed firms is not allowed to “(i) accept any 
consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from the issuer; or (ii) be an affiliated person of 
the issuer or any subsidiary thereof” (Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
78j-l(m)(3)(B))) 
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Though the independent director system in China is expect to guard interests of 
minority shareholders against the exploitation of corporate insiders, it is unlikely to 
achieve such goals and bring value to the firm.123 It is possible that self-interested 
corporate insiders could appoint independent directors to bond themselves to effective 
external monitoring, so as to reduce the firm’s cost of capital and make it more 
competitive with other firms and thus more likely to survive. Such voluntary 
incentives are weak considering the high private benefits of control.  
 
Under current situation, independent directors seeking for selection need to obtain 
support from controlling shareholders (Chao, 2006). Though shareholders holding 
more than 1% stakes could nominate independent directors, according to Article 1 of 
Section 4 of the Opinion, the nomination have to be approved by shareholder meeting, 
which is controlled by dominant shareholders. As a rational entity, the controlling 
shareholder will not approve dissenting independent directors against their private 
benefits, which will lead to implicit dependence of independent directors’ successful 
elections on controlling shareholders, who should be monitored by independent 
directors.  
 
The independent directors generally lack appropriate incentives, i.e. they face little 
changes in costs and benefits if their efforts change, which is crucial to monitor the 
management effectively and guard the interests of retailing shareholders against 
exploitations of corporate insiders. The corporate law employs a system of liability to 
motivate directors, i.e., the directors are hold liable if they violate the fiduciary duties 
to the company and all its shareholders mandated by Article 33 of Company Law. 
However, as the definition of the fiduciary duty is extremely vague in Chinese 
corporate law, the independent directors are seldom hold liable for their negligent 
monitoring. In addition, it is extremely difficult to prove that directors have done 
                                                             
123 The empirical studies provide no solid evidence that independent directors bring value to listed 
firms, though executive directors with proper incentives are proven to bring value to the firm 
(Bhagat and Black, 2001). 
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violation other than in the situation of conflict interests, and the insurance 
successfully protect directors from most of liabilities (Hamdani and Kraakman, 2007).  
 
The reward system is another important mechanism to provide appropriate incentives 
to independent directors, which align the interests of directors with those of the listed 
firms and is seen as the solution to director governance.124 According to the Article 5 
of Section 7 of the Opinion, independent directors should be paid with fixed 
allowance, the amount of which is formulated by the board meeting and approved by 
shareholder general meeting. If the payroll of the directorship is the major benefits to 
independent directors, then they should be responsible to the interests of those that 
can reelect them.125 In the current situation of China, the power is resided in either 
controlling shareholders or the government bureaucrats. Hence, it is difficult to 
imagine such arrangement could be an effective mechanism to protect the interests of 
the firm and minority shareholders. Clarke (2006: 150) has already notice the 
difficulty to solve the problem with active state shareholders: “[T]hus, as long as state 
policy requires the state to stay as an active investor in firms of which it is not the sole 
shareholder, meaningful legal protection for minority shareholders is going to mean 
either constraints on the state’s ability to do precisely those things for which it 
retained majority ownership, or else a de facto separate legal regime for enterprises in 
which the state is the dominant shareholder.” 
 
In addition, the legislature in China forbids independent directors to own significant 
proportion of shares, which aims to distinguish the incentives of independent directors 
from those of shareholder directors. The Opinion rejects the independency of directors 
if they hold more than 1% of the share outstanding, or among the largest ten 
                                                             
124 Hamdani and Kraakman (2007) caution that in the short run, equity holdings will reduce the 
incentives of directors to investigate and disclose wrongdoings, since it will depress the share 
price. They propose a novel system, reverse negligent, which takes a rewarding perspective and 
provides benefits to those directors who prove to satisfactorily discharge their obligations of 
monitoring senior management. 
125 Zhao (2011) argues that the payroll of the boardroom job is highly important to some of 
independent directors, such as academic scholars, whose salary is paid in accordance with that of 
civil servants, and far less than that of the payment from the position of independent directors.  
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shareholders. This is in contrast with the proposition held by American corporate law, 
which, according to Clarke (2007), stipulates that five to ten percent of shareholding 
is not regarded as the reason to challenge independency. This could be attributed to 
the concern that due to the concentrated ownership, the independence of the directors 
could be impaired by significant share ownership, as it is easy for independent 
directors with block shareholding to collude with the controlling shareholders.  
 
As a result, it is difficult for independent directors to act independently and guard 
interests of minority shareholder against exploitations by corporate insiders, such as 
self-dealing transactions. For example, a common strategy employed in continental 
Europe countries, i.e. countries with listed firms having concentrated ownership 
structure, to deal with transactions with conflict of interests, is mandatory procedures, 
where independent directors are highly involved (Conac et al., 2008). The Article 1 of 
Section 5 of the Opinion explicitly requires the independent directors as the watchdog 
for significant related-party transactions, which should be approved by them before 
submitting to the board of directors. However, independent directors that always 
challenge the transaction preferable to the controlling shareholders will be hardly 
elected.  
4.4.3 Rematch the means with the ends in Chinese corporate law 
The discussion of means and ends of CLG is crucial to facilitate the stock market 
development in China. Its current model, that shareholder control over the firm for the 
benefits of shareholder, is not efficient in achieving good corporate governance 
practice, since it overemphasizes the principal-agent relationship in the firm. 
According to Eisenberg (1998), the firm has dual nature, on one hand, it is a 
contractual organization, congruent to principal-agent model; on the other, it is 
bureaucratic hierarchical organization, congruent to the team production model. It 
should be noticed that the controlling shareholder is not a vulnerable party in 
corporate governance framework, who has already gained protection through its 
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concentrated shareholding. This is in sharp contrast to the listed firms in 
Anglo-Saxons countries, which have dispersed ownership. The outside investors hold 
small stakes in the firm and are weak compared to management.  
 
As a result, the mandatory ends of corporate law to maximize shareholder value, 
which is sometimes inappropriately interpreted as maximizing share prices, aggregate 
the problem of corporate governance. The overweight interests of shareholders 
actually increase the already significant power of controlling shareholders, which lead 
to maximizing the wealth of controlling shareholders rather than that of the valuation 
of the firm. Based on the argument of rational apathy, minority investors should pay 
no attention to the control rights allocated with the shareholder meeting. 
 
The ESV, that is, the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders are crucial in 
achieving maximization of long-term valuation of the firm, has gained success in the 
British corporate law, which tries to balance the interests of various corporate 
constituencies. Meanwhile, Chinese corporate law also recognizes the importance of 
stakeholders’ interests, both of which reflect adjustments towards balancing the 
feature of team production and that of principal-agent relationship. Blair and Stout 
(2001) refer the central feature of the team production to firm-specific investments 
and on-going value of the firm, which are hard to be verified by outside parties. 
Therefore, corporate constituencies making firm-specific investment, for example, 
employees and consumers, also hold residual claims over the firm, though a 
significant part of their payoff is fixed (Stout, 2002). To exploit the benefits of team 
production, it is important to protect these firm-specific investments.  
 
To protect such non-contractual firm-specific interests, shareholder control is not a 
good choice, as for minority shareholders, they rationally pay no attention to 
management of firms’ affairs, and for controlling shareholders, they maximize their 
private benefits. Blair and Stout (1999) propose a director control model, in which the 
board of directors serves as the “mediating hierarchy” independent from all the 
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corporate constituencies including shareholders. Such model, in contrast, emphasizes 
the team production feature of the firm, while overlooks the principal-agent problem. 
Directors without any constraint will absolutely try to maximize their own benefits 
rather than protect firm-specific investments and maximize the valuation of the firm. 
 
Considering the dual nature of the firm, the corporate governance model should 
balance its features of accountability and authority (Arrow, 1974; Dooley, 1992; 
Bainbridge, 2002b). The principal-agent model maintains that directors are 
accountable to the principal shareholders, which reduces their authority over the 
management of the firm, while in contrast, team production model argues for absolute 
director authority, while fails to hold directors accountable. The current Chinese CLG 
model put overwhelming weight on the accountability of directors to shareholder 
principal, which undermines the authority of directors.  
 
As is discussed in previous sections, the corporate law allocates the de jure authority 
to the shareholder meeting. For the real authority, the concentrated ownership 
structure guarantees that shareholder meeting is controlled by dominant shareholders 
under current voting schemes.126 The controlling shareholder with significant stakes 
to decide corporate affairs have enough incentives to collect information to maximize 
their personal wealth, hence to maintain real authority over the firm. As a result, 
controlling shareholders maintain both the formal and real authority.  
 
Though enjoying a significant control over the firm, the controlling shareholders only 
bear general duties that they should not exploit interests of the firm and other 
investors.127 Such duties are often too vague to be enforced by dissenting investors. 
                                                             
126 The Article 104 of the Company Law mandates that to pass a resolution, there must be more 
than half of the voting rights presented in the shareholder meeting in favor of such resolution, 
while for a special resolution, the quorum is two thirds.   
127 Hopt et al., (2011) points out that the French corporate law imposes fiduciary duties on 
controlling shareholders, while the American, Italian and Swiss corporate law shy from such 
arrangement.  
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In addition, considering that Chinese courts are not willing to accept such cases, the 
controlling shareholders bear little risk to exploit the minority shareholders.128  
 
Nevertheless，such real authority is important for directors to make firm-specific 
investments, such as collecting enough information to make the efficient decisions. 
Baker et al. (1999) argue that the formal authority is always held by the principal 
shareholder, while the real authority is occasionally delegated to the agent directors 
informally, which could be retracted by principal controlling shareholders at will. As 
such informal contracts are never enforceable by external authorities, the principal 
needs to establish the reputation that such delegation will not be retracted so as to 
encourage the agent director to invest. However, it seems that the controlling 
shareholders have little interest to establish the reputation that directors have real 
authority. 
 
Imagine that directors expect that whatever decisions they make will be overturned by 
shareholder meetings, or should be approved by shareholder meetings, it is rational 
for them to cater to the preference of controllers, instead of making the efficient 
choice, as controllers of shareholder meetings will discharge their fiduciary 
obligations. In the current circumstances, such controllers are controlling shareholders 
for private firms and civil servants of local and central governments for SOEs, who 
prefer their private benefits rather than those of the firm. 
 
As a result, to balance the authority and accountability it is important to reorganize 
the internal governance structure of the firm and restore the key feature of the public 
corporations, i.e. specialization and separation of the decision roles and residual risk 
bearing roles. The arrangement is in accordance with the framework proposed by 
                                                             
128 In 2001, the Supreme People’s Court issues a notice that requires courts to decline the appeals 
of civil cases arising from market misconducts in Chinese stock markets. See Zuigao Renmin 
Fayuan Guanyu She Zhengquan Minshi Peichang Anjian Zanbuyu Shouli De Tongzhi [The Notice 
of the Supreme People’s Court on Declining of Civil Tort Dispute Cases Arising from Market 
Misconducts on the Securities Market] (Sep. 21, 2001). 
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Fama and Jensen (1983b), who argue that the decision process could be decomposed 
into the decision management function and decision control function. For small and 
medium enterprises, decision management function is delegated to subordinate 
managers and the residual claimants maintain the decision control role. However, 
such governance structure no longer suits the large public corporations with dispersed 
ownership structure, and residual risk bearing should be separated from decision 
rights. 
 
In most countries with one tier board, the internal governance model with respect to 
the decision rights is as follows: The management decisions are allocated with the 
executive board members, who are often the senior managers, while the 
non-executive directors and independent directors maintains the control decisions. In 
contrast, in countries with two tier board, the management decision is allocated with 
management board and the control decision is allocated with the supervisory board. 
Such arrangements have the efficiency gains due to the fact that decision agents no 
longer have to be those with both wealth and willingness to bear the risks and 
specialized knowledge, and the risk bearer could enjoy the benefits of diversification.  
 
A moderate step towards restructuring of the internal governance of listed firms is to 
change the mandatory regime of corporate law with respect to division of authority 
between shareholder meeting and board of directors to a default regime. The default 
regime allows listed firms evolve towards the model of director control under market 
competitions. The default regime avoids the “one-size-fit-all” internal governance 
structure, which kills the possibility of evolving to more efficient arrangement 
incentivized by the needs to survive in the product market competition. 
4.5 Conclusion  
This Chapter reviews the means and ends of corporate governance system in China, 
which are compared with those of American and British system that exert great 
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influence on the Chinese corporate law system. The literature has already noticed the 
complex ownership structure of listed firms in China, which differs from the 
dispersed ownership structure in Anglo-Saxons countries. Generally speaking, a large 
proportion of the listed firms are controlled by the State, while an increasing number 
of firms are controlled by private parties. These two types of firms suffer from 
different agency problems: For SOEs, the agency problem exists between controllers 
(government officials and management) and minority shareholders, and for private 
firms, the problem exists between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders.  
 
The Chinese CLG system features with ends of shareholder wealth maximization and 
means of shareholder control, which contributes to the bear market in recent years. 
Though shareholder wealth maximization is still an influential criteria for corporate 
governance, it imposes great costs on listed firms. A new concept, ESV, which has 
already been written into the Company Act in U.K., gains attention in both academics 
and practice. It regards the long term valuation of the firm as the objectives of the 
firm and argues that to achieve such ends, the interests of corporate constituencies 
should be taken into consideration.  
 
Given the ownership structure of the Chinese listed firms, the shareholder control as 
mandated by corporate law proves to be an inappropriate arrangement, which 
entrenches the controlling shareholders and makes it easy for them to exploit the 
interests of minority shareholders. Though the legislature and regulators in China tries 
to increase the independence of listed firms through establishing the modern 
independent directors system, it proves to be futile as the independent directors lack 
incentives to guard interests of minority shareholders against exploitation of 
controlling shareholders. The problem lies in overweight of accountability of agent 
director to shareholder principle, which overlooks the team production feature of 
corporate governance. To fix such problem, the Chapter proposes a move from the 
mandatory division of power between shareholder meeting and board meeting to the 
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default regime. Market competition will drive listed firms to opt-out inefficient 
requirements and opt-into more efficient internal governance system.
5 Conclusion 
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5 Conclusion 
The last decades witnesses the rise of the law and finance scholarship, which argues 
that legal institutions are fundamental to financial development, and is built on a 
series of empirical studies carried out by LLSV and their coauthors. As legal origins 
are no longer valid instruments, the First Chapter performs a global sensitivity 
analysis to test the robustness of cross-country relationship between shareholder 
protection rules “on the book” and stock market outcomes. The study employs 26 
variables having theoretical predicative power for stock market outcomes and applies 
the BMA algorithm to the specification used by DLLS (2008). The analysis finds that 
the established positive relationship between the anti-self-dealing rules and stock 
market development are fragile and no longer significant. Another interesting 
observation is that the significance of the doubtful variables is different across 
regressions with different outcome variables. The result indicates that the usually 
adopted “one-size-fit-all” specification strategy with respect to different 
characteristics of stock market is inappropriate. 
 
The Second Chapter pays special attention to IPO markets and presents a simple 
model to investigate if the rules of minority shareholder protection affect firms’ 
decision to issue external finance homogenously. The level of minority shareholder 
protection influences firms’ decisions through two channels: The lower costs of 
external finance and the higher costs of insider control. Using the dynamic panel 
specification and GMM-sys estimator, this Chapter confirms that the minority 
shareholder protection could impose heterogeneous effects on stock market outcomes. 
The additional costs imposed on controllers of private firms reduce their incentives to 
undertake IPO, while the decreased costs of external finance facilitate listed firms to 
make seasoned offering.  
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The Third Chapter examines the corporate governance reform in China against the 
background of law and finance movement. To boom its stock market, the legislature 
and regulators in China actively transplant best practice from Anglo-Saxons countries, 
which emphasize minority shareholder protection. However, the ownership structure 
of listed firms in China is quite different from that in Anglo-Saxons countries, with 
the governments and private parties as the controllers. The corporate law in China 
mandates that firms should maximize the wealth of shareholders, though ESV 
becomes noticed and interests of stakeholders are considered to achieve maximization 
of long-term valuation of the firm. However, to achieve such ends, the corporate law 
allocates the control rights with the shareholder meeting, which combined with 
concentrated ownership entrenches the controlling shareholders. The mismatched 
means and ends of corporate law is the fundamental weakness of the corporate 
governance of listed firms, which should be corrected in order to facilitate better 
corporate governance practice. As a result, the Chapter proposes a default regime with 
respect to the internal governance system instead of the mandatory one. Such enabling 
approach leaves space for market competition and make it possible for listed firms to 
opt out inefficient arrangements.  
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